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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation examines the contrasting development outcomes among 
countries in the Global South that depend on revenue from oil and mineral exploitation. 
According to the conventional “resource curse” perspective, developing countries rich in 
oil and minerals paradoxically suffer from poverty and underdevelopment. However, a 
closer look at these economies reveals substantial variation in their levels of economic 
and social development. Drawing on theories of globalization, development, and political 
sociology, this dissertation addresses: Why do some oil- and mineral-dependent 
developing countries end up with relatively high levels of development while others 
remain underdeveloped? To answer this question, my research uses a multimethod 
research design involving three phases and both quantitative and qualitative methods. The 
first phase draws on evidence from quantitative cross-section time-series regression 
analysis using national development data on 26 oil- and mineral-dependent developing 
countries for the period from 1985 to 2010. For the second phase, I conduct an in-depth 
comparative-historical analysis of two similar oil-rich developing countries with 
divergent development outcomes – Trinidad and Tobago, and Gabon – using more than 
	  	   ix 
100 national documents and secondary sources that I collected during 13 months of 
fieldwork. In the third phase, I conduct abbreviated case studies of three mineral-
dependent developing countries – Guyana, Niger, and Zambia – using secondary data. 
My explanation for why some countries outperform others consists of two nested claims. 
First, I find that strong state institutions matter the most for economic and social 
development, but, unlike previous studies, I also show that the negative impacts of 
dependence on foreign direct investment and foreign debt on development cannot be 
ignored. Therefore, the divergence in outcomes among these countries depends on a 
particular constellation and intersection of local and global factors. Second, the 
construction of strong state institutions is not solely driven by the legacies of European 
colonial agents, as is often cited in existing literature, but rather, by the strength of local 
labor movements. My dissertation thus provides critical intervention into broader debates 
within the development literature about the relative roles of natural resources, domestic 
political conditions, and global economic structures in effecting development.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
NATURAL RESOURCES, STATES, AND DEVELOPMENT 
 
Introduction 
Among the diverse experiences across the developing world since the Second 
World War, developing countries that are rich in natural resources stand out. In the years 
following independence from colonial rule, there was a considerable amount of 
excitement and optimism both for and within these countries. In the 1950s and 1960s, 
prominent economists predicted that resource-rich countries would have the revenues to 
invest in infrastructure, schools, and other public services - revenues that resource-poor 
countries lacked. This would enable them to leap forward in terms of industry and 
development (Innis 1956; Lewis 1955; North 1955; Rostow 1959; Viner 1953; Watkins 
1963). Hypothetically, the increases in per capita income should have brought a 
commensurate expansion in political rights, enfranchisement, and voice and 
accountability for all citizens (Lerner 1958; Lipset 1959).  
However, that optimism soon turned to despair. Fifty years later, an 
overwhelming number of academics, international agencies, nongovernmental 
organizations, the popular media, and even state officials have come to believe that these 
countries are suffering from a “resource curse.” This is a condition whereby countries 
seemingly blessed with enormous wealth from natural resource production and exports, 
paradoxically, experience economic underdevelopment. Specifically, they experience 
slower or negative economic growth (Auty 1993; Gelb et al. 1988; Gylfason et al. 1999; 
Leite and Weidmann 1999; Neumayer 2004; Sachs and Warner 1995, 2001; Wheeler 
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1984), lower per capita incomes (Auty 2001), poverty and low human development (Ross 
2003); high unemployment, inflation and external debt (Nankani 1979); and more civil 
strife (Ballentine 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 1998, 2004, 2005; Reynal-Querol 2002, 
Ross 2004). This is particularly true for countries with abundant oil and minerals deposits 
(Isham et al. 2005). Nigeria and Sierra Leone are archetypal examples of the curse. In the 
case of the Nigerian state, despite receiving a total of about US$350 billion in oil 
revenues in the thirty-five years since 1965, the per capita GDP has barely changed, 
suggesting that oil wealth had little impact on the average quality of life for most 
Nigerians (Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian 2003:4-5). Similarly, diamond mining in 
Sierra Leone did not bring prosperity to that nation. Instead, it is associated with a 
decade-long civil war - “a tragedy of major humanitarian, political and historical 
proportions” (Smillie 2010:95). 
Why do natural resources inhibit development? Traditional research on the 
resource curse shows that oil and minerals were a developmental curse because they 
transfigure and cause havoc in the economic and political realms. Those focusing on the 
economic impacts argue that natural resource dependence produces overspecialization 
and volatility in the economy (Hirschman 1958), and distorts the economy by weakening 
manufacturing and agriculture (Matsuyama 1992; Papyrakis and Gerlagh 2004). Those 
emphasizing the political impacts argue that natural resources produce euphoric, short-
sighted states that, instead of investing in productive economic transformation, squander 
revenues through patron-client networks, inefficient and expensive projects, and the 
building up of repressive state capacities for political leaders to maintain their hold on 
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power (Karl 1997, 2007; Mahdavy 1970). Therefore, oil and minerals are said to cause 
underdevelopment. For instance, Ross (2012:3) states, “These countries suffer from 
authoritarian rule, violent conflict, and economic disarray because they produce oil...” 
The orthodox understanding of the development experiences in resource-rich developing 
countries is that they are doomed to fail. 
However, not all oil- and mineral-dependent countries follow the same trajectory 
or suffer the same fate. Humphreys, Sachs and Stiglitz have noted that the “general bleak 
picture among resource-rich countries nonetheless masks a great deal of variation” 
(2007:1-2). Some resource-rich countries have performed far better than others. Figures 1 
and 2 lists the levels of economic development (measured using per capita GDP (PPP in 
constant 2005 US dollars)) - for some 40 oil-dependent and mineral-dependent 
developing countries. On the one hand, oil-rich Nigeria and mineral-rich Democratic 
Republic of Congo indeed register very low levels of economic development, lending 
support to the conventional view.  On the other hand, oil-rich Trinidad and Tobago and 
mineral-rich Chile have transformed their resource wealth to raise the average per capita 
income. Many others, such as oil-rich Venezuela and mineral-rich Morocco have done 
moderately well. Thus, oil- and mineral-dependent countries can be found at all levels 
and rankings of development. This variation in developmental performance has led some 
to note that “natural resources are neither curse nor destiny” (Lederman and Maloney 
2007:3). 
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Figure 1. Variation in Economic Development among Oil-Dependent Developing 
Countries, 2010
 
Source: PWT 2014. 
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Figure 2. Variation in Economic Development among Mineral-dependent 
Developing Countries, 2010 
 
Source: PWT 2014. 
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as the resource curse perspective is, it fails to capture the diverse development 
experiences among these countries with supposedly similar economic and political 
susceptibilities that stem from resource dependence. Why, for example, would Trinidad 
and Tobago have three times the per capita income of Gabon even though they are both 
oil-dependent economies? If high and low levels of development can be found across 
resource-dependent countries, resource wealth cannot be the only causal factor shaping 
their performances. We may therefore benefit from looking beyond the reification of the 
curse of natural resources to understand the factors and processes producing variations in 
development among these countries. Instead of conceptualizing these countries as a 
homogenous group of poverty-stricken economies, development scholars must shift our 
attention toward understanding why resource abundance promotes development in some 
cases, and underdevelopment in others. This dissertation addresses the following 
overarching question: Why do some oil- and mineral-dependent countries outperform 
others? 
To answer this question, I draw on the social scientific literature on states, the 
resource curse, and development. More specifically, recent state-centered perspectives 
have argued that there is wider variation in the state institutions, constitutional forms, and 
policies of these countries than the conventional resource curse literature has suggested, 
and that there is no inherent correlation between natural resources and weak states or bad 
economic policies (Andersen and Aslaksen 2008; Orihuela 2013). A related body of work 
- the colonial legacies literature - traces contemporary development outcomes to the 
strength of institutions established during the colonial era, and advocate an analysis that 
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investigates the levels and types of inequalities established by colonizers during the 
colonial era (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012; Lange 2009; Mahoney 2010). Second, 
dependency/world systems scholars assert that resource-rich developing countries are 
stuck at the bottom of a rigid global hierarchy. They urge scholars to attend to the 
disproportionately low benefits these countries receive for resource exports in addition to 
their dependence upon foreign direct investment and loans and being subjected to 
pressure from international financial institutions (Bradshaw and Huang 1991; Bunker 
1984; Kentor and Boswell 2003).  Insights from these schools of thought provide the 
theoretical frameworks for examining what accounts for the variation among oil- and 
mineral-dependent countries. 
I use a multimethod research design involving three phases and both quantitative 
and qualitative methods. In the first phase of the project, I conduct a cross-section time-
series regression analysis using national development data in a large sample of oil- and 
mineral-dependent developing countries. This analysis provides insight into the general 
causal factors that influence development in these countries. Given that the results of the 
first phase showed that state institutions are a powerful determinant of development, in 
the second phase of the research, I build on this finding and examine the particular causal 
mechanisms for why some resource-dependent countries possess stronger state 
institutions that promote development, while others have weak institutions that inhibit 
development. I use an in-depth comparative-historical analysis of two similar oil-
dependent developing countries with divergent development outcomes – Trinidad and 
Tobago, and Gabon. In the third phase of the research, I test the generalizability of these 
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mechanisms using abbreviated case studies of three mineral-dependent developing 
countries – Guyana, Niger, and Zambia – using secondary data. 
My explanation for why some resource-dependent countries outperform others 
consists of two nested claims. First, stronger state institutions indeed matter the most for 
economic development, but, unlike previous studies, I show that some aspects of global 
structural inequalities - namely the negative impacts of foreign direct investment and 
foreign debt on development - cannot be ignored. Second, the construction of strong state 
institutions is not solely driven by the legacies of European colonial agents, as is often 
cited in existing literature, but rather, by the strength of local labor movements. My 
dissertation thus provides critical intervention into broader debates within the 
development literature about the relative roles of natural resources, domestic political 
conditions, and global economic structures in effecting development.  
 
Literature Review 
This project is situated within a fundamental quest in the social sciences: to 
understand why some countries are more developed than others. A core component of 
early paradigms of development by Marx and Weber centered around understanding why 
industrial capitalism emerged in Europe and not elsewhere in the world. Other scholars 
became preoccupied with discovering possible explanations for variation in national 
development among European countries (Alderson 1999; Pierson 2000). Others examine 
the global hierarchy of development and what accounts for why national income 
disparities between First and Third world countries persist (Acemoglu and Robinson 
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2012; Goesling 2001; Mittleman 2000; Wallerstein 1974). This gave way to attempts to 
develop grand theories that explain the divergent levels of development within the Global 
South (Acemoglu et al. 2012; Mahoney 2010). In many cases, the evidence for these 
theories are drawn from particular geographic regions, such as Spanish-speaking and 
Latin-American countries (Cardoso and Faletto 1979; Mahoney 2010) or East Asia 
(Amsden 1989; Evans 1995), and from particular industrial sectors, such as 
manufacturing (Amsden 1989; Evans 1995). This research has provided invaluable 
insights into the key factors and causal mechanisms driving uneven development 
outcomes. 
Still lacking, however, are theories about the origins of diverging development 
levels among developing countries with similarly structured economies that are organized 
and dependent upon the exploitation of its natural resources. These countries are critical 
to the global economic system since all processes of industrial production and material 
transformation absolutely depend upon resource extraction. For instance, automobiles 
require iron ore to be produced and petrol to operate. These indispensable inputs for 
production processes are located in a small number of very specific geographic areas. For 
example, 81% of the world's crude oil reserves are located in just 12 countries (OPEC 
2014). Consequently, fuel and mineral exports comprise a significant proportion of world 
merchandise trade - 21.8% of total world merchandise trade in 2013 (WTO 2014). 
Therefore, resource-exporting countries are unique because they fulfill an exceptional 
role in the global capitalist system. In addition, these states are sui generis because of 
their way of collecting revenue. It is these states, and not the private sector, that largely 
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own and control the center of accumulation and receive windfalls from the international 
economy, while resource-poor states rely heavily on taxing their citizens for income 
(Karl 1997). It is therefore essential that we understand the different ways in which 
resource extraction affects the subsequent development potential of the countries from 
which they are extracted. Answering this question can provide insight into what drives 
this dimension of between-country inequality and the global hierarchy of national 
development. 
As described below, the traditional resource curse literature lacks the ability to 
provide answers to this research question. However, the literature on state institutions and 
dependency/world systems theory offer important insights into the potential causal 
factors affecting divergent outcomes. I review each of these theories below. 
 
The Inadequacy of Resource Curse Explanations 
The resource curse, it is said, operates primarily through two main mechanisms - 
one is economic and the other political. Those focusing on the economic side argue that 
unique market factors related to trade in natural resources constrain resource-driven 
growth. These countries suffer from the “Dutch Disease” - a market failure where a boom 
in natural resource exports causes the real exchange rate to appreciate, and draws capital 
and labor away from non-resource sectors of the economy, such as manufacturing and 
agriculture. Together, these inflate the costs of domestic goods and services, and reduce 
productivity growth in tradeable goods, which lead to economic stagnation (Cordon and 
Neary 1982; Gelb et al. 1988; Gylfason et al. 1999; Krugman 1987; Matsuyama 1992; 
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Papyrakis and Gerlagh 2004). Others argue that declining terms of trade for commodity 
exports reduces revenue over time (Prebisch 1950; Singer 1950). Commodity price 
volatility causes fluctuations in government revenue and foreign exchange supplies 
(Hirschman 1958; Levin 1960; Nurske 1958). This instability increases investment risk 
and debt, thereby inhibiting long-term economic planning and growth (Athukorala 2000; 
Bleaney and Greenaway 2001; Ghosh and Ostry 1994; Levin 1960; Manzano and 
Rigobon 2007; Newfarmer et. al 2009; Nurske 1958; Poelhekke and van der Ploeg 2007). 
Thus, natural resource dependence causes a host of economic problems. 
Other scholars argue that the resource curse operates through political 
mechanisms. Resource-dependent states were classified as a unique group of states called 
“rentier states,” which, unlike other states across the world, receive substantial amounts 
of external “rents” or income from taxes and royalties on natural resource production and 
exports (Beblawi and Luciani 1987; Mahdavy 1970). As oil rents accrue from abroad, 
these states are relieved of the burden of taxing their citizens. Thus, rather than 
developing extractive capacities, these states develop excessive distributive (spending) 
capacities. Instead of investing in productive economic transformation, revenues are 
squandered through wasteful spending on inefficient but high-profile public works 
projects (Beblawi and Luciani 1987; Crystal 1990; Gavin 1993; Karl 1997, 2007; 
Mahdavy 1970; Robinson and Torvik 2005), corruption and kleptocratic behavior 
(Acemoglu, Robinson and Verdier 2004; Ascher 1999; Broad 1995; Chaudhry 1994; 
Gallo 1997; Leite and Weidmann 2002; Ross 2001; Tornell and Lane 1999), and the 
tendency to build up military and security capacities and authoritarian regimes in order to 
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maximize the prospects of societal obedience (Clark 1997; Jensen and Wantchekon 2004; 
Ross 2001). 
As true as this may be for some oil- and mineral-dependent countries, these 
explanations still fall short in their ability to account for why this is either not the case for 
all of these countries, or why, despite facing these vulnerabilities, some are nevertheless 
able to achieve developmental success. Other literatures provide important insights into 
what is necessary for and what constrains development, which may be applicable to this 
group of countries. 
 
Beyond the Resource Curse: Institutions, Dependency, and Development 
What do we know about what facilitates and inhibits national development? Two 
main schools of thought have provided answers to this question: the state-centered 
perspective and the dependency/world systems approach.  
 
It's all about the states 
Decades of work by scholars who bear a state-centered perspective on national 
development emphasize that state institutions as a primary explanatory variable for why 
some countries outperform others. While economists have almost exclusively defined 
“good institutions” primarily in terms of the enforcement of property rights or policy 
choices, more sociological approaches have generally defined institutions as the shared 
formal (written down, codified) and informal (unwritten knowledge, ideas, “schemas”) 
rules that direct behavior into predictable patterns of interactions (Hall and Taylor 1996; 
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Immergut 1998; Mahoney and Thelen 2010; North 1990; Thelen 1999). These scholars 
have identified several specific state structures that are critical to successfully propelling 
a nation's development: bureaucracy, transparency and accountability, and participation.1 
First, rational, meritocratic bureaucracies, from a Weberian perspective, recruit 
and retain qualified civil servants, and effectively transform individual self-interested 
behavior into shared expectations and commitments (Evans 1989, 1995; Evans and 
Rauch 1999; Rueschemeyer and Evans 1985). Such structures also provide the regulatory 
capacity to coordinate multiple actors and implement the provision of goods on a 
nationwide scale, regardless of government change (Barkey and Parikh 1991; Chibber 
2003). This includes the ability to assure widespread compliance with the rule of law, 
involving the enforcement of contracts and property rights, and effective police and court 
systems (O'Donnell 2004).  
Second, institutions of transparency and accountability, that is internal 
institutional monitoring mechanisms within the state bureaucracy, restrain state officials 
from exploiting state coffers or the private sector for personal gain and from succumbing 
to the influence of special interest groups (Barkey and Parikh 1991). External monitoring 
mechanisms and open, competitive electoral processes keep public administrators 
accountable to electorates and citizens, and guard against the arbitrary exercise of power 
by state officials (Diamond, Pattner and Schedler 1999; Heller 1999). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 These scholars come from the “developmental state” literature. 
2. Eric Williams, the then Prime Minister of T&T, did not understand this aspect of international 
diplomacy as well as his Gabonese counterpart. In 1972 and again in 1974, because of piqued 
interest due to the observed benefits gained by Libya, T&T applied for OPEC membership. 
However, T&T's membership was vetoed by Iraq under the excuse that T&T did not fit the 
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Third, institutions allowing citizens to participate in policy formulation and 
implementation enhances information exchange (Amsden 2001; Evans 1995, 2008), and 
can improve reduce inequality and facilitate redistribution (Besley et al. 2004; Bradley et 
al. 2003; Huber et al. 2006; Huber and Stephens 2000, 2001), health, education, and other 
public infrastructures (Gibson 2012; Olken 2010). These three features of state 
institutions - a relatively effective bureaucracy, transparency and accountability, and 
citizen participation - captures the key dimensions of the institutional quality that enable 
the promotion of broad-based development.  
In additional to state characteristics, state actions are also important for 
development. States need well-designed industrial and economic policies as a basis for 
economic development (Amsden 1989, 2001; Henry and Miller 2009; Rodrik 2007). 
Birdsall and colleagues (2005:145) argue that the East Asian success cases used a well-
crafted package of “export subsidies, directed credit, patent and copyright infringements, 
domestic-content requirements on local production, high levels of tariff and nontariff 
barriers, public ownership of large segments of banking and industry, and restrictions on 
capital flows, including direct foreign investment.” Stiglitz (1996:156-7) argues that these 
state interventions into the market succeeded because they were well-balanced: not so 
prohibitive as to disrupt markets, but powerful enough to incentivize development-
oriented behaviors. Thus, state policies also shape the success or failure of economic 
development. 
The preceding studies shed light on what state structures and strategies are critical 
for development. Another group of scholars investigate the historical origins of strong 
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and weak state institutions. This “legacies of colonialism” literature views contemporary 
development outcomes as manifestations of historical institutions determining the 
distributions of income and power. In formerly colonized societies, these levels and types 
of inequalities were heavily influenced by the institutions established by the colonial 
powers. Thus, scholars in this literature focus on the types of institutions created by 
colonial agents, from European settlers to colonial administrators. Some argue that 
colonies with few European settlers do not experience the transfer of institutions 
necessary for positive economic and social development and democracy (Acemoglu et al. 
2001, 2002; Engerman and Sokoloff 2002). Other theoretical models argue that the levels 
and forms of colonial rule implants different state institutions in different colonies, which 
shape long-term development (Lange 2004, 2009; Lange et al. 2006; Mahoney 2010; 
Migdal 1988). These explanations may give further insight into what historical processes 
may have produced varied the state institutions and development outcomes of today.  
 
It's not the state, it's the system 
A different, prominent body of work - the dependency/world systems literature - 
provides a different explanation for uneven development in the world. Rather than 
focusing on the internal workings of states, dependency and world-systems scholars posit 
that national development can only be understood by examining a country's structural 
position in the global capitalist system (Amin 1977; Arrighi et al. 2003; Babones 2009; 
Bollen 1987; Bornschier and Chase-Dunn 1985; Cardoso and Faletto 1979; Clark 2010; 
Frank 1969; Kentor 2001; Kentor and Boswell 2003; Mahutga et al. 2011; Snyder and 
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Kick 1979; Wallerstein 1974). Dependency scholars argue that, during the colonial 
period, a hierarchical relationship was established between rich, advanced First World 
nations and poor predominantly postcolonial countries (Frank (1969) uses the terms 
“metropoles” and “satellites,” and Wallerstein (1974) uses “core” and “periphery”). 
Nations in the periphery provide cheap natural resources, raw materials, and labor, to the 
core. In doing so, they channel capital out of their borders, thereby reducing their 
capacity to industrialize. Moreover, when global market demand or productivity declines, 
foreign and domestic economic interests in these economies diminish, and they contract, 
reflecting their dependence on western industrial nations. Therefore, economic growth 
and development is not autonomous or self-generating as modernization theorists 
contend. Rather, the development experienced by the core was predicated on the active 
underdevelopment of the periphery. Developing countries may have gained political 
independence after WWII, but they continue to suffer from economic dependence on 
their former colonizers. Foreign loans, aid, and investment, for example, serve to further 
impoverish the Third World. According to Wallerstein (1974), a nation's position in the 
world system is relatively permanent. The likelihood of descending from the core to 
semi-periphery (a group of “buffer” countries that lie between the two extremes) or 
periphery is greater than the upward mobility. In fact, Frank (1969) contended that 
satellites could only achieve significant development by breaking all ties with Western 
nations. 
Some argue that development does not necessarily require a complete break with 
the global capitalist system. Instead, they envision an important role for the state in 
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breaking the chains of dependency. Cardoso and Faletto (1979) suggested that 
development was possible even in situations of dependency if there were an alliance 
between the state, multinational corporations (MNCs), and local elites. The state 
maintains law and order, and creates the necessary economic and political conditions to 
attract foreign investment. MNCs provide the investment, technology, and training 
necessary for industrialization, albeit while retaining the dominant position in decision-
making. The local elite, as junior partners in joint venture enterprises, directly profit from 
the international division of labor. Even the middle and working classes may also benefit 
from the eventual growth of prosperity from dependent development. This dependent 
development perspective elucidates the structural features that allow countries to achieve 
some economic growth within a hierarchical global capitalist system. 
During the 1980s, the rise of neoliberalism stimulated some fundamental global 
transformations that challenged these old theoretical debates. Scholars found new 
patterns in the global division of labor. International trade no longer consisted primarily 
of raw material exports from developing countries to the developed world, where the 
manufacturing and production industries were located. Rather, in the late 1970s, Western 
manufacturing companies began relocating production to developing countries (Frobel et 
al. 1980). A number of factors stimulated this migration: the larger supply of cheap and 
disposable labor in developing countries; the extensive fragmentation of operations which 
now required only minimal worker skills; and innovations in transport and technology 
which reduced production costs (Gereffi 2005). Thus, many peripheral countries moved 
from commodity exports to high-skilled, technology-based, high-value added production 
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(Gereffi 1989). Still, because of the geographic specificity of resource deposits and the 
extent to which social organization was already well-developed around their extraction, 
resource extraction in the periphery persisted through the era of neoliberal era. 
Traditional dependency/world systems scholars would therefore predict that their 
resource exports continue to facilitate the economic development of higher-income 
countries in the semi-periphery and core, while they remain underdeveloped as they earn 
comparatively less from this structure of trade, become dependent on foreign direct 
investment and loans, and experience pressure from international financial institutions 
(Bradshaw and Huang 1991; Bunker 1984; Kentor and Boswell 2003). However, in the 
same way that state institutions vary across these countries, there may also be wider 
variation in their ties to the world economy than orthodox global structural inequalities 
arguments imply. Might this variation better explain the uneven outcomes of 
development? 
 
The Argument and Contribution 
In this dissertation, I analyze the determinants of varied development outcomes 
among oil- and mineral-dependent countries. My explanation consists of two nested 
claims. First, the divergence in outcomes depends on a particular constellation and 
intersection of domestic and global factors: strong state institutions are a powerful 
determinant of development in this sample of countries, but global structural inequalities 
in the world system such as dependence on foreign direct investment and foreign debt 
inhibit development.  
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Second, the construction of strong state institutions is driven by a different agent 
that has not yet been discussed in the literature on the legacies of colonialism upon 
development – organized labor.  In T&T, a strong labor movement forced the colonial 
state to undergo institutional reforms that promoted greater redistribution and a more 
active developmental role in the resource sector, a legacy that continued into the 
postcolonial period. Here, following the influx of oil windfalls in 1973 and 1979, the 
legal-administrative capacities of the state, particularly for the management of oil 
revenues and the provisioning of health and sanitation systems, education, and law and 
order were strengthened, and windfalls were also invested in productive, higher-value 
added industries. This promoted long-run economic and social development in T&T. 
Conversely, in Gabon, labor was weak, allowing colonial state officials and local political 
elites to retain control of state-building. These actors constructed predatory, extractive 
state institutions, a legacy that produced worse development outcomes in the post-
colonial period. Oil windfalls were used to further increase the repressive apparatus of the 
state and to pursue large, inefficient projects that brought little returns, while 
comparatively less was channeled toward elevating per capita income and social 
development and the country remained wedded to traditional crude oil production. This 
argument holds when applied to other cases controlling for the geographic location of 
countries, the resource commodity, and the colonial ruler.  
In showing that state institutions have a positive effect on development 
trajectories and that organized labor played a critical role in shaping the strength of those 
state institutions during the colonial and post-colonial periods, this analysis contributes to 
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the literature on institutions, natural resources, and development. First, this work supports 
the idea that natural resource production sets in motion a number of economic and social 
changes that unequivocally alter the societies from which the resources are extracted 
(Bunker 1984). However, this analysis agrees with scholars who are engaged in moving 
beyond a reification of the presence of natural resources as the most salient determinant 
of development outcomes (Okruhlik 1999; Rosser 2007). Oil and mineral dependence, as 
this dissertation shows, does not always and everywhere produce widespread 
impoverishment and depravity. The evidence in this dissertation shows the conditions 
under which resource wealth have produced this unfortunate outcome, and also the 
conditions under which natural resources have improved the economic and social well-
being of the population. This research therefore advances the debate on the impacts of 
natural resources on development. 
Second, I bring to the resource curse literature a different and more holistic 
conceptualization of state institutions and development. I show that resource-dependent 
states are not only distinguished from each other by virtue of their ability to protect 
property rights, combat corruption, or reduce spending impulses, characteristics that 
economists and resource curse theorists tend to focus on. Oil- and mineral-dependent 
states are much more multifaceted. They are capable of a bureaucratic capacity to 
effectively develop successful downstream and entirely new industries, maintain some 
level of transparency and accountability to citizens, as well as forging synergies with 
society for drafting and implementing development policy. The effects of such 
institutions are also much more multidimensional than traditional studies have 
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acknowledged. Such institutions not only affect economic growth and per capita income, 
but also the health and well-being of the population - outcomes that are not typically 
considered in resource curse studies. Thus, as a whole, this study provides a more holistic 
view of state institutions as well as development in these nations. 
Third, this dissertation is the first to systematically evaluate the explanatory 
power of two preeminent schools of thought in development studies - state-centered 
explanations of development and dependency/world system approaches - in accounting 
for uneven development trajectories among oil- and mineral-extracting countries in the 
developing world. These two perspectives have been applied to studies of uneven 
development in other contexts, such as within and across different geographic regions 
and among developing countries as a whole, but not among resource-dependent 
countries. This study therefore illustrates the unique constellation of factors that shape 
development among these nations. 
Fourth, this study also advances previous research that asserts that today's global 
development inequalities were inextricably linked to colonialism (Rodney 1972; 
Mahoney 2010). It supports the idea that colonialism rejiggered and destroyed societies, 
and imposed foreign administrative and economic systems on conquered territories, 
causing a harrowing impact on the people who were subjected to it's force. However, 
these people were not just victims of colonial domination and institutional imposition. 
This study also reinforces the perspective that the colonized, specifically organized labor, 
was also an active agent in stimulating significant economic and social transformation 
(Heller 1999; Rueschemeyer et al. 1992), with the important amendment, inspired from 
	  	  
22 
postcolonial studies, that attention must be paid to the agency of the subordinate classes 
as well as interactions between them and the dominant class. The explanation advanced 
here, therefore, diverges from previous work that centers on colonial agents as the 
primary drivers of the transformative process (Acemoglu et al. 2001, 2002; Lange et al. 
2006; Mahoney 2010). I argue that in order to better understand development outcomes 
among oil- and mineral-exporting countries in the Global South, one must consider not 
only the colonial legacies of European agents, but also the colonial legacies of local 
labor. 
Finally, this research also amends work showing the tendency of state structures 
and state-society relations to reproduce themselves over long periods of time (Mahoney 
2000). Natural resource revenues helped states to replicate structures or alter them 
depending on the preexisting state-society relationship. On the one hand, in countries 
characterized by legacies of strong labor and state-society relations based on protest and 
concession, natural resource booms provided states with an opening for change and 
enabled them to increase their developmental capacities, as they did in T&T. On the other 
hand, where legacies of weak labor and state-society relations based on repression were 
established, such as in Gabon, resource wealth produced path dependence as those states 
continued to build repressive capacities rather than investing in long-term development. 
 
Methodology 
This study employs a mixed-methods research design using both quantitative and 
qualitative methods. A number of social scientists advocate mixed-methods research for 
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macro-causal analysis because both quantitative and qualitative methodology have 
limitations; by using both together, each can help address questions left unanswered by 
the other (Brady and Collier 2004; Huber and Stephens 2001; Lange 2009). In this study, 
I use both statistical and comparative-historical methods to examine why some resource-
dependent developing countries perform better than others. Specifically, this multimethod 
research design consists of three phases. The first phase is a statistical analysis of 26 oil- 
and mineral-dependent developing countries, which isolates the determinants of uneven 
development outcomes. Given that the first phase shows that powerful state institutions 
are strongly associated with higher development outcomes, the second phase investigates 
the historical origins of strong and weak states. I use an in-depth comparative-historical 
analysis of two oil-dependent developing countries. The third research tier uses 
abbreviated case studies of three mineral-dependent developing countries to test the 
generalizability of these causal processes. Together, these tiers enable a triangulation or 
cross-validation of findings, and aim to provide a comprehensive understanding of why 
and how some resource-rich countries outperform others. 
 
Phase #1: What Factors Promote or Inhibit Development? 
As previously discussed, hypotheses for answering this question come from two 
strands of thought. The state-centered literature posits that variations in state structures 
and policies contribute to divergent development outcomes. The dependency/world 
systems perspective argues that the main driver of underdevelopment is the way in which 
these countries are integrated into the global capitalist system. These possible 
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explanations have not yet been systematically adjudicated. The quantitative tier of this 
research design enables us to uncover the relative power of these explanations and to 
pinpoint the most critical determinants of uneven development outcomes. In other words, 
this study enables us to know how well these theories explain varied development 
outcomes among resource-dependent developing countries, and how well they do with 
respect to each other.  
I first develop hypotheses based on the state-centered, dependency/world systems 
and other literatures, then test these hypotheses using an unbalanced panel data set of 26 
oil- and mineral-dependent developing countries for the period from 1985 to 2010. I use 
data compiled from multiple sources, such as the United Nations Commodity Trade 
Statistics Database (UNCOMTRADE), World Development Indicators (WDI) and the 
Penn World Tables (PWT), and panel methods that account for unmeasured 
heterogeneity between countries. 
 
Phase #2: The Origins of Strong/Weak Institutions? 
Finding that the quality of state institutions is indeed the strongest predictor of 
development outcomes among oil- and mineral-dependent countries in this study's 
sample, this begs the question: How did some end up with stronger state institutions and 
others with weak, development-inhibiting institutions? This question is best answered by 
delving into history and uncovering the events and processes that produced this variation. 
To further advance the ability to draw causal inferences, and to provide an integrative 
account of how conditions come together in historically specific ways to produce varied 
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institutional strengths, which, in turn, produced higher and lower development levels, I 
conduct an in-depth comparative-historical analysis of specific oil-dependent countries. 
Here, I intensively explore the unfolding of the causal factors over time and examine 
variables in light of the particular context of each case and its history, and the many 
complex combinations and configurations of factors that produce different institutions, 
and in turn, divergent development outcomes.  
I select two countries that conform to the statistical findings for comparative-
historical analysis- T&T and Gabon. T&T has a stronger state than Gabon and a higher 
level of development. I also consider other characteristics for case selection in order to 
increase my ability to control for rival hypotheses. T&T and Gabon share several key 
characteristics. Both gained their independence from colonial rule in the early 1960s 
(1960 in Gabon, and 1962 in T&T), had similarly small populations of less than 1.5 
million, large amounts of oil wealth, and low levels of economic development. In 
addition, 1973 and 1979 were particularly important years for both countries. In 1973, 
OPEC nations limited its oil exports to the U.S. because of their dissatisfaction with the 
U.S.-Israeli relationship during the Yom Kippur war, which caused a surge in the global 
price of petroleum. Likewise, in 1979, widespread panic over the decrease in global oil 
supply due to decreased oil exports from Iran during the Iranian Revolution caused the 
price of oil to skyrocket (Falola and Genova 2005). 
The boom in oil prices significantly impacted oil exporters across the world, 
including Gabon and T&T. As an OPEC member, Gabonese oil prices were in line with 
the cartel. Accordingly, the price of Mandji crude increased from $2.40 a barrel in Jan 
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1973 to $13.03 in Jan 1974. The price of Gamba rose from $2.40 to $13.79 (Yates 
1996:68). While, T&T was not an OPEC member,2 it nevertheless benefited from the 
skyrocketing prices. The average price of T&T oil in 1972 was US$3.14 a barrel, and in 
1974 had increased to $11.20 a barrel (Hosein and Tewarie 2004:5). Oil production also 
increased. In Gabon, total oil production increased from 152,000 barrels per day (bpd) in 
1973 to peak at 227,000 bpd in 1975 (B.P. 2014).3 In T&T, total oil production increased 
from 166,000 bdp in 1973 to a high of 214,000 bpd in 1978 (B.P. 2014).4  
Figure 3 shows that, in both countries, natural resource rents accounts for more 
than 10% of the GDP over the 1970-2012 period, meeting the official classification for a 
resource-dependent country (Karl 1997). Both also receive remarkably similar levels of 
resource rents over this time period. Similarly, figure 4 shows that both countries engage 
in almost identical government spending patterns between 1960-2012. Gabon and T&T 
are also “capital-deficient oil exporters,” meaning they both have relatively large 
populations and smaller proven per capita reserves (Karl 1997:17). This means that their 
dependence on oil is felt more acutely because they absorb the revenues more quickly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2. Eric Williams, the then Prime Minister of T&T, did not understand this aspect of international 
diplomacy as well as his Gabonese counterpart. In 1972 and again in 1974, because of piqued 
interest due to the observed benefits gained by Libya, T&T applied for OPEC membership. 
However, T&T's membership was vetoed by Iraq under the excuse that T&T did not fit the 
criterion of “substantial net exporter” (Calvin Smith 1979:33). However, many believe that the 
reason was due to a diplomatic error on the part of T&T, which despite being formally invited to 
visit Iraq before the vote failed to do so (McGuire 1981:200-202). 
3. In Gabon, almost all of this was crude - crude oil production shot up from 108,847 bpd (5 423 
000 tons) in 1970 to 150,808 bpd (7 598 000 tons) in 1973 to 202,502 bpd (10 202 000 tons) in 
1974 and 222,580 bpd (11 316 000 tons) in 1975 (Yates 1996:70; GOG 1986:55). 
4. In T&T, crude oil production went from 140,304 bpd in 1972, to 166,219 bpd in 1973 and 
186,673 bpd in 1974 (GOTT Ministry of Petroleum and Mines 1974:1) 
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and their ratio of population to proven reserves are such that the projected revenues 
would be unable to carry development for many decades (Karl 1997:18).5 
 
Figure 3. Total Natural Resource Rents (% of GDP) in Trinidad and Tobago and 
Gabon, 1970-2010 
 
Source: World Bank WDI 2014. 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5Some capital-surplus countries are Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Libya, Qatar, and the United Arab 
Emirates. They are less populated and could not possibly absorb all the revenues from their 
substantially large proven reserves (Karl 1997:17-18).  
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Figure 4. Comparing State Spending in Trinidad and Tobago and Gabon, 1960-2010 
 
Source: World Bank WDI 2014. 
 Yet, despite the similar levels of resource dependence and state spending, which 
resource curse theorists argue should result in the resource curse and underdevelopment, 
T&T and Gabon have followed decidedly different patterns of economic and human 
development. While T&T had similarly low levels of per capita income fifty years ago, 
today, T&T citizens are, on average, far wealthier (Figure 5) and healthier (Table 1) than 
their oil-rich Gabonese counterparts, facts that the resource curse theory cannot explain. 
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Figure 5. Comparing Economic Development (GDP per capita) in Trinidad and 
Tobago and Gabon, 1960-2010 
  
Source: World Bank WDI 2014. 
 
Table 1. Health and Social Indicators in Trinidad and Tobago and Gabon, 2010 
 Gabon T&T 
Human Development Index      .676     .758 
Literacy rate, adult total (% of people ages 15 and above)  88.4 98.8 
Life expectancy at birth, total (years)  63 70 
Gender inequality index      .492     .311 
Mortality rate, under 5 (per 1,000 live births)  74 27 
Maternal mortality (deaths per 100,000 live births) 230 40 
Source: UNDP 2014; World Bank WDI 2014. 
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This comparative-historical analysis examines what can account for the striking 
divergence. In other words, why did T&T develop strong state institutions to channel 
resource wealth toward development, while Gabon became a conventional rentier state 
that failed to promote development? The comparison of these two countries helps 
pinpoint the configuration of factors, events and processes that caused T&T to become a 
relatively successful developer through the exploitation of oil, but resulted in Gabon's 
relatively disappointing performance despite its oil wealth. 
As is customary in comparative-historical research, my data derive primarily from 
secondary sources, namely from published books and articles by historians, sociologists, 
political scientists, and country analysts. I work with data on the colonial history, and 
economic and political development of T&T and Gabon. The historical data that I draw 
on primarily comes from key secondary sources, such as books and articles written by 
historians and country experts, and some primary documents, such as colonial reports, 
speeches, and letters by actors identified as being deeply involved in institution-building 
in both countries. I also use government reports and international agency reports and 
investigations. 
Comparative-historical analysis makes use of a variety of data analysis 
techniques. I employ the “causal narrative” approach - a method that uses “cross-case 
comparisons of within‐case chronologies as a basis for making causal inferences” 
(Mahoney 2003:365). The approach consists of two steps: process tracing and comparing 
event structures. Process tracing is the documentation of within‐case chronologies, or 
sequences of events, factors, actors, and processes, that clearly connect the explanatory 
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variable with a stronger state in T&T and a weaker state in Gabon and prevent alternative 
occurrences (Abbott 1992; Calhoun 1998; Griffin 1993; Mahoney 2003). This requires 
assembling information into causal chains that show the intervening variables through 
which the explanatory factor produces strong/weak states. I also develop event‐structure 
diagrams to show the path/sequence of events culminating in each particular outcome. 
The search for clear connections between events helps to distinguish causal paths from 
spurious correlations.  
In the next step, I conduct a cross‐case comparison of the event structures of each 
country to look for similarities and differences in the events that led to the institution of 
different state strengths in T&T and Gabon. If both countries have the same causal 
conditions but different outcomes, I return to the data to consider possible additional 
factors. In addition, while the presence or absence of a variable might result in a strong or 
weak state, the mechanisms through which the specific factor produces one outcome over 
another may follow different event processes. Thus, I will also compare the event‐
structure diagrams of each country to determine the similarities and differences between 
the sequences of events leading to the different regimes (see Mahoney 1999). This 
method of contrasting event‐structure sequences serves as a negative check on established 
explanations concerning the specific paths that these states follow, and helps avoid 
deterministic conclusions. Accordingly, I compile support to validate a cross‐country 
argument in a rich, contextualized description of each country. 
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Phase #3: The Generalizability of the Causal Mechanisms 
It is possible that T&T and Gabon are unique or that the comparison exposes only 
one of several mechanisms underlying why some countries outperform others. For 
example, could it be that the identity of the colonizer is indeed important, and that former 
British colonies perform better than French colonies? Similarly, could it be a regional 
issue where Caribbean countries tend to perform better than African countries, which 
would make location and not labor the primary explanatory factor? The study requires a 
rigorous check on the findings from the in-depth two-country comparative analysis and to 
expose possible additional factors affecting the development outcome. One way to 
address this is to increase the number of cases in the in-depth comparative-historical 
analysis of phase two of this research design. This strategy would be more rigorous 
because it would lay out the details of the historical processes of development in even 
more cases. However, this task is colossal and one could spend the rest of their career 
simply collecting this data. Another way to address the generalizability of the causal 
mechanisms is to use abbreviated case studies. Admittedly, the analysis is not as detailed 
as the more in-depth case studies, but the task is more manageable and enables a 
corroboration, rather than replication of the results of the in-depth analysis (see Lange 
2009). 
I select countries according that provide a juxtaposition along the following 
factors: British/French colony; Caribbean/African region; and mineral- rather than oil-
dependent in order to compare with the oil-producing T&T and Gabon. This gives the 
following permutations - Guyana (mineral-dependent former British colony in the 
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Caribbean); Niger (mineral-dependent former French colony in Africa); and Zambia 
(mineral-dependent former British colony in Africa). Ideally, I would also be able to 
include a oil- or mineral-dependent former French colony in the Caribbean to compare a 
French colony with a desirable commodity to T&T. However, a country with such a 
profile does not exist in the real world, as all former French colonies in the Caribbean 
were primarily exporters of sugar and other agriculture products. Nevertheless, this case 
selection for these abbreviated studies will serve as yet another cross-check against the 
in-depth T&T/Gabon findings. 
 
 
Organization of the Dissertation 
This study explores the variation in development outcomes among oil- and 
mineral-dependent developing countries. Chapter 2 lays out the statistical component of 
the empirical analysis. I extract a number of hypotheses from the development literature 
about the possible determinants of uneven development outcomes and test them in a large 
sample of oil- and mineral-dependent developing countries. I find that indeed, the 
institutional strength of the state is a strongest predictor of development levels, thereby 
supporting the claim that “institutions rule” (Rodrik et al. 2004).  
In the two chapters that follow, I lay out the in-depth comparative-historical 
analysis of T&T and Gabon, which shows the causal mechanisms underlying the 
statistical relationship between institutions and development. Chapter 3 describes the 
origins of higher quality state institutions in T&T and the mechanisms by which these 
	  	  
34 
institutions promoted relatively better oil wealth management, industrialization, and 
broad-based economic and social development. I describe how a strong labor movement, 
headed by workers in the oil sector, pressured the colonial state to reform its policies 
toward colonial subjects, thereby spurring institutional reform toward a more 
developmental approach. In the post-colonial period, the militant labor movement 
propelled even greater institution-building toward higher quality state institutions which 
used oil revenues to promote industrialization and broad-based economic and human 
development.  
Chapter 4 describes the origins of weaker state institutions in Gabon and the 
processes by which these institutions produced the mismanagement of oil revenue and 
lower development outcomes in the country. I describe how the roots of Gabon's weak 
post-colonial state emerge from close ties between a strongly authoritarian colonial state 
and political elites, and a weak labor movement that was unable to break up or even 
weaken these ties in the interest of the Gabonese population. These state structure and 
state-society relationships shaped the way in which oil revenue was used - to enrich the 
political elite at the expense of the broader citizenry - and led to underdevelopment in 
Gabon. 
Chapter 5 presents the results of the final phase of this dissertation research. It 
shows the extent to which the causal mechanisms from the in-depth comparative-
historical analysis of T&T and Gabon can be generalized to other resource-dependent 
developing countries - Guyana, Niger, and Zambia. The final chapter, Chapter 6, 
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summarizes the findings of this study, describes the limitations, and discusses 
implications for future research.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF DEVELOPMENT  
IN OIL- AND MINERAL-DEPENDENT DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I conduct the cross-national statistical analysis of the divergent 
development outcomes among oil- and mineral-dependent countries in the Global South. 
Statistical analyses enable me to test rival hypotheses. I employ a variety of measures of 
development including per capita GDP, infant mortality rate, and average life expectancy 
as dependent variables, in addition to different independent variables to test two general 
sets of explanations of uneven development among oil- and mineral-dependent 
developing countries. 
According to the state-centered perspective, state structures and policies play a 
decisive role in effecting development. In particular, variation in the state institutions, 
constitutional forms, and policies of these countries may explain why some developing 
countries with natural resources escape the curse. To test these hypotheses, I include 
variables capturing the strength of state institutions, parliamentary/presidential 
constitutional forms, the extent to which the state employs interventionist economic 
measures, and data on national savings rates, which correspond to the hypothesized 
determinants of uneven development. 
Conversely, the dependency/world systems scholars assert that resource-exports 
from developing countries facilitate the development of higher-income countries in the 
semi-periphery and core, but they become underdeveloped since they earn comparatively 
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less from this structure of trade, become dependent on foreign direct investment and 
loans, and experience pressure from international financial institutions. I re-deploy the 
logic of this argument by hypothesizing that perhaps variations in the structural ties of 
resource-exporting developing states to the global economy may also explain variations 
in their development outcomes, and use variables capturing these specific ties (e.g. 
Foreign direct investment as a percentage of GDP) to test these claims. 
I test these theories using an unbalanced panel data set of 26 oil- and mineral-
dependent developing countries for the period from 1985 to 2010. I use data compiled 
and created from multiple data sources, and panel methods that account for unmeasured 
heterogeneity between countries. In what follows, I summarize the state-centered and 
dependency/world systems theories and extract from them testable hypotheses. Next, I 
describe the data used to operationalize the key variables. Following a discussion of the 
results, I conclude by highlighting the contributions of this research to the advancement 
of comparative research on development in oil- and mineral-dependent countries in the 
Third World. 
 
States or Systems? Hypotheses for Divergent Development 
State-centered Perspectives  
Various state-centered development theories highlight two types of state 
structures (institutional quality of the state and constitutional form) and two state policies 
(state intervention in the economy and savings rates) that may enable some resource-
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dependent developing countries to outperform others. Below, I discuss these theories and 
generate testable hypotheses. 
 
Institutional quality. State-centered, historical-institutional scholars have long 
argued that strong state institutions are necessary for successful economic transformation 
(Amsden 2001; Evans et al. 1985). Strong states have meritocratic and cohesive 
bureaucratic institutions that are able to promote compliance with the rule of law, restrain 
state officials from exploiting state coffers for personal gain, insulate officials from the 
influence of special interest groups, and coordinate multiple actors to provide 
developmental goods on a nationwide scale (Amsden 2001; Chibber 2003; Evans 1989, 
1995). A number of quantitative and qualitative studies of developing countries show that 
stronger state institutions improve economic performance (Dawson 2010; Evans 1995; 
Evans and Rauch 1999). 
Traditional resource curse scholars often blame poor state institutions for 
underdevelopment across resource-dependent nations in the developing world. These 
scholars argue that resource-rich states are plagued with poor institutional quality, as 
resource revenues foster corruption, kleptocratic behavior, and patron-client relations 
both within the state and between the state and society (Acemoglu et al. 2004; Bjorvatn et 
al. 2012; Isham et al. 2005; Karl 1997, 2007; Mahdavy 1970; Robinson and Torvik 2005; 
Ross 2001).  
However, recent work on resource-dependent countries warns against viewing 
state institutions in these countries as homogeneous or static. These scholars argue that 
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not all state institutions among these countries are alike, and that some possess stronger 
states enabling them to outperform those with weaker state institutions (Acemoglu et al. 
2003; Atkinson and Hamilton 2003; Boschini et al. 2007, 2013; Kurtz 2009; Mehlum et 
al. 2006; Orihuela 2013). Therefore, I examine the following hypothesis and whether 
predicted results hold in the presence of other counter-arguments and control variables: 
Institutional quality hypothesis: Higher institutional quality of the state positively 
impacts economic development in oil- and mineral-dependent developing countries. 
 
Constitutional form. Another hypothesis from the recent literature on state 
structures in resource-dependent countries comes from Andersen and Aslaksen (2008). 
They argue that uneven development among resource-dependent developing countries 
stem from variation in the constitutional arrangements: those with presidential systems 
perform worse than those with parliamentary systems. This divergence may stem from 
structural differences between the parliamentary and presidential systems. In 
parliamentary systems, cabinets and parties need the support of a majority in the 
legislature to maintain their positions, which induces greater spending on broad social 
and welfare programs to please constituents. Conversely, executives in presidential 
regimes, once appointed, do not need this support, which yields the under-provision of 
public goods (Persson and Tabellini 2003). Given that constitutional form has been 
shown to influence development, I examine the following: 
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Constitutional form hypothesis: Oil- and mineral-dependent developing countries 
with parliamentary systems have higher levels of economic development than those with 
presidential systems. 
 
State intervention. Unlike the agreement among state-centered scholars on the 
effect of institutional quality on economic development, there is considerable debate over 
the impact of state intervention. Traditional resource curse scholars argue that state 
intervention in the economy impedes economic development in resource-dependent 
developing countries. Following the commodity booms of the 1970s and 1980s, these 
states tended to employ a number of interventionist measures, including import-
substitution policies such as subsides, tariffs, and import quotas, the creation of state-
owned companies, higher public sector salaries, public works projects, and fuel and food 
subsidies. These measures failed to produce competitive firms and only increased 
external borrowing and national debt (Auty 1990; Auty and Gelb 2001; Gelb et al. 1988; 
Karl 1997, 2007; Mahdavy 1970; Sachs and Warner 1995; Torvik 2001). Some have 
argued that the countries that maintained fiscal restraint and fewer protectionist measures 
performed better (Arezki and van der Ploeg 2007; Atkinson and Hamilton 2003; Matsen 
and Torvik 2005; Sachs and Warner 1995). 
However, other scholars advance a different view, arguing that state intervention, 
in both developed and developing countries, has historically played a leading role in 
coordinating the creation of entirely new industries, a key requirement of economic 
development (Amsden 2001; Chang 2002; Evans 1995; Rueschemeyer and Evans 1985; 
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Wade 2003). The sustained economic growth in oil-rich Indonesia over the past thirty 
years has been partly attributed to these types of state intervention measures, which 
protected local agriculture and stimulated expansion of the manufacturing sector (Bevan 
et al. 1999; Rosser 2007; Timmer 1993). Thus, to address this debate, I test the following: 
State intervention hypothesis: Higher levels of state intervention increase 
development performance in resource-dependent developing states. 
 
Savings rates. Another key mechanism that new research deems important for 
economic development outcomes in resource-dependent developing countries is the 
savings of resource income. If exorbitant public spending on state intervention programs 
has led to national debt crises in resource-dependent developing counties, perhaps saving 
those windfalls would alleviate the resource curse. Matsen and Torvik (2005) show that 
there is a large variation in savings rates among resource-dependent countries, and those 
with higher savings rates are generally considered the resource curse escapees. Atkinson 
and Hamilton (2003) have confirmed these findings in cross-national regressions. 
Likewise, I investigate the impact of savings rates and whether this factor is more or less 
important than the other claims. 
Savings rates hypothesis: Higher savings rates positively impact economic 
development in oil- and mineral-dependent developing countries. 
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Dependency/World systems Perspectives 
According to dependency/world systems scholars, countries in the periphery are 
less developed than those in the core and semi-periphery due to four main hierarchical 
and exploitative structures of the world economy: vertical natural resource flows, foreign 
capital dependence, debt dependence, and International Monetary Fund (IMF) pressure. 
If these mechanisms explain uneven development between countries in the periphery, 
semi-periphery, and core, could variations in these factors also explain why some oil- and 
mineral-dependent developing countries outperform others? 
 
Vertical natural resource flows. According to some scholars, flows of extracted 
materials, manufactured commodities, and agricultural products from the low-income 
periphery to the high-income core/semi-periphery, that is, vertical export flows, is a 
structural feature of the world economy through which socioeconomic and environmental 
disparities are generated (Bunker 1984; Bunker and Ciccantell 2005, 2007; Hornborg 
2001; Jorgenson and Burns 2004). This vertical trade structure has produced a system of 
unequal exchange where more powerful trading partners appropriate natural resources 
and conserve it in useful forms, such as infrastructure and human capital, increasing their 
social and economic organization and externalizing the social and environmental costs of 
resource extraction. However, resource-exporting developing countries earn 
comparatively far less, have fewer opportunities to utilize the resources domestically, and 
bear the costs of environmental degradation, including higher rates of water pollution, 
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deforestation, and poorer health outcomes (Bunker 1984; Hornborg 2001, 2009; 
Jorgenson 2006; Jorgenson and Clark 2009, 2011; Rice 2007a, 2007b).  
While studies of unequal exchange have not explicitly focused on oil and mineral 
exports, prior research shows that vertical flows of total merchandise exports (Jorgenson 
2006, 2009a; Jorgenson and Burns 2004; Shandra et al. 2009a, 2009b) and vertical 
primary sector exports (defined as food and live animals, beverages and tobacco, and 
crude materials not including fuel and minerals) (Jorgenson 2010; Jorgenson et al. 2009, 
2010; Shandra et al. 2009b) harms the environment and human health in developing 
countries. By this logic, vertical oil- and mineral-exports should also harm economic 
development in resource-exporting countries. 
Vertical natural resource flows hypothesis: Higher levels of oil and mineral 
exports to high-income countries negatively impacts development in the resource-
exporting developing countries.  
 
Foreign Capital Dependence. In addition to the unequal distribution of core-
periphery benefits from trade in natural resources, the global structural inequalities 
literature argues that foreign capital dependence also negatively impacts development in 
these nations. Natural resources are scarce and difficult to procure, so extraction and 
production requires extraordinary capital, technology, expertise, and infrastructural 
investment (Barham et al. 1994; Boyd et al. 2001; Bunker 1989; Frank 1969). Resource-
rich developing countries often lack these resources and, as a result, rely upon foreign 
direct investment (FDI) in order to exploit and earn income from natural resources. 
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However, the domination of industrial sectors by foreign transnational corporations 
affords the investing country a significant advantage over the dependent trading partner 
(Galtung 1971). This foreign capital dependence limits the autonomy of governments to 
pursue development policies that may not coincide with the economic interests of foreign 
corporations (Amin 2001; Perelman 2003), particularly if most of the FDI comes from a 
single investing country (Kentor and Boswell 2003; Kentor and Jorgenson 2010). 
Furthermore, profits largely tend to be siphoned abroad rather than re-invested in the 
local economy (Bornschier 1980; Bunker and Ciccantell 2005, 2007). Thus, I examine 
whether variation in foreign capital dependence can explain divergent development 
outcome among oil- and mineral-rich developing countries.  
Foreign capital dependence hypothesis: Increases in foreign capital dependence 
decrease development performance. 
 
Debt Dependence. Third World countries rely not only on foreign investors to 
finance industrialization and development projects, but also on loans from a variety of 
external sources - from private commercial banks, to multilateral (e.g. IMF and World 
Bank) and bilateral (e.g. government) sources. However, during the late 1970s, 
skyrocketing energy costs, higher interest rates and inflation combined with a global 
economic recession reduced the value of Third World exports, making it difficult for 
them to repay the interest and principal on their debt (McMichael 2004). Indebted 
countries experienced severe economic contraction as otherwise investable capital was 
diverted toward repaying outstanding debt (Peet 2003). A number of studies show that 
	  	  
45 
debt overhang negatively impacts economic growth and human health in developing 
countries (Bradshaw and Huang 1991; Bradshaw and Tshandu 1990; Bradshaw and Wahl 
1991; Shen and Williamson 2001). Further, Manzano and Rigobon (2007) argue that the 
poor performance of resource-dependent developing countries is not due to a 'curse' but 
to debt overhang. Given that debt dependence is highlighted as a critical factor shaping 
development outcomes, I examine the following:  
Debt dependence hypothesis: Higher levels of foreign debt decrease economic 
performance in oil- and mineral-dependent countries. 
 
IMF Pressure. Scholars also note that certain efforts by developing countries to 
ease their debt burdens have only further retarded development. Third World borrowers 
sought debt relief through debt renegotiation and restructuring with external creditors. 
The IMF assumed a leading role in collecting the outstanding debt and evaluating 
creditworthiness for future loans (Bradshaw and Huang 1991; McMichael 2004). The 
IMF and sister organization, the World Bank, mandated that future loans be conditional 
upon neoliberal structural adjustment reforms, such as currency devaluation, the 
reduction of health and social services, and the opening up domestic markets to foreign 
investors. Empirical research has shown that these IMF-imposed austerity measures 
lowered living standards and impeded economic development (Babb 2005; Bradshaw et 
al. 1993; Bradshaw and Huang 1991; Walton and Ragin 1990). Moreover, recent 
attempts of resource-rich developing states to recoil from these neoliberal reforms, and 
increase national autonomy over their resource sector and development strategies have 
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often been constrained by the path-dependent effects of neoliberal arrangements (Kaup 
2010). This perspective implies that countries facing less pressure from the IMF to 
engage in neoliberal structural reforms would outperform those facing higher levels of 
IMF pressure.  
IMF pressure hypothesis: Greater pressure from the IMF negatively impacts 
economic development in oil- and mineral-dependent developing countries. 
 
Data and Methods 
To test these hypotheses, I compile a unique unbalanced panel dataset of 26 
resource-dependent developing countries from 1985 to 2010, variables that capture the 
potential explanatory factors, and some key controls. The sample includes developing 
countries that meet three criteria. First, the countries are independent, sovereign states 
throughout the period of study. The Soviet successor countries, such as Azerbaijan and 
Kazakhstan, are excluded because these states did not have autonomy over their energy 
or development policies and experienced unique economic changes following the fall of 
communism that are beyond the scope of this study (Jones Luong and Weinthal 2010; 
Nee 1989). 
Second, only developing countries that are oil- and mineral-dependent are 
included. The data on oil and mineral exports by country and year come from World 
Bank's World Development Indicators (WDI), which itself gathers this data from 
UNCOMTRADE. Oil corresponds to the UNCOMTRADE Standard International Trade 
Classifications (SITC) for fuels and natural gas, and minerals correspond to the SITC for 
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crude fertilizer, minerals ores, metalliferous ores and scrap, and non-ferrous metals. 
Following the resource curse literature, oil and mineral dependence is measured as the 
combined fuel and mineral exports as a percentage of total merchandise exports. 
According to the standard criteria in the literature, a country is resource-dependent if net 
natural resource exports account for 40% or more of total merchandise exports (Auty 
1993; Nankani 1979).  
Finally, in order to examine the changes within and between countries over time, 
the data for each country included in the sample must be available for at least two time 
points. The resulting sample includes 26 countries: Algeria, Bolivia, Cameroon, Chile, 
Republic of Congo, Ecuador, Egypt, Gabon, Guyana, Indonesia, Iran, Jamaica, Jordan, 
Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Niger, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Syrian 
Arab Republic, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Venezuela, and Zambia.  
 
Dependent variables 
To test the determinants of uneven development among oil- and mineral-
dependent countries in the developing world, I employ three different measures of 
economic and social development as dependent variables. First, economic development is 
measured using per capita GDP (PPP in constant 2005 US dollars). I use a purchasing 
power parity measure because it captures the cost of a domestic basket of goods, which is 
a more welfare-oriented way of reflecting national income (Firebaugh 2003). This data 
comes from the Penn World Tables (PWT) (Heston et al. 2012). As is common in studies 
using this measure, the figures are logged to reduce skew. Next, I use infant mortality rate 
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and average life expectancy as separate indicators of social development. Both are taken 
from the World Bank's World Development Indicators (2014). 
 
Independent Variables 
The dataset includes independent variables that capture the main explanatory 
factors derived from state-centered and global structural inequalities theories. To test the 
institutional quality hypothesis, I use the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) 
Quality of Government indicator (Teorell et al. 2013). This index averages the ICRG 
variables for bureaucratic quality, corruption, and law and order, and is scaled between 0 
and 1 where higher values indicate higher quality institutions. This variable has been used 
in a number of cross-national quantitative studies (Boschini et al. 2013; Mehlum et al. 
2006). 
To test the constitutional form hypothesis, I slightly revise an indicator for 
constitutional form using the data on regime type from the Database of Political 
Institutions (Beck et al. 2001; Teorell et al. 2013). This study is primarily interested the 
effect of parliamentary versus presidential systems. Thus, I designate both presidential 
and strong elected presidential systems with 0 and parliamentary systems with 1.  
The state intervention and savings rates hypotheses were developed to assess the 
relative impact of these state policies on economic development. The variable for state 
intervention comes from the size of government indicator in the Fraser Institute's 
Economic Freedom of the World Index, which is available for countries from 1985 
onward at five-year intervals (Gwartney et al. 2010). This combined measure of 
	  	  
49 
government consumption spending, transfers and subsidies, government enterprises and 
investment, and top marginal tax rates corresponds to those state interventions theorized 
to impact economic development. For savings rates, I follow Matsen and Torvik (2005) 
and use national savings as a percent of GNI adjusted for natural resource depletion from 
the WDI database. 
The world systems/dependency theories are examined using variables that capture 
vertical natural resource flows, foreign capital dependence, debt dependence, and IMF 
pressure. First, to evaluate the vertical natural resource flows, I develop a more precise 
measure for the purposes of this study - to focus on oil and minerals exports - using the 
same logic, procedure, and databases as previous research examining vertical 
merchandise export flows and vertical primary sector exports (not including fuel and 
minerals) (Jorgenson and Rice 2012; Rice 2007b; Shandra et al. 2009b). My variable - 
vertical natural resource flows - is the percent of oil and mineral exports to high-income 
countries, calculated using export data gathered from the UNCOMTRADE database and 
the World Bank classification of high-income countries.  
The second aspect of global structural inequalities - foreign capital dependence - 
can be measured in several ways: (1) inward FDI stocks as a percentage of GDP, which is 
the most commonly-used measure (Curwin and Mahutga 2014; De Soysa and Oneal 
1999; Dixon and Boswell 1996; Kentor 1998); (2) foreign investment concentration, 
calculated as the largest percentage of FDI stocks obtained from a single investing 
country (Kentor and Boswell 2003); and (3) inward FDI into the primary sectors as a 
percentage of total FDI (Kaya 2010). I use the traditional inward FDI stocks (% of GDP) 
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as a proxy for foreign capital dependence because of greater data availability for the 
countries in this sample (n=106).6 The data comes from the United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development (UNCTADstat 2014). Stocks rather than flows are primarily 
employed because while inward FDI flows may positively impact economic growth in 
the short-term, long-term dependence on foreign capital, measured by inward FDI stock, 
has been shown to have negative effects (Bornschier et al. 1978; Bornschier and Chase-
Dunn 1985). Nevertheless, I cross-check the models with inward FDI flows as a 
percentage of GDP and the results are found to be essentially the same. 
To measure the impact of debt dependence, I follow Bradshaw and Wahl (1991) 
and Manzano and Rigobon (2007) and use total debt stocks/GNI to capture the increasing 
debt burden a country faces relative to the size of the national economy (World Bank 
2014).7 Finally, to capture IMF pressure, I slightly revise an index introduced by Walton 
and Ragin (1990) to conform to the appropriate time period for this study. The index uses 
evidence of circumstances and actions that indicate IMF conditionality: (1) the number of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 The data for foreign investment concentration for the time period in this study (1985-2010) are 
available from the UN (1992, 1994, 1996, 2000, 2003, 2004) and UNCTAD (2006, 2008, 2011). 
However, these data contain many inconsistencies. For instance, for some countries, the authors 
who compile the data warn, totals in this table may be different from those shown in tables 11 and 
12 [in this very document] as the data in each table have been revised at different times 
(UNCTAD, 2004:7). In addition, the data are limited and reduce the number of observations in 
the dataset from 106 to 61. The other measure - inward FDI into the primary sectors as a 
percentage of total FDI - was compiled using data from the UN (1992, 1994, 1996, 2000, 2003, 
2004) and UNCTAD (2008). However, for the countries and years in this study’s sample, the data 
are so scant that STATA cannot run the regression models. Given these data limitations, I employ 
the traditional measure of inward FDI stocks to GDP for foreign capital dependence in the main 
models and include foreign investment concentration in the sensitivity analyses (Table 4). 
7 Some scholars use debt service payments/exports of goods and services. They argue that this 
measure represents the actual pressure a country faces to repay its loans since exports help 
countries obtain hard currency to repay their debt (Bradshaw and Tshandu, 1990; Walton and 
Ragin, 1989, 1990). The data for this measure are more limited, but the results using it are 
consistent with my findings from the main model (Table 4).	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debt renegotiations with both private and multilateral lenders experienced by each 
country between 1985 and 2010 (World Bank 1987, 1990, 2000, 2004, 2006, 2007, 2008, 
2009, 2010); (2) the number of debt restructurings between 1985 and 2010 (World Bank 
1987, 1990, 2000, 2004, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010); (3) the number of IMF Extended 
Fund Facility Arrangements between 1985 and 2010 (IMF 1985a, 1985b; 1990a, 1990b; 
2014); and (4) the total IMF loans a country received as a percentage of its allotted IMF 
quota for the period 1985 to 2010 (IMF 2014). To create the IMF pressure index, the four 
components were transformed into z-scores and summed.  
 
Controls 
I include a number of other variables in the models to control for other factors that 
scholars argue impact development. First, the models include a control for 
industrialization or manufacturing as a percent of GDP (World Bank 2014), which 
according to the endogenous growth model, positively impacts economic growth (Barro 
1991; Solow 1956). Second, this study controls for human capital since Bravo-Ortega and 
de Gregorio (2007) find that natural resources reduce growth in countries with low 
human capital. I use Barro and Lee's (2000) measure of the average years of schooling in 
the total population aged 15 years and over. Third, population density from the WDI 
dataset is included to control for any demographic effects on economic growth (Bjorvatn 
and Farzanegan 2013; Kuznets 1960; Lenski 1970). Finally, year is included in the 
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models as T-1 time dummies to control for unmeasured country-invariant time specific 
effects.8 
Due to data availability, data have been collected for years 1985, 1990, 1995, 
2000, 2005, and 2010, and countries contribute between a minimum of two observations 
and a maximum of six observations. Thus, the panel dataset is unbalanced with a total of 
106 observations. Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics and the sources of the 
variables used in the analysis. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 One concern is that time dummies reduce the degrees of freedom (Green, 2000). I employ them 
in this study because the degrees of freedom in these models are sufficient and the use of time 
dummies allows the coefficient pattern to be driven by the data, thereby providing more 
conservative estimates (Green, 2000). An alternative is to include year as a linear time trend 
where it is coded as 1 (1985), 2 (1990), up to 6 (2010), forcing the time effect coefficient to lie on 
a straight line. I cross-check the models estimated using time dummies with the results of the 
models utilizing the linear time trend, and the results are consistent (Table 7).	  
	  	   53 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
	  
Variable Description  Mean SD Min. Max. Source 
Real GDP per 
capita (log) 
PPP GDP per capita at 2005 constant 
prices in $US 3.561 .359 2.677 4.360 
Penn World Tables, Heston, 
Summers, and Aten (2012) 
Institutional quality 
Average of the ICRG variables for 
Bureaucratic Quality, Corruption, and 
Law and Order 
.479 .131 .111 .778 Quality of Government Dataset, Teorell et al. (2013) 
Constitutional form Regime type n/a n/a n/a n/a Quality of Government Dataset, Teorell et al. (2013)  
State intervention Fraser Institute’s Size of Government indicator 6.328 1.401 2.373 9.655 
Economic Freedom of the 
World, Fraser Institute  
Savings rates Savings adjusted for natural resource depletion (% of GNI) 10.696 11.283 .008 59.911 
World Development Indicators, 
World Bank 
Vertical resource 
flows 
Oil and mineral exports to high-income 
countries (% of total exports) 34.862 21.099 .048 90.256 
United Nations Commodity 
Trade Statistics Database  
 
Foreign capital 
dependence 
 
Inward FDI stocks (% of GDP) 33.751 28.150 1.381 141.051 
United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development, 
UNCTADstat 
Debt dependence Total external debt stocks (% of GNI) 74.528 58.085 7.919 487.521 World Development Indicators, World Bank 
IMF Pressure 
Number of debt negotiations, 
restructurings, IMF Extended Fund 
Facilities and total IMF loans (% of 
allotted quota) 
 
.141 2.541 -4.767 6.074 
World Bank (1987, 1990, 2000, 
2004, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010); International Monetary 
Fund (1985a,b; 1990a,b; 2014) 
Manufacturing Manufacturing, value added (% of GDP) 14.564 5.446 3.679 27.745 World Development Indicators, World Bank 
Human Capital Average years of schooling in the total population aged 15 years and over 6.165 2.173 1.22 10.17 Barro and Lee (2000) 
Population density People per sq. km of land area 58.176 63.292 1.626 252.813 World Development Indicators, World Bank 
GDP, Gross Domestic Product; SD, Standard Deviation 
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Methods 
Analyses of unbalanced panel data that encompass both within- and between-
country variation, such as those compiled here, can be estimated using three main 
methods - Pooled Ordinary Least Squares (POLS), fixed-effects models (FEM), and 
random-effects models (REM). I utilize the random-effects models (REM) (Stata IC 
11.2) with panel-clustered robust standard errors for theoretical and methodological 
reasons.  
POLS may be inappropriate under this panel structure because errors are likely to 
be correlated within the panels due to unmeasured heterogeneity, which can bias 
regression coefficients (Beck and Katz 1995; Greene 2000; Wooldridge 2002). Scholars 
often use FEM and REM to deal with this problem (Hsiao 2003; Wooldridge 2002). 
However, the FEMs only explain historical variation within countries as they control for 
time‐invariant differences between countries by including country-specific constants and 
differencing away all unmeasured between‐country variation (Halaby 2004). Conversely, 
the REMs include a normally distributed error term to adjust for within-panel error 
correlation, thereby preserving both cross-national (between-country) and historical 
(within-country) variation (Hsiao 2003). The cross-national variation is of greater interest 
in this study than the historical variation, and the models should not restrict the 
independent variable from explaining both types of variation. 
In addition, FEMs are unable to deal with variables that either do not or barely 
change over time. Two of the central hypotheses in this study - the constitutional form 
and the IMF pressure hypotheses - require the ability to analyze time-invariant indicator 
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variables. Only the REMs can accommodate these factors. Thus, in order to preserve both 
between- and within-country variation, and to accommodate the constitutional form 
dummy variable and the IMF pressure indicator, I adopt the REM.9 
To help ensure unbiased and consistent parameter estimates, I also control for 
serial correlation and heteroskedasticity by using robust-cluster standard errors at the 
country level (Huber et al. 2006; Kollmeyer 2012; Wooldridge 2002).10 In addition, in 
studies with small samples, sensitivity to influential cases, outliers, and specific variables 
can be particularly problematic. For the former, I examine residual-versus-predicted 
plots, test for and drop countries with residuals greater than +/-2 in each model. I present 
the results without the outliers for greater robustness, but the findings with the outliers 
included are consistent. For the latter, I conduct an array of sensitivity analyses using 
alternative variables and model specifications, such as REM corrected only for first order 
temporal autocorrelation. The conclusions remain consistent (Table 5).  
The variance inflation factor values (VIF) range from 1.50 to 3.32 with an 
average of 2.21, suggesting that there is not a significant problem of collinearity among 
the independent variables. Table 3 shows that all the correlation coefficients among 
independent variables, except one, are below .5. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 In addition to these justifications, the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test comparing the fit 
between the POLS and the REMs indicate that the REMs give more robust results. The Hausman 
test comparing FEM to REM is irrelevant since only the REM can manage time-invariant data. 
10 The standard, non-cluster robust estimator provides correct standard errors where there is 
heteroskedasticity (unequal variances of the error terms), but not where the errors are correlated 
as a result of unmeasured stable country-specific factors. When there is both heteroskedasticity 
and serial correlation, scholars use a robust-cluster estimator, which accounts for the presence of 
any correlation pattern among errors within units, including both serial correlation and correlation 
stemming from specific unit components (Huber et al., 2006; StataCorp, 1999).	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Table 3. Matrix of Correlations for All Variables	  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1. GDP per capita (log) 1.000             
2. Institutional quality .489 1.000           
3. State intervention .137 -.009 1.000          
4. Constitutional form .282 .147 .132 1.000         
5. Savings rates .225 -.097 -.219 .186 1.000        
6. Vertical resource 
flows 
.127 -.198 -.194 .166 .472 1.000       
7. Foreign capital 
dependence 
.074 .230 .020 .222 .075 -.151 1.000      
8. Debt dependence -.342 -.072 -.177 -.082 .128 .057 .119 1.000     
9. IMF Pressure .039 -.144 .429 -.238 -.427 -.188 -.082 -.063 1.000    
10. Manufacturing .176 .151 .246 -.314 -.347 -.210 -.283 -.136 .175 1.000   
11. Human capital .744 .366 .368 .196 .058 -.071 .378 -.129 .232 -.006 1.000  
12. Population density .364 .107 .266 .711 .019 .088 .135 -.166 -.072 -.018 .278 1.000 
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Results 
Findings I: Economic Development  
 Table 4 reports the results of the REM analyses for the determinants of varied 
development trajectories among oil- and mineral-dependent countries in the Global 
South. Model 1 includes only the time dummies to obtain a baseline estimate. In an effort 
to examine the relative impacts of state characteristics and dependency on development, I 
present the models that regress development on each of these groups of independent 
variables separately before combining them in the final model. Model 2 tests the state 
characteristics hypotheses, that is, whether institutional quality, constitutional form, state 
intervention, and/or savings rates explain this trend, and model 3 examines whether these 
findings hold with the introduction of the control variables. Model 4 examines only the 
dependency/world system variables - vertical resource flows, foreign capital dependence, 
debt dependence, and IMF pressure - and Model 5 introduces the control variables to 
those in model 4. Finally, model 6 includes all the key independent and control variables. 
The results of model 2 show that, of the variables for state structures and policies, 
state strength has a positive, statistically significant effect on economic development at 
the very high p<.01 level. The positive impact of institutional strength remains robust to 
the addition of controls (Model 3). Even in the full model (Model 6), with all the 
dependency/world systems variables and the controls, institutional strength remains a 
decisive factor with a coefficient of .139 that is significant at the .01 level. In addition, 
the results in the final model (Model 6) show that higher savings rates in this sample of 
oil- and mineral-dependent developing countries positively impacts development. Thus, 
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oil- and mineral-rich states with higher levels of savings and greater institutional 
capacities to minimize corruption, maintain the rule of law, and the expertise and 
bureaucratic efficiency to effectively channel resource revenue toward development may 
stave off the resource curse. 
However, not all state structures and policies have significant and positive effects 
on development. The insignificance of the dummy variable for constitutional form 
indicates that the parliamentary and presidential systems do not have significantly 
different impacts on economic development outcomes in this sample of countries. The 
coefficient for state intervention is negative, indicating that, for these countries, higher 
levels of government consumption spending, transfers and subsidies, government 
enterprises and investment, top marginal tax rates are associated with lower levels of 
development. However, this variable is not statistically significant, which suggests that 
state intervention is not playing a decisive role in the economic development of these 
countries. Therefore, the constitutional form and state intervention hypotheses have not 
been confirmed. 
Models 4 and 5 include the variables that test the dependency/world systems 
hypotheses. The results are mixed. On the one hand, consistent with arguments that 
foreign capital dependence and debt dependence are negatively associated with economic 
development, inward FDI stocks/GNI and debt stocks/GNI are strongly negatively 
correlated with per capita income at the very high p<.01 level (Model 4). These results 
are robust to the introduction of the controls and the state characteristics variables 
(Models 5 and 6). On the other hand, the effects of vertical natural resource flows and 
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IMF pressure on the dependent variable are not statistically significant, suggesting that no 
definitive conclusions can be drawn about their influences on development in this 
sample.  
I also note that of the control variables, human capital is found to be strongly 
associated with economic development in this sample of countries, consistent with 
research underscoring the necessity of including it as a control variable. Nevertheless, 
this study provides evidence in support of the perspective that institutional quality of the 
state and savings rates increases economic development, and that foreign capital 
dependence and debt dependence negatively impact economic development in these 
nations. However, there is no evidence for the view that constitutional form, state 
intervention in the economy, vertical natural resource flows, and IMF pressure affect 
development in this sample.
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Table 4. Random-effects Regressions of Real GDP per capita (log) on state structures and policies, dependency/world 
systems, and control variables: 26 oil- and mineral-dependent developing countries, 1985-2010.	  
         (1)       (2)       (3)      (4)      (5)       (6) 
State structures and policies       
Institutional quality  0.124*** 0.124***   0.139*** 
  (0.027) (0.030)   (0.029) 
Constitutional form  0.722 0.185   0.159 
  (0.589) (0.407)   (0.322) 
State intervention  -0.016 -0.032   -0.038 
  (0.035) (0.039)   (0.048) 
Savings rates  0.075 0.119   0.193*** 
  (0.102) (0.088)   (0.054) 
Global structural inequalities       
Vertical resource flows    0.026 0.030 0.026 
    (0.068) (0.078) (0.075) 
Foreign capital dependence    -0.111** -0.110** -0.135*** 
    (0.045) (0.045) (0.042) 
Debt dependence    -0.041* -0.069** -0.091*** 
    (0.022) (0.030) (0.031) 
IMF pressure    -0.016 -0.072 0.059 
    (0.204) (0.140) (0.116) 
Controls       
Manufacturing   -0.029  -0.039 0.019 
   (0.057)  (0.074) (0.073) 
Human Capital   0.466***  0.532*** 0.607*** 
   (0.127)  (0.144) (0.092) 
Population density   0.125  0.146 0.150 
   (0.185)  (0.155) (0.134) 
Dummy variable for each year? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -3.438 -0.356 0.040 -0.425* -0.027 0.098 
 (0.214) (0.220) (0.172) (0.217) (0.138) (0.163) 
Observations 106 106 106 106 106 106 
R2 within .544 .624 .573 .613 .559 .605 
R2 between .021 .165 .679 .001 .690 .824 
R2 overall .005 .214 .661 .011 .661 .790 
Standardized coefficient with the robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Findings II: Social Development  
Tables 5 and 6 report the results of the REM analyses for uneven social 
development outcomes among these countries, namely infant mortality rates and life 
expectancy. Again, for each dependent variable, model 2 tests the state-centered 
hypotheses and model 3 introduces the controls. Model 4 tests the dependency/world 
systems hypotheses and Model 5 examines whether these findings hold with the 
introduction of the control variables. The final model - model 6 - includes all the key 
state-level and dependency/world systems-level variables in addition to the controls.  
The findings presented in Tables 5 and 6 are largely consistent with the results of 
the regressions on economic development. There is consistent evidence in favor of the 
state strength, foreign capital dependence, and debt dependence hypotheses: stronger 
state institutions reduces infant mortality rates and improves overall life expectancy, 
while higher levels of dependence on foreign capital and debt have the opposite effect on 
these social development outcomes. In addition, the evidence concerning constitutional 
form, state intervention, resource flows and IMF pressure are also consistent with the 
analyses of the determinants of varied per capita incomes: these factors have no 
significant impact on infant mortality and life expectancy in this sample of countries. 
Therefore, the same variables that account for uneven economic development in this 
sample of countries also explain their uneven social development. 	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Table 5. Random-effects Regressions of Infant mortality rates on state structures and policies, dependency/world 
systems, and control variables: 26 oil- and mineral-dependent developing countries, 1985-2010. 
         (1)       (2)       (3)      (4)      (5)       (6) 
State structures and policies       
Institutional quality  -.209*** -.190***   -.194** 
  (.059) (.063)   (.069) 
Constitutional form  -.455 .079   .100 
  (.399) (.352)   (.333) 
State intervention  -.042 -.008   -.021 
  (.069) (.075)   (.067) 
Savings rates  .087 .045   .041 
  (.097) (.091)   (.079) 
Global structural inequalities       
Vertical resource flows    -.075 -.098 -.042 
    (.087) (.101) (.099) 
Foreign capital dependence    .201** .197** .208** 
    (.073) (.067) (.067) 
Debt dependence    .059 .082** .078* 
    (.035) (.036) (.037) 
IMF pressure    .105 .191 .174 
    (.178) (.128) (.132) 
Controls       
Manufacturing   -.044  -.109 -.058 
   (.093)  (.096) (.089) 
Human Capital   -.445***  -.556*** -.527*** 
   (.107)  (.109) (.087) 
Population density   -.159  -.112 -.151 
   (.135)  (.085) (.128) 
Dummy variable for each year? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant .903** .794** .379 1.092** .646 .471 
 (.265) (.213) (.200) (.315) (.245) (.245) 
Observations 109 109 109 109 109 109 
R2 within .715 .766 .752 .773 .783 .807 
R2 between .062 .079 .509 .023 .442 .590 
R2 overall .085 .272 .559 .083 .526 .642 
Standardized coefficient with the robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 6. Random-effects Regressions of Life expectancy on state structures and policies, dependency/world systems, 
and control variables: 26 oil- and mineral-dependent developing countries, 1985-2010.	  
State structures and policies       
Institutional quality  .133*** .122***   .132** 
  (.036) (.036)   (.043) 
Constitutional form  .199 -.496   -.609 
  (.472) (.467)   (.504) 
State intervention  -.008 -.023   -.006 
  (.053) (.060)   (.057) 
Savings rates  -.068 -.048   -.024 
  (.091) (.094)   (.079) 
Global structural inequalities       
Vertical resource flows    .101 .110 .039 
    (.056) (.067) (.094) 
Foreign capital dependence    -.138* -.135* -.153* 
    (.062) (.063) (.081) 
Debt dependence    -.087** -.100*** -.120*** 
    (.025) (.029) (.033) 
IMF pressure    -.032 -.076 -.115 
    (.203) (.177) (.156) 
Controls       
Manufacturing   -.012  .042 .021 
   (.060)  (.058) (.069) 
Human Capital   .391**  .312* .476*** 
   (.138)  (.147) (.125) 
Population density   .234  .047 .257 
   (.203)  (.187) (.199) 
Dummy variable for each year? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -.921** -.738*** -.324 -.938*** -.694** -.307 
 (.201) (.210) (.195) (.269) (.227) (.243) 
Observations 107 107 107 107 107 107 
R2 within .727 .762 .709 .816 .802 .769 
R2 between .119 .022 .423 .014 .301 .570 
R2 overall .021 .133 .455 .030 .342 .576 
Standardized coefficient with the robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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One exception is the results concerning the savings rates hypothesis. While Table 4 
shows that higher savings rates have a positive impact on per capita GDP, tables 5 and 6 
show that national savings has no significant effect on infant mortality and life 
expectancy. This result is not surprising. Long-run social development, while shaped by 
economic growth, is not always derived from it, which is why it is critical to look at these 
proxies for the provision of public goods, specifically effective health care delivery 
systems, to get insight into the average societal health and quality of life of the population 
(Brady, Kaya and Beckfield 2007; Firebaugh and Beck 1994). 
 
Sensitivity Analyses 
One concern about these results is that they may be sensitive to specific measures 
and model specifications. Table 7 displays a range of sensitivity analyses. These 
alternatives largely reinforce the conclusions from the main models. For example, Model 
1 in Table 4 replaces the ICRG institutional strength of the state variable from the main 
analysis with an alternative government fractionalization indicator taken from Beck, 
Clarke, Groff, Keefer, and Walsh (2001), which has been used in other empirical studies 
(Bjorvatn et al. 2012). The index goes from 0 to 1 where higher values indicate that a 
highly fractionalized government comprising a large number of parties, and lower values 
denote a more cohesive government, consisting of a small number of parties, possibly 
only one. The results show that the higher levels of government fractionalization 
negatively impacts economic development, confirming the hypothesis that a weak state 
inhibits development. For this and all the other sensitivity analyses, the interchanging of 
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variables, the use of a linear year term, and the results of random effects model corrected 
only for first-order temporal autocorrelation (RE-AR1) analyses does not alter the 
findings from the main model.  
The only exception is Model 5 where foreign investment concentration replaces 
FDI stocks/GNI. The foreign investment concentration coefficient is negative like in the 
other models, but not significant. I suggest that this may be due to missing data and data 
inconsistencies for the foreign investment concentration variable for the nations and years 
in this study's sample.11 Nonetheless, the institutional strength, savings rates, and debt 
dependence variables remain significant in Model 5, indeed indicating that the 
inconsistent results of the foreign investment concentration variable may be due to 
limitations of this particular data. 
Another concern about these regressions is the problem of reverse causality, 
where, for instance, while institutional strength may affect per capita income, per capita 
income may also affect the quality of institutions. This problem could arise if institutional 
quality is correlated with unobservable variables that affect the error term. If these 
unobservable variables vary over time, this could cause inefficient and inconsistent 
results. There is enough evidence in the literature that this study's results are robust. 
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) use European settler mortality as an instrument 
for the strength of state institutions, and Boschini, Pettersson and Roine (2007) use 
fraction of the population speaking a European language and latitude. Both find no 
evidence that income determines institutional quality. Likewise, Curwin and Mahutga 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 See footnote #4. 
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(2014) use second and lagged second differences of FDI measures as instruments for 
foreign capital dependence and find no evidence of reverse causality. In sum, the 
evidence from these robustness checks confirms the results of the main analysis.
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Table 7. Sensitivity Analyses  
 (1) Main 
model 
(2) Using 
Government 
fractionaliza-
tion instead of 
ICRGvariable 
(3) Using net 
national savings 
instead of 
resource-adjusted  
savings rates 
(4) Inward FDI 
flows  (% GDP) 
instead of FDI 
stock (%GDP) 
(5) Foreign 
investment 
concentration 
instead of FDI 
stock  
(6) Debt 
service/export
instead of 
debt stocks/ 
GNI 
(7) Linear 
year term 
instead of 
time 
dummies 
(8) RE-
AR(1)  
State structures and policies         
Institutional quality 0.378*** -.090** .390*** 0.346*** 0.526*** 0.221** 0.340*** 0.320*** 
 (0.078) (.038) (.098) (.095) (.154) (.112) (.098) (.096) 
Constitutional form 0.057 0.085 .027 .038 -.165 0.039 0.050 0.071 
 (0.115) (0.138) (.091) (.143) (.375) (.116) (.110) (.114) 
State intervention -0.010 -0.009 .003 .003 -.010 -0.011 -.012 -.012 
 (0.012) (.012) (.011) (.009) (.007) (.009) (.006) (.010) 
Savings rates 0.006*** 0.005*** .008*** .007*** .010*** .003** 0.006*** 0.005*** 
 (0.002) (.002) (.001) (.002) (.002) (.001) (.002) (.002) 
Global structural inequalities         
Vertical resource flows 0.000 0.001 .000 .000 .002 .000 .001 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
FDI dependence -0.002*** -0.001** -.002*** -.004** -.001 -.001* -.002*** -.002*** 
 (0.001) (.001) (.001) (.002) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
Debt Dependence -0.001*** -0.001*** -.001*** -.001*** -.002** -.002*** -.001*** -.001*** 
 (0.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) 
IMF Pressure 0.008 0.000 -.005 .009 .019 .005 .008 .003 
 (0.016) (.016) (.014) (.017) (.018) (.017) (.016) (.011) 
Controls         
Manufacturing 0.001 0.005 -.001 .001 .004 -.001 .002 .004 
 (0.005) (.005) (.004) (.005) (.004) (.004) (.005) (.003) 
Human capital 0.100*** 0.109*** .115*** .087*** .113*** .097*** .104*** .112*** 
 (0.015) (.016) (.015) (.017) (.012) (.017) (.014) (.012) 
Population density 0.001 0.001 .000 .001 .001 .001 .001 .001 
 (0.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.002) (.004) (.001) (.001) 
Constant 2.810*** 2.827*** 2.764*** 2.856*** 2.579*** 3.007*** 2.797** 2.769** 
 (0.170) (.121) (.117) (.181) (.158) (.170) (.172) (.100) 
Observations 106 105 100 107 61 101 106 106 
R within .605 .573 .668 .570 .803 .633 .579 .571 
R between .824 .772 .886 .814 .899 .754 .828 .825 
R overall .790 .729 .866 .777 .909 .741 .788 .798 
Standardized coefficient with the robust standard errors in parentheses. Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
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Summary 
Most studies of developing countries that depend on income from natural resource 
exploitation show that these countries are cursed by their resources, but some have fared 
better than others. This study is the first to systematically test competing hypotheses 
derived from the state-centered and the dependency/world systems literatures, and assess 
what accounts for the diverging development outcomes among oil- and mineral-
dependent countries in the developing world. The analysis uses a unique dataset 
containing data on per capita income for 26 oil- and mineral-dependent developing 
countries over the period 1985-2010, variables capturing possible causal factors, and 
panel methods that account for unobserved heterogeneity between countries. The results 
provide overwhelming support for the institutional quality, foreign capital dependence, 
and debt dependence hypotheses: stronger state institutions augment economic and social 
development, while higher levels of dependence on foreign capital and debt overhang 
impede development. These factors matter net of other state structures and policies and 
other forms of dependency. However, there is no conclusive evidence that state 
intervention, constitutional forms, vertical resource flows, or IMF pressure harm or 
benefit development in this sample of countries. Greater national savings improves 
economic but not social development. 
This study has implications for state-centered theories of development. It aligns 
with previous research that shows that higher quality state institutions promote 
development (Evans 1995; Amsden 2001), and confirms the argument that natural 
resource revenues do not have the same defiling effect on all resource-dependent states 
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(Atkinson and Hamilton 2003; Orihuela 2013). Those states that are effectively able to 
prevent patronage and nepotism, have cohesive, meritocratic systems for recruiting and 
training personnel, and promote law and order are better able to channel their oil and 
mineral wealth toward national development. However, the lack of evidence to support 
arguments that constitutional forms matter for development suggests that the resource 
curse may only be affecting countries where poor state institutions exist and/or persist, 
regardless of whether those countries have parliamentary or presidential systems.  
Similarly, this research shows that for these resource-dependent countries, some 
state policies matter more for development than others. The findings show that higher 
savings rates improve economic performance (though not social performance). Some oil- 
and mineral-rich countries, such as Trinidad and Tobago, and Chile have established 
Sovereign Wealth Funds, which are special funds to save fiscal surpluses and excess 
resource revenues in order to cope with revenue fluctuations, provide for future 
generations of citizens, and cover future expenditures such as pensions (IMF 2012). The 
results indicate that such savings policies may be a critical to successfully managing the 
economy in the resource-rich context. However, this study does not confirm the idea that 
state intervention policies, involving measures such as more subsidies and state-owned 
enterprises impacts development in these nations. This is not to assert that all state 
intervention is futile. Future research should investigate whether these states employ 
other intervention policies, perhaps not currently captured in the development literature, 
which may have more decisive effects on development outcomes.  
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These findings also present provocative nuances for dependency/world systems 
perspectives, in that not all aspects of global structural inequalities have the same impacts 
on development in this sample of oil- and mineral-rich developing countries. This 
supports Gereffi's (1989) assertion that different forms of dependency have different 
effects on development for different groups of countries. In my sample, higher 
concentrations of FDI have a significant and negative effect on development, which 
supports the view that greater dependence on foreign capital may allow foreign investors 
to exert more influence over the host country's resource-extracting and economic policies 
in ways that are incompatible with national development (Galtung 1971; Kentor and 
Boswell 2003). Similarly, the results confirm arguments that debt dependence constrains 
development (Bradshaw and Huang 1991). Resource-dependent countries with heavy 
debt burdens, such as Bolivia, Guyana, and Zambia, channel revenues from resource 
extraction toward debt repayment rather than economic development programs that can 
raise per capita incomes. Thus, of the mechanisms by which global structural inequalities 
in the world-system can adversely affect developing countries, the oil- and mineral-
dependent countries need to especially guard against the negative effects of foreign 
capital dependence and debt overhang. 
However, the nonsignificant effects vertical natural resource flows and IMF 
pressure fail to support these hypotheses. One possible explanation for the lack of 
evidence to confirm the vertical resource flow hypothesis is that vertical oil and mineral 
exports from the nations in this sample are only moderately correlated with vertical flows 
of total merchandise exports (r=.345, p<.001). This suggests that oil- and mineral-
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exporting developing countries are uniquely positioned in the world system to export 
natural resources to higher-income, equivalent, and lower-positioned countries. Similarly, 
the relationship between oil- and mineral-dependent countries and the IMF may not be 
straightforward. For example, some countries, despite high debt burdens, have managed 
to avoid dealing with the IMF. Syria and Mongolia, for example, have preferred bilateral 
debt renegotiations with major creditors such as Russia over IMF prescriptions (IMF 
2005; EIU 1992). It may also be the case that the IMF may have had more influence in 
the pre-1985 period, which is not captured in this analysis on the 1985-2010 period. 
Another reason for these contradictions may be that prior research has not tested 
these factors alongside the ICRG variable for the quality of state institutions, which 
stands out as an important predictor of development outcomes. Admittedly, some world 
systems/dependency research employing domestic taxation or revenue as the variable for 
state strength find that a stronger state can mediate the negative effects of international 
forces on development (Bradshaw and Tshandu 1990; Bradshaw and Wahl 1991; 
Rubinson 1976; Shen and Williamson 1997, 2001; see also Lee et al. 2007).12 The 
findings in this chapter are consistent with these arguments. However, the bulk of 
research on the effect of vertical trade flows on the environment and development in less-
developed countries control for state strength using government expenditures as a 
percentage of total GDP, and find that this measure has no significant effect (Jorgenson 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 In this paper, government expenditure is captured in the state policy variable for intervention, 
and is indeed found to have no significant effect on development when tested alongside vertical 
resource flows.	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2009b; Jorgenson and Clark 2009; Jorgenson et al. 2009).13 This chapter suggests the 
need to conceptualize the strength of state institutions as structural features of the state 
(bureaucratic efficiency, control of corruption, and rule of law) and include such 
variables in statistical research on vertical trade flows.  
In closing, development outcomes in resource-dependent countries have been 
analyzed from a variety of perspectives, and research on these countries is breaching new 
frontiers, now aiming to pinpoint why some perform better than others. This chapter is a 
small step toward adjudicating between different schools of thought and providing 
tangible answers to the question of uneven development among oil- and mineral-
dependent developing countries. The results suggest the need for more nuanced view of 
resource-driven development that considers both domestic and external factors. 
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 I did not use this measure because, to capture only revenue from taxing the population, I would 
have to exclude trade taxes, grants, and rents generated from resource extraction and exports from 
the tax data. This correction procedure results in very limited data points for the countries in this 
sample.	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CHAPTER THREE 
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO:  
A CASE OF STRONG LABOR AND DEVELOPMENT 
Introduction 
On the whole, the cross-national time-series regression analyses provides strong, 
consistent, generalizable evidence that the different institutional strengths of states 
account for much of the variation in the postcolonial development levels among oil- and 
mineral-dependent countries in the Global South. However, we still do not understand 
why some resource-dependent states ended up having stronger institutions than others. In 
this part of the dissertation, the in-depth comparative-historical analysis of two similar 
countries with different development outcomes provides rich causal narratives about the 
mechanisms/historical processes that produced stronger states in some countries and 
weaker states in others, and how these varied institutional strengths shaped postcolonial 
development trajectories.  
As mentioned in chapter 1, T&T are Gabon share a number of important 
similarities. Both became independent from colonial rule in the early 1960s, and had 
similarly small populations, large amounts of oil wealth, and low levels of economic 
development. In addition, both received remarkably similar levels of resource rents since 
independence and engaged in almost identical government spending patterns, which 
traditional resource curse theorists predict should produce similarly low development 
outcomes. Yet, today, T&T citizens have, on average, three times the per capita GDP and 
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are far healthier than their oil-rich Gabonese counterparts, facts that the resource curse 
theory cannot explain.  
Indeed as the statistical analysis in this dissertation would predict – development 
outcomes in Gabon and T&T differ largely because they have different state strengths. 
Figure 6 shows the World Bank's World Governance Indicators (WGI) for each country. 
The WGI is an index of the strength of state institutions which corresponds to those 
features of the state that are theorized to impact development - control of corruption, 
government effectiveness, political stability, regulatory quality, rule of law, and voice 
and accountability. The index goes from -2.5 to +2.5, with higher values indicating a 
better performance on each dimension.  
 
Figure 6. Comparing Institutions in Trinidad and Tobago and Gabon, 2010 
 
Source: World Bank WGI 2014 
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It is evident that T&T outperforms Gabon on almost every dimension of state strength. 
The only exception is on political stability where Gabon appears more “politically stable” 
than T&T. This is explained by the fact that Gabon has only had three presidents since its 
independence in 1960, of which two were father (Omar Bongo Ondimba, hereafter 
referred to as Omar Bongo) and son (Ali Ben Bongo Ondimba, hereafter referred to as 
Ali Ben Bongo). Gabon also officially became a one-party state without free and fair 
elections from 1968 to 1990 when multiparty legislative elections were reintroduced. 
However, since 1990, Gabon politics is still controlled by pre-existing ruling party and 
the former President's son Ali Ben Bongo, and continues to register very low levels of 
political rights and civil liberties (Freedom House 2015). Conversely, T&T has had a 
strong record of postcolonial elections and governmental change. Nevertheless, overall, 
T&T has a stronger state than does Gabon, and a corresponding higher development 
outcome despite their similarities and shared oil dependence. What explains this 
difference? 
This question immediately takes me to the colonial legacies literature. This body 
of work has already addressed why, in all colonies, not just resource-dependent ones, 
some countries would have stronger state institutions that are able to direct economic and 
social development in the postcolonial period while others have weaker states and 
commensurate low levels of development. In what follows, I review the prominent 
development theories from the colonial legacies literature. Next, I briefly summarize my 
cases and detail how they differ from the mechanisms that are supposed to account for 
their states and development outcomes. Based on the limitations of these explanations, I 
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present a different approach - a postcolonial approach - that accounts for Gabon's and 
T&T's development outcome. Then, the following two chapters will present the detailed 
historical narratives of state-building and development trajectories in Gabon and T&T. 
 
Colonial Legacies 
In the colonial legacies perspective, contemporary development outcomes are 
viewed as manifestations of historical institutions determining the distributions of income 
and power. In formerly colonized societies, these levels and types of inequalities were 
heavily influenced by the institutions established by the colonial powers. Thus, scholars 
in this literature focus on the types of institutions created by colonial agents, from 
European settlers to colonial administrators.  
Some trace institutional differences in post-colonial societies to the work of 
European settlers: European colonizers establish more or less extractive institutions 
depending on the degree to which they were able to settle in a particular territory 
(Acemoglu et al. 2001, 2002; Engerman and Sokoloff 2002). For instance, Acemoglu et 
al. (2001, 2002) distinguish between two forms of colonialism - “settlement” and 
“extractive.” Settlement colonies were established in sparsely-populated territories with 
benign disease environments, since these areas were favorable to large-scale European 
settlement. There, the settlers transposed institutions that protected property rights and 
effective legal systems, which promoted economic growth and development in the long-
run. In contrast, in areas with large indigenous populations and harsher disease 
environments, European settler mortality rates were high. In these territories, colonizers 
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established extractive institutions, defined as institutions that “concentrate political power 
in the hands of a few who used their power to extract resources from the rest of the 
population,” (Acemoglu et al. 2002:14). These institutions inhibited post-colonial 
economic growth and development. 
These theories, while compelling, do not thoroughly explain the experiences of 
T&T and Gabon. Both were “extractive” colonies according to Acemoglu et al.'s (2001, 
2002) categorizations. Endemic tropical diseases such as malaria and yellow fever 
claimed the lives of many Europeans attempting to settle in these two regions (Brereton 
1981; John 1988:6; McNamara 1989:19). Consequently, the settler populations were very 
low. On the eve of independence in 1960, the white population in T&T and Gabon were 
both comparably low: whites represented approximately 1.9% of the population in T&T 
(MacDonald 1986:146), and 0.9% in Gabon (McNamara 1989:138). The few Europeans 
that did settle indeed established extractive institutions of repressive labor practices and 
natural resource exploitation. In T&T, subordinate classes during colonialism were 
subjected to plantation slavery, indentureship, and later low-wage work, for the 
production of sugar, cocoa, coffee, and oil (Brereton 1979; John 1988; Millette 1985; 
Robinson 2001; Williams 1964; Wood 1968). Likewise, in Gabon, workers underwent 
forced labor policies and low-wage work to extract timber and other forest products for 
large concessionary companies (Gray 2002). Yet, despite sharing a historical legacy of 
extractive institutions under colonial rule, T&T performed relatively well while Gabon 
remained underdeveloped. Therefore, this theory of institutional transfer based on 
European settler rates does not explain the divergent outcomes. 
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Another perspective on the effective transfer of European institutions by colonial 
agents focuses on the colonial state's methods of colonial domination - namely, direct and 
indirect rule. According to this perspective, in colonies under direct rule, colonial 
officials dismantled preexisting indigenous political institutions, and established 
centralized, bureaucratic, legal-administrative institutions based on formal rules derived 
from European law, which promoted post-colonial economic development. Conversely, 
in colonies under indirect rule, colonial officials in the formal bureaucracy collaborated 
with indigenous intermediaries, such as chiefs, who controlled regional areas and 
institutions, which created despotic institutions that impeded post-colonial development 
(Banerjee and Iyer 2005; Boone 1994; Gerring et al. 2011; Lange 2004, 2009; Mamdani 
1996; Migdal 1988; Reno 1995). 
On the surface, T&T appears to have experienced direct colonial rule under the 
British and Gabon indirect rule under the French. In T&T, colonial officials controlled 
the colonial state apparatus, and there were no indigenous-controlled customary courts 
existing side-by-side with colonial courts (Lange 2009). However, unlike other directly-
ruled colonies, the political institutions under British colonialism were far from 
meritocratic, rational, or inclusive. The British colonial government retained the Spanish 
legal system until 1844. Consequently, there were many legal inconsistencies, which 
created significant disorganization for police work and the maintenance of law and order 
(Ottley 1964:30-36). The magistracy was run by officials who lacked legal training and 
familiarity with the formal laws, performed several other administrative duties, and were 
all connected by family or friendship ties (Trotman 1986:82-85; Titus 2009:4-5, 12-15). 
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The colonial police force was very small, suffered from high turn over rates, low pay, and 
harsh working conditions (Ottley 1964; Trotman 1986:99-100). The officers are 
described as “totally corrupt - accepting bribes, perjuring themselves in court, and even 
taking part themselves in other illegal activities” (Trotman 1986:99). In addition, the 
colonial administration had difficulty recruiting local officers. Consequently, the 
overwhelming majority of policemen came from outside T&T and they did not speak 
French Patois, which was then, the language of the masses (Ibid:99-100).14 Finally, while 
directly-ruled colonies such a Mauritius were generally granted their own legislatures 
throughout the British colonial rule, T&T was not allowed one until 1831, at which point 
the Governor appointed all members. It was not until 1925 that locals could be elected to 
the Legislative Council (Ledgister 1998:96-98). Thus, throughout the period of British 
colonial rule, the institutions could hardly be described as consistent, legal-rational and 
representative as was the case in other directly-ruled colonies. 
Similarly, in Gabon, the form the colonial rule cannot neatly be categorized as 
“indirect.” In fact, many scholars characterize French colonial rule as “direct” because it 
tended to emphasize direct political association with the metropole and the formal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 The Spanish colonized Trinidad in 1498 and the few native Amerindians who had survived the 
introduction of European diseases were forced into slave labor. In 1783, after about 200 years of 
underpopulation, economic stagnation, and colonial neglect, the Spanish administration 
liberalized its immigration policy and allowed non-Spanish Catholics to migrate to Trinidad 
(Abraham 2007:19; Magid 1988:3-10). Extractive institutions expanded as the majority of 
immigrants were French Catholics and their slaves, which transformed the colony into an African 
slave economy and a vibrant sugar, cocoa, and coffee exporter (Brereton 1979; John 1988; 
Millette 1985; Robinson 2001; Williams 1964; Wood 1968). 
 The British captured Trinidad in 1797, and administratively united it with Tobago in 
1888. When the British arrived, they encountered a Spanish colony, administered under Spanish 
laws, but the French community outnumbered the Spanish 20:1, and French/French Patois was 
the lingua franca (Magid 1988:28).	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incorporation of chiefs into the administration (Fisher 1991). In 1897 in Gabon, the 
colonial administration imposed rule of law in courts administered by colonial officials, 
and “African communities of the Estuary brought their conflicts before colonial 
authorities” (Jean-Baptiste 2014:136). However, historians note that “French personnel 
who presided over courts had little to no training or expertise in jurisprudence,” which 
was similar to the situation in T&T (Ibid). By the mid-twentieth century, the colonial 
state had successfully captured the administration of justice away from indigenous 
leaders (Idourah 2001:241). Admittedly, from the 1920s, the colonial court system started 
relying on French-appointed chiefs to reconcile civil conflicts as long as “local customs” 
were not contrary to “French civilization” (Jean-Baptise 2014:138). But even so, these 
chiefs were formally incorporated into the French bureaucracy, and there was not one 
body of customary laws as was the case in much of the rest of African colonies that were 
subject to indirect rule in the 1930s (Ibid:138). Thus, neither Gabon nor T&T neatly fit 
into conceptual categories of direct and indirect rule making it difficult to predict their 
development trajectories based on this theory.  
A third explanation also focusing on the institutional work of colonizing agents 
examines variations in levels of colonialism, defined as the extent to which both colonial 
authorities and settlers installed transformative institutions (Lange et al. 2006; Mahoney 
2010). They argue that the political economic models of the colonizing power and the 
institutional complexity of precolonial societies influenced the level of colonialism in 
colonized territories, which, in turn, affected development outcomes. Colonizers adopted 
either the mercantilist political economic model, where accumulation was based on short-
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run consumption and economic self-sufficiency, more trade and ownership restriction and 
status-based stratification, or the liberal model, where accumulation was based on long-
run investment and international comparative advantage, fewer trade and ownership 
restrictions, and market-based stratification systems (Mahoney 2010). Precolonial 
societies are categorized as having high levels of complexity, that is those multiethnic 
societies with class-based relations, with centralized, bureaucratic political institutions, 
and a complex division of labor based on slavery and agriculture, or low complexity, 
characterized by “bands and tribes ... hunting-gathering, herding, and horticultural 
societies ... with decentralized and non bureaucratic decision-making institutions ... they 
lack a significant division of labor ... with a homogenous ethnicity and a single language; 
kin-based relationships; frequent mobility; and the absence of formal religion, central 
authority, and systematic labor exploitation” (Ibid:24-25).  
According to this theory, mercantilist colonizers tended to pursue higher levels of 
colonialism in areas with very complex indigenous societies. Here, colonial authorities 
and settlers exploited already-developed coercive labor systems and set up powerful 
monopolies, which resisted competitive markets and redistribution, negatively impacting 
long-term post-colonial development. In contrast, liberal colonizers tended to pursue 
higher levels of colonialism in societies of low complexity, because the indigenous could 
be easily eliminated, allowing for the relatively smooth transfer of market-based 
institutions that replicated those in the metropole. This had comparatively positive 
impacts on these nations' development trajectories (Lange et al. 2006; Mahoney 2010). 
However, a close comparison of the colonial history of T&T to this theory of 
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colonial legacies reveals several issues that weaken its explanatory power. These scholars 
classify T&T's society prior to British colonialism as of “low complexity.” However, as 
previously described, historical work shows that when the British arrived there was a 
significant division of labor comprised of French planters and African slave labor for 
intensive agricultural production. Also, the political system of the cabildo under Spanish 
law was in place. It was centralized and bureaucratic, and excluded the multiple non-
white ethnicities in the colony (Brereton 1979; John 1988; Millette 1985; Robinson 2001; 
Williams 1964; Wood 1968). Thus, T&T, prior to the onset of British rule, does not fit 
these theorists' definition of “low complexity.”15 Rather, it is consistent with their 
classification of a more complex society, and accordingly T&T should have experienced 
low levels of colonialism and therefore low development outcomes. Yet, T&T's 
economic performance defies these predictions. Likewise, Gabon does not fit the causal 
predictions of these theories. Pre-colonial society Gabon indeed had a low complexity, 
was colonized by mercantilist France, and experienced low levels of colonialism. 
However, Gabon did not attain high levels of post-colonial development. Therefore, the 
mechanisms described in these theories do not explain the development outcomes in T&T 
and Gabon. 
 
A Postcolonial Approach 
Overall, the colonial legacies literature has been persuasive in showing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15. The scholars rely on the work of Newson (1976) to categorize T&T. However, this work 
focuses mainly on interactions between the Spanish colonizers and the indigenous population. 
Only one chapter is devoted to the political and economic changes initiated by French 
immigration to the island. 
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continuities between institutional arrangements during the colonial period and post-
colonial development outcomes. Colonial agents, namely European settlers and colonial 
administrators, are identified as the main actors responsible for the construction of strong 
and weak institutions in colonial territories, which in the long-run, have differential 
impacts on post-colonial development. However, these theories are inadequate for 
explaining T&T's and Gabon's development experience. I argue that the explanatory 
power of these theories can be increased by adopting a postcolonial approach to the study 
of the legacies of colonialism upon T&T's and Gabon's post-colonial development. 
This “postcolonial approach” comes from postcolonial theory. Postcolonial theory 
has sought to critique and redress Western colonial systems and their economic, political, 
cultural, and psychological vestiges (for an excellent review of postcolonial theory, see 
Go 2013). It has taken on a variety of meanings in different disciplines: provincializing 
rather than universalizing European history (Chakrabarty 2000); attending to how ways 
of representing the non-Western world support Western imperialism (Bhabha 1994; Said 
1979, 1993; Spivak 1986; Spivak and Harasym 1990; Gandhi 1998; Young 1990); 
showing how the racism of colonialism affects the colonized, colonizer, and their mutual 
constitution (Fanon 1965, 1967; Memmi 1965; Mannoni 1964); showing interconnections 
between colonizer and colonized and how they were mutually constituted in the colonial 
encounter, and the constitution of modernity (Bhambra 2007; Hall 1996; Magubane 
2004, 2005; Stoler 1992, 1995); and promoting voices from below, through the use of 
literary texts from the non-Western world (Aschcroft et al. 2002) and an academic 
practice that acknowledges “the subaltern as the maker of his own destiny” (Guha 
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1984:vii; see also Chakrabarty (2002)).  
The “postcolonial approach” that I use in this study comes from these latter two 
points. It refers to a mode of analysis that takes into account the interactions between 
colonizer and colonized, and the agency of the colonized in shaping the range of 
possibilities for the colonial and postcolonial state. In the colonial legacies literature, 
colonial agents are credited with transferring, installing, and extending institutions to the 
rest of the population. The colonized are not considered to be integral to and deeply 
involved in the construction of these institutions. Rather, they are implicitly regarded as 
objects, recipients, or inheritors of the institutions transferred by the colonial agents. 
According to Go (2013:14), these theories focus “upon what the imperialists and 
colonizers do without reference to their embeddedness in interactive local environments” 
and “the explanatory “factors” are rarely if ever the actions of colonized groups.” 
Consequently, the colonial legacies theories fail to capture possible alternative actors 
involved in and causal pathways to institutional development. My postcolonial approach 
explicitly shifts the analysis from examining institutional outcomes as a product of 
institutional transfer to that of institution-building processes emerging from interactions 
between the colonizer and colonized, and considers the colonized as a possible factor 
affecting development outcomes. In doing so, new explanations of the factors and 
processes contributing to post-colonial outcomes are uncovered. Using a postcolonial 
approach to the colonial history of T&T and Gabon, I find that organized labor was a 
critical agent in shaping postcolonial development trajectories.  
The impact of organized labor has been extensively examined in studies of 
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democratization (Collier 1999; Rueschemeyer et al. 1992), institutions of governance 
(Lee 2007), development strategies (Deyo 1990; Tenorio 2014), and development 
outcomes (Bergquist 1986; Heller 1999; McGuire 1999). My research extends this work 
by showing how differences in the strength of labor helped produce varied development 
outcomes in T&T and Gabon. Thus, by using a postcolonial approach, I bring together 
two literatures that are not commonly in conversation: the colonial legacies literature and 
the literature on labor movements. 
Using a postcolonial approach, my comparative-historical analysis of T&T and 
Gabon reveals that the colonial legacies literature, because it emphasizes the role of 
colonial agents in transferring institutions from Europe to the colonies, misses the role 
played by organized labor in shaping post-colonial trajectories. In both countries, during 
the colonial period, settlers, colonial officials, and foreign capital imposed repressive 
institutions of labor exploitation and political exclusion on the colonized. In T&T, a 
strong labor movement, spearheaded by workers in the oil sector, and state-labor relations 
shaped by British imperial interests in a secure source of petroleum produced institutional 
change away from repressive labor practices and toward improved living standards for 
the lower classes, better industrial relations between resource-extracting companies and 
workers (in addition to state expansion and democratization). This legacy of a strong 
labor movement and a state-labor relationship based on protest and concession survived 
the decolonization period and continued to shape state institutions and the channeling of 
oil revenue into development in the post-colonial period. Conversely, in Gabon, 
organized labor was comparatively weaker, which allowed state-building to remain in the 
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hands of political elites and colonial officials, who established extractive, predatory state 
institutions. This legacy persisted into the post-colonial period and the weak state 
institutions were unable to transform oil wealth into prosperity for the population.  
 
Trinidad and Tobago 
Introduction 
Prior to oil exploitation in southern Trinidad in 1907, the working class was weak 
and dispersed. Slave revolts on the sugar and other agricultural estates were not 
uncommon but swiftly crushed by colonial authorities (Magid 1988:70). When slavery 
was abolished, the East Indian indentured laborers who replaced the slaves on the 
plantations, though large in number, and victims of racial discrimination, low wages, 
malnourishment, and high morbidity rates, lived in isolation on the estate barracks and in 
rural communities on the fringes of the plantations, and remained largely outside of local 
politics prior to the end of indentureship in 1917 (Thomas 2012:238). The former black 
slaves moved off the plantations and quickly settled in urban areas and the oil belt, which 
became concentrations of working class communities (Abraham 2007:26). However, 
early urban workers protests were isolated and sporadic.  
Once workers in the oil sector began to mobilize, the landscape of protest and 
trade union activity in the colony was fundamentally altered. In the early decades of the 
twentieth century, the T&T economy enjoyed growing prosperity as sugar (and other 
crops), asphalt, and petroleum exports boomed (Jacobs 1977:9,12; Kiely 1996:70; Magid 
1988:33; Ryan 1972:47-48).  In the 1936-37 financial year, the five major oil companies 
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in T&T paid dividends averaging 25% (Johnson 1975:49 ft.11). Sugar companies 
declared dividends of 5.5 to 7.5% (Ryan 1972:47). While the small affluent class in the 
colony enjoyed this economic upturn, the working classes suffered under the economic 
woes engendered by WWI, including low wages, rising food prices, and poor health, 
education, and sanitation services (Ibid:34-35). Moreover, the colonial state further 
harassed workers through the 1918 Habitual Idlers' Ordinance - legislation that any 
unemployed male could be committed to a government-run agricultural program to be 
taught the “habits of industry” and subsequently transferred out to private employers for a 
low wage - which workers considered to be another repressive form of labor control akin 
to indentureship (Elkins 1969:73; Kiely 1996:66).16 Workers also faced racial 
discrimination by white company management from the US, UK, and South Africa, 
limited educational opportunities, and acute income inequality (Jacobs 1977:9-10).  
In addition to repressive labor legislation, there were neither institutional 
bargaining mechanisms nor broad political representation systems (Johnson 1975:30-31; 
Rennie 1974:25; Ryan 1972:46,49-55). Petitions, memorials, and repeated requests for 
meetings with government and company officials fell on deaf ears. The workers 
themselves argued that this is what forced them to adopt more militant methods of 
seeking reform (Jacobs 1976:223; Samaroo and Girvan 1972:219). In a letter dated 1936 
to the Acting Governor, Tubal Uriah “Buzz” Butler, an oil worker who emerged as 
perhaps the most influential labor leader in the colony stated,  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16. The bill became law in 1920 but was never effectively implemented and the agricultural 
settlements were never constructed. Nevertheless, over 3000 people signed to have this law 
repealed (Elkins 1969:73). 
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“…I am to inform you that the prevailing Spirit of the vast majority of your Fellow-
Citizens of the great Empire of the Working-classes in Trinidad and Tobago brook no 
further delay on the part of the government in instituting British Constitutional Measures 
to remove for all time the “fascist” touch or taint in the General Life of Our Country and 
Empire which we at least see and deplore … do not tempt us to be disloyal … do not 
tempt us to become lawbreakers! We want bread and full equality with all our fellow 
Britishers. Great wide power are today ours for any use against fascism and British un-
constitutionalism” (Jacobs 1976:211-212).  
 
In a letter to the attorney for Apex (Trinidad) Oilfields Ltd., Butler charged 
company officials with a “… policy of creating and spreading disaffection, dissatisfaction 
and disloyalty amongst certain followers of us … when, on the most obviously foolish 
and insincere pretexts, you dared to turn deaf ears, to turn down Petitions praying for a 
general increase in the Wages of all your employees” (Jacobs 1976:223). He goes on to 
argue that the Apex officials, “… are altogether responsible for the spirit of restlessness, 
and lawlessness, discontent and dissatisfaction which clearly manifests itself in the ranks 
of the Petroleum Workers of the Colony whose ambitions - British ambitions - not the 
least of which is ‘A Higher Standard of Living’ - you have so ruthlessly trampled 
underfoot in the best known Fascist style” (Jacobs 1976:223). In a letter to the Governor, 
Butler indicates “the present hostile attitude of the Oil Workers being what it is as a result 
of the failure of their many and varied constitutional pleas, prayers, petitions for more 
pay and better all round conditions of life and labour on the oilfields of the colony …” 
Jacobs (1976:224). The lack of institutions for mediating worker-management relations 
and the unrepresentative political system left workers with little outlets through which to 
air their grievances. 
In 1917, a mere 10 years after the first oil discovery, oilfield workers at the 
United British Oilfields and asphalt workers at the Trinidad Lake Asphalt Company 
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organized two strikes for higher wages (Thomas 2012:237). The colonial government 
quickly restored order and sentenced the strike leaders to prison (Abraham 2007:27). 
However, this superficial tranquility was very short-lived, as the oil workers would again 
lead labor unrest, and bring together workers in other industries to form a colony-wide, 
multi-sectoral, and multi-racial working class movement. In the following narrative, I 
explain T&T's institutional development as the product of labor uprisings in two key 
historical moments - the 1919-1920 and the 1935-1940 labor riots. 
 
Colonial labor in T&T  
I have identified several characteristics of T&T's labor movement that enabled it 
to stimulate institutional strengthening of the state, which, in turn, promoted improved 
resource management and long-term economic and social development: Labor 
mobilization in T&T was locally generated, workers engaged in social-movement 
unionism, workers were united across economic sectors and across racial groups, and the 
unrest lasted for a significant period of time. 
First, the movement was indigenously-generated. Working class agitation for 
higher living standards and access to the state began in the oil enclaves in T&T, by oil 
workers. Fyzabad, was one of the main oilfield towns where the predominantly black 
workers in the oil sector were most concentrated and living in deplorable conditions. The 
town had “a reputation for seediness and tough public order policing; its poor housing 
and lack of amenities inversely matched by the large numbers of unemployed laborers, 
prostitutes and street hawkers...” (Thomas 2012:241). It was here that workers developed 
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the class consciousness, networks, and mobilization strategies to challenge capital and the 
state. Over time, a vibrant working class consciousness developed and the town became a 
hub of strikes, protests, and labor uprisings (Abraham 2007:26). The 1919 uprising was 
started by workers at the Trinidad Asphalt Company and oil workers who struck for 
better wages, overtime rate increases, and a reduced working day (Kiely 1996:66; 
MacDonald 1986:49). They also demanded “equality of wages between “native oil 
drillers” and “European oil drillers”” (Samaroo and Girvan 1972:218). Likewise, the 
1930s unrest began when the Forest Reserve Oilfield workers of Trinidad Leasehold's 
Limited went on strike. Thus, the workers were organizing themselves in pursuit of a 
better standard of living. 
Second, the oil workers engaged in social-movement unionism, defined by Gay 
Seidman (1994:2) as “an effort to raise the living standards of the working class as a 
whole, rather than to protect individually defined interests of union members.”17 T&T 
workers in the colonial period demanded not only proper trade union laws and job 
security for workers, but also broader health insurance laws, “the right of blacks to reach 
the highest position of thought and labour in the Colony”, more liberal divorce laws, 
facilities for the unemployed to get jobs, social legislation for workers, and for people to 
get the land that the oil companies were increasingly monopolizing (which resonated with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Social movement unionism has also been defined as when workers strikers do not work within 
the channels of collective bargaining, but rather challenge authorities in unpredictable and 
creative ways, calling their neighbors for support in strikes in spontaneous and energetic social 
movement-type organizing (Waterman 1979); often involving dancing, chanting, militant striking 
outside the formal industrial framework to challenge employers and the state (Webster 1988); and 
more than just narrow worker demands, they link worker demands for rights at work to 
community demands for more rights and services (Seidman 2011) and also political 
democratization (Scipes 1996; Seidman 1994) and inclusion (Koo 2001).  
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sugar and other agricultural workers who were predominantly tied to the land) (Jacobs 
1977:20). According to Butler, “We want bread and full equality with all our fellow 
Britishers” (Jacobs 1976:212). Furthermore, workers wanted the colonial government to 
adopt a more active role in the mediation process. In a letter from Butler to the Governor, 
he pleads, “it is most desirable that you Sir accede to our demand for an early meeting of 
representatives of the Employer and Employee class before Government” (Jacobs 
1976:224). Such a campaign linked the oil sector workers to the communities, challenged 
both the state and employers, and aimed to bring about broad socio-economic 
improvements for the working class as a whole.  
Third, the strength of the movement also lay in the formation of formal alliances 
between workers and working-class organizations, across economic sectors and racial 
divisions, in both the 1919 and 1930s riots. The oil workers were avant-garde in formally 
co-operating with the only existing working-class organization at the time - the Trinidad 
Workingmen's Association (TWA). Established in 1897, it originally suffered from 
inactivity, factional struggles between the leaders, and dwindling membership. However, 
during the 1919 strikes, the TWA successfully helped the asphalt workers secure a 33.3% 
wage increase and other concessions (MacDonald 1986:49; Samaroo and Girvan 
1972:213). The organization also won a 25% wage increase from the shipping companies 
for the stevedores under the leadership of Arthur Cipriani, a middle class white radical 
(Abraham 2007:27; Samaroo and Girvan 1972:214). The TWA's success in representing 
strikers taught the lesson that organized agitation produced results (Ramdin 1982). As a 
result, during the 1919-1920 strikes, the TWA rose to prominence as the most influential 
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multi-sectoral working-class organization in the colony and membership expanded to 
include “domestics, stevedores, railwaysmen, tailors, seamstresses, and gold and silver 
workers, agricultural labourers, porters, clerks, and casual and general labourers, as well 
as in regional branches, and separate women's sections” (Reddock 1994:122). As 
membership increased and alliances were formed, the movement gained further strength 
as it spanned multiple sectors. The riots involved Port of Spain waterfront workers and 
City Council sweepers and scavengers, Indian sugar estate workers in parts of northern 
and central Trinidad, and government-employed carpenters in Tobago all followed suit 
(Ibid:214; Kiely 1996:73-74), women workers (Reddock 1994:145), welders from nearly 
all oil and sugar companies, Pan Broilers (Abraham 2007:30), and even power station 
technicians (Jacobs 1977:32-34).  
Trade unions also coalesced across the racial divisions that marked the different 
economic sectors in the colony. In 1936, Black oil workers joined Butler's British Empire 
Workers and Citizens Home Rule Party (Butler Party) (Ryan 1972:45-46).18 In 1937, 
Indian sugar workers came together under Rienzi's newly formed All Trinidad Sugar 
Estates and Factory Workers Trade Union (ATSE) (Singh 1982:20). Despite the racial 
segmentation of particular unions in particular sectors, from 1935 to 1938, Butler, along 
with other labor organizers such as John Rojas, Adrian Cola Rienzi, Blades, Moses, and 
Mentor, rallied what he called his “working-class warriors” and led a strike at the 
southern Apex Oilfields (Kiely 1996:45-46,72-73; Ryan 1972:45-46). They traversed the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18. It is unclear why this was called a “party.” It might be because of the 1932 Trade Union 
Ordinance, which is also why Cipriani renamed the TWA to TLP, but Butler's party was 
essentially a trade union in violation of the ordinance. 
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country urging workers to organize and co-operate across racial and sectoral boundaries. 
They conducted meetings in the sugar estates, established union branches and educated 
workers of the advantages of trade unionism (Singh 1982:23). Elma Francois, urban labor 
leader, traveled to the oil belt and organized her comrades in the colony's capital (Bolland 
1995:92). Organizing workers into unions was a deliberate strategy: under the 1932 
ordinance, workers did not have the right to picket or protection against tort, but they did 
have the legal right to organize collective action and withdraw their labor; for Rienzi, this 
would only work if the vast majority of the workers in a given industry belonged to one 
union (Singh 1982:20). 
 Labor strength increased when these unions and the movement became 
consolidated. Upon Butler's arrest, Rienzi became president of Oilfields Workers' Trade 
Union (OWTU), making him head of the two most important trade unions in the country, 
uniting the two backbone industries (oil and sugar) and the two major racial groups in the 
colony (Blacks and Indians). Rienzi “...discountenanced any attempt by Indians to treat 
Indian grievances as distinct from those of Negroes...the struggle was a 'class struggle' 
and the standard of living of the Indian workers could best be advanced with the support 
of the Negro worker” (Ibid:23). He was also involved in the Federated Workers Trade 
Union (FWTU) in the capital city, which comprised mostly government railroad and 
public works employees (Knowles 1959:80). The resulting OWTU-ATSE-FWTU 
alliance had colony-wide coverage and brought the entire territory to a standstill.  
The context in which this occurred was crucial. The movement also drew strength 
from the fact that T&T was of acute geostrategic interest to the colonial state and the 
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British empire. In 1910, to the British Navy converted from the use of coal to oil (Holton 
1994:53-55). By 1913, T&T was considered Britain's only secure oil source for the Royal 
Navy since British oil companies in Asia, Europe, and Latin America were vulnerable to 
government sanctions, the threat of the revocation of oil concessions, and expropriation 
(Holton 1994:3-4, 54; Jacobs 1977:8). About thirty companies had made tremendous 
investments in the T&T oil sector (Farrell 1974:89-90). As a result, by 1918, T&T had 
become the second largest annual oil producer in Latin America and the Caribbean after 
Peru (Owen 1975:1012). By 1937, 22 oil companies had concessions in Trinidad, and the 
colony was producing approximately 62.8% of the Empire's refined oil and 25% of the 
Royal Air Force aviation fuel (Jacobs 1977:8). This intersection of militant labor and the 
strategic importance of the oil sector in the colony was expressed by one British 
government spokesman in 1938: 
“In 1936 Trinidad produced over 60 per cent of the oil produced from British Empire 
sources, but this was only 0.92 per cent of the world's production. None the less, on 
account of its quality and geographical position, it is of very real significance to the 
Empire as a whole, and in both peace and war the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force 
have a vital interest in the development and modern scientific refining of Trinidad oil. 
Accordingly the security both from external and internal danger of the various oil plants, 
including the pipe lines and refineries has become a matter of imperial concern. It is 
important to us all that good relations between capital and labour in the Trinidad oilfields 
should be built up and maintained” (Johnson 1975:48).  
 
Secretary of State for the colonies, William Ormsby-Gore, also shared his 
concern:  
“The strike is now over and the men are back to work, but I have special reasons for 
desiring that such unfortunate incidents should not recur. The Trinidad oil field is one of 
the few Empire oil fields on which the Admiralty and Air Ministry will have to rely in 
time of war. Already there are large Admiralty and Air Force contracts for the supply of 
different types of oil fuel which are got and refined in Trinidad, including arrangements 
for the putting up of a new 3/4 million pound plant to produce a special spirit of the 
highest grade for our fast fighter aeroplanes for the defense of London. Oil wells and 
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refineries with their complicated machinery are singularly vulnerable to sabotage, and if 
fires started millions of pounds worth of damage can be done. It therefore behooves 
Government in the interest of the State, even more than in those of property, to take all 
such steps as are humanly possible to prevent the causes - and especially the legitimate 
causes - of trouble arising” (Thomas 2012:252). 
 
 
Consequently, the British sought solutions to the labor crisis that would make for 
lasting peace in the colony, particularly in the oil sector. As Ormsby-Gore put it, it was 
imperative that the state be “determined to forestall the possibility of future disturbances 
by a settlement acceptable to the workers” (Ibid:39-40, 48-54).  
In addition, the local repressive capacity of the state was not strong enough to 
deal with the labor unrest. For example, in 1937, when the Forest Reserve Oilfield 
workers of Trinidad Leasehold's Limited went on strike, workers set fire to oil wells, 
opened the pipes and emptied the reservoirs (Teelucksingh 2012:5-6). Locally available 
police manpower was very low and police reinforcements found it difficult to reach the 
oilfields, which were not easily accessible. Strikers, knowing this, further frustrated 
police efforts by disrupting communications, such as cutting telephone and telegraph 
lines, and building roadblocks by felling large trees, digging large ditches, and strewing 
coconuts along the roadway (Jacobs 1977:41; Thomas 2012:244). In this context, the 
colonial state was forced into submission by a powerful movement of the people. 
In sum, the uprisings in 1919-1920 and the 1930s were not isolated incidents, but 
organized colony-wide, multi-sectoral labor unrest which, while initiated by oil workers, 
disrupted the entire colony. The movement reflected the flattening of race and ethnic 
differences as class consciousness came to dominate, which fostered cooperation between 
the two largest ethnic groups in the colony - Indians and Africans - as they both struck 
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side-by-side in the face of hefty fines, imprisonment, and death (Ibid 1972:218). Despite 
opposition by the economic and political elite, organized labor succeeded, in both 
periods, in prompting a wave of institutional reforms within the state that ultimately 
improved the lot of workers in the long-run. 
 
Labor-induced Reforms and the Seeds of Development 
 The white settler community of estate owners, local commercial interests, foreign 
oil and sugar company representatives, and colonial government officials condemned the 
strikes. The local settler elite, represented in institutions such as the Chamber of 
Commerce and the press, such as Catholic News, The Port of Spain Gazette, and The 
Trinidad Guardian, was almost unanimously against the labor unrest. They cried out 
against what they saw as anti-white sentiments, and requested that the Colonial Office 
dispatch significant and permanent white troops and a British naval station to the colony 
to protect their property (Johnson 1975:35-36; Samaroo and Girvan 1972:215; Thomas 
2012:239-245). In the short-term, the colonial government, anxious to restore order, 
secure the oil, and get workers back to the production lines, enacted a number of 
repressive measures, such as the use of British troops from Barbados (MacDonald 
1986:60), arrests, fines, deportations, anti-strike legislation, raids, arms seizures, 
intimidation, police beatings, and killings (Abraham 2007:27-28; Jacobs 1977:27-31, 45; 
Kiely 1996:67; Thomas 2012:240).  
However, the colonial government's handling of the strikes was not all repressive. 
The British were not convinced that sustained repression of such a militant labor 
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movement was the correct course of action to restore lasting peace in the colony. The 
Forster Report argued that the introduction of such force “would create a feeling of 
bitterness and suspicion among the working people and would inevitably render more 
difficult the already difficult task of settling industrial disputes by normal industrial 
methods” (Johnson 1975:42). Thus, the strength of labor threatened British military 
interests forcing the colonial administration to concede to several worker demands.  
The colonial government underwent a wave of institutional reform to improve 
living standards for the workers, alter its role from by-stander to active mediator between 
capital and labor, and widen representation and participation in political institutions. 
First, new, less repressive legislation was introduced, such as the 1919 Truck Ordinance 
which required, with a few exceptions, that wages be paid in money; the Labour Bureau 
Ordinance which aimed to improve the way in which employers recruited workers; and 
the 1932 Trade Union Ordinance which allowed the registration of unions followed by 
the Trades Disputes Ordinance of 1938, which expanded conditions for collective 
bargaining (Kiely 1996:67-74). Direct measures to improve worker wages and living 
standards included the establishment of a minimum wage for unskilled government 
laborers hoping to encourage private companies to follow suit, and this was met with 
some success (Johnson 1975:33).  
Second, institutions were also created to mediate capital-labor relations and 
promote settlements - the Mediation Committee, the Labor Department, and a post for 
secretary of social services (Jacobs 1977:26; Johnson 1975:33-34). In addition, by 1938, 
some ten trade unions obtained official government recognition, a uniquely high number 
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for the British Caribbean (Bolland 2001:276). The same year, Rienzi established the 
Committee of Industrial Organization, which in 1939, became the T&T Trades Union 
Council (TUC) as an umbrella organization to unite the unions in different regions and 
industries (Ibid:276-277). 
Third, the Legislative Council underwent institutional reform. After the 1919 
riots, the wholly governor-appointed Council was expanded to a majority 13 unofficial 
members of which 7 would be elected (Ledgister 1998:97-99; MacDonald 1986:51-53), 
and further to 9 elected members after the 1930s uprisings (MacDonald 1986:62). In 
1940, the Executive Council was reformed to include two elected members and three 
nominated unofficial Legislative Council members; by 1945, the number of elected 
members increased to four and the number of nominated was only one (Ledgister 
1998:101). In addition, institutions governing citizen participation underwent reform. 
After the 1919 protests, the franchise was expanded, albeit based on property and English 
literacy restrictions, and the first ever elections to the Legislative Council was held in 
1925 (Wooding 1960:154). The TWA succeeded in getting representatives from labor, 
namely Sarran Teelucksingh and Cipriani, “the champion of the common people” (James 
1963:403), elected to the Legislative Council in 1925 where they served for about 20 
years (MacDonald 1986:51). Similarly, in response to the 1930s unrest, a franchise 
committee was established and from 1941-1944, three major union leaders - Rienzi, 
Gomes, and Mentor - served as representatives (MacDonald 1986:65). These members 
demanded universal suffrage, which was introduced in 1945 (Ryan 1972:68).  
In sum, the labor movement in T&T was formidable and fought for institutional 
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reforms that would improve the quality of life of subordinate classes. These reforms were 
not initiated by European colonizing agents. The colonial state did not come up with 
these initiatives of its own accord, and the settlers were not in favor of the introduction of 
less repressive, more inclusive institutions because it challenged their economic and 
political dominance. Furthermore, apart from individual radicals of middle class origin, 
such as Cipriani and C.L.R. James, the middle class as a whole was largely inactive in 
pre-war colony-wide politics (McDonald 1986:102). It was the oil workers who both 
ignited and fueled the organization of the Trinbagonian working class, and by threatening 
British oil supplies, emerged as the prime mover behind economic reforms and political 
liberalization during the colonial period. 
 
Preparing for Independence: Labor, Parties, and the State 
Throughout the 1946-1962 period, T&T underwent a number of political changes: 
the white settler elite lost political power, political parties emerged and unions became 
fragmented, the middle class achieved political power, and a ethnicity-based two-party 
system emerged. Nevertheless, trade unions remained politically independent from the 
eventual ruling party and the state, which enabled them to uphold their colonial legacy of 
promoting institutional reform and broad-based development in the post-colonial period. 
The small settler elite group, despite opposing democratization and independence, 
was forced to relinquish their political privilege and institutional control. In 1950, the 
colonial government allowed a quasi-ministerial system of limited self-rule, and for the 
first time in T&T's history, the Legislative and Executive Councils would have elected 
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majorities (MacDonald 1986:80; Ryan 1972:86). In addition, the dominant class no 
longer only included French planters. A mélange of British planters and merchants, and 
Chinese, Portuguese and the Middle Eastern immigrants who had accumulated wealth 
through commerce, also became influential (Rueschemeyer et al. 1992:238). The 
business and planter class opposed democratization and independence as their prospects 
for controlling the postcolonial state slipped away with majoritarian politics (Hintzen 
1989:39-41; Ryan 1972:86-96). However, internal ethnic divisions, in addition to the 
containment of their power under Crown Colony rule, inhibited the formation of an upper 
class that could use the state apparatus to oppress labor. With the expansion of the 
franchise and the introduction of majoritarian politics, the settler business and planter 
class lost control of the state (Hintzen 1989:39-41; Ryan 1972:86-96). 
This period was also marked by the introduction of party politics. Electoral 
constituencies and competition for votes produced infighting between labor leaders, 
different ideologies, and organizing logics that relied less on cooperation between 
workers of all races in all sectors and more on racial differences (Abraham 2007:49; 
Bolland 2001:457-461). For example, union leaders tried to pursue worker interests by 
forming political parties, which resulted in the fragmentation of the trade unions. Butler 
ran for the Legislative Council under the Butler Party, and several other OWTU leaders 
formed the Socialist Party of Trinidad and Tobago, and other labor groups joined the 
United Front party; all eschewed communism while espousing some form of socialism 
and all claimed to represent the working class (Bolland 2001:459; MacDonald 1986:73). 
For the 1946 and 1950 elections, these three labor-led parties plus two other parties 
	  	  
101 
representing the white conservative elite contested the election (Ryan 1972:72-74; 86). 
While the leftist parties together won all the votes and each won seats on the Council, no 
single party or candidate won by a clear majority (Bolland 2001:458-460; Kiely 1996:84-
89; MacDonald 1986:72-74).19 In addition, unions themselves competed for workers. In 
1947, six unions competed to represent railway workers, and there were about six unions 
in the sugar industry alone (Kiely 1996:88-89). As a result, neither unions nor parties 
unified their struggle against the British administration.  
It was not until 1956, that a highly organized, programmatic political party 
emerged - the People's National Movement (PNM) led by Eric Williams - that had 
tremendous support from the black middle class and popular sectors (MacDonald 1986: 
100, 103-105). While the party promoted multiracialism, nationalism, and democracy, the 
members and supporters were overwhelmingly of African descent. To the majority of 
Hindu East Indian masses and white conservatives, the PNM represented not just 
nationalism, but black nationalism, and gave their support to the rival Democratic Labor 
Party (established in 1957) (Ibid:116-117). The PNM ultimately became the ruling party 
in the country's first government, but this entrenched a two-party system in T&T largely 
based on ethnic divisions in the society. 
Despite losing the battle for state control, the unions remained politically 
independent of the ruling party and the post-colonial state. As a result, trade unions 
remained a powerful check on state power. In the 1956-1962 period, Williams recognized 
the need for and courted union support in the battle for decolonization, independence, and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19. In 1950, the Butler Party won the largest bloc of seats on the Legislative Council, but not 
enough to give them influence in the Executive Council (MacDonald 1986:82). 
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to win the general elections. According to Williams, “If there is any group in the 
community which is going to defend democracy and self-government, that group is the 
workers... No Government will survive without the point of view of the labour movement 
behind it... and we have it...” (Ryan 1972:258). He, however, was very resistant to unions 
joining the party as a bloc of guaranteed candidates (MacDonald 1986:106; Ryan 
1972:258). Likewise, the T&T Trades Union Congress, while it endorsed the PNM's 
nationalist principles, maintained that “it would be dangerous for labour to become too 
closely identified with the PNM” without endangering its autonomy (Ryan 1972:256). 
Ultimately, the working class and trade unions, with the immediate goal of independence, 
gave their support to Williams and the PNM. However, the unions retained their 
autonomy and strength, and would challenge the post-colonial state very early in morrow 
of independence. 
 
Legacies of Labor (1962-1973) 
At independence, T&T could be characterized as a two-party system based on 
ethnic cleavages in the population. At independence, approximately 43% of the 
population was Afro-Trinidadian, 36% were Indo-Trinidadian, and 16% were classified 
as mixed race. The remaining 4% consisted of 2% whites, 1% Chinese, 0.3% Portuguese, 
0.2% Syrian and Lebanese, and 0.5% “other” races (Harewood 1971:267). The PNM has 
traditionally maintained the Afro-creole population as its base, and the Indo-Trinidadian 
population has largely supported the People's Democratic Party, which later became the 
Democratic Labor Party (DLP). Since the 1956, Williams’ PNM consistently won every 
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general election until 1986.20  
However, the Williams administration's economic development policies before 
the oil booms of 1973 and 1979 failed to address labor's concerns. The state envisioned 
its role as confined to the provision of favorable infrastructure to attract foreign 
investment, rather than direct involvement in productive activities or employment 
creation. In the 1958 development plan, the government defined it's role as to “create a 
framework which is favorable to investment, and to try to persuade as many persons as 
possible, here or overseas, to create new employment opportunities” (GOTT 1958:4). The 
adoption of this minimalist role was a pragmatic position, based on the small domestic 
market, lack of local expertise and resources required for a more active approach (Farrell 
2012:94). These ideas were translated into the industrialization and development 
program, also called “industrialization by invitation.” A holdover from colonial 
administration, this strategy was based on the ideas of W.A. Lewis and involved 
aggressively welcoming foreign capital by offering generous tax concessions and cheap 
labor, and promoting exports (Mulchansingh 1971:85-86; Palmer 2006:282; Singh 
1984:104). Admittedly, the state, while espousing a clear preference for foreign capital, 
did engage in some limited import-substitutions policies designed to foster growth of 
manufacturing capacities. The state created the Industrial Development Corporation 
(IDC) in 1958 to contact and provide incentives to and protections for foreign and local 
capitalists, locate factory space, and execute industrial policy (GOTT 1958:15-16). T&T 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20. 1956 election results: PNM won 14 of 24 seats and 39% of the popular vote (MacDonald 
1986:110). In 1961: PNM won 20 of 30 seats, and 57% of the popular vote while the DLP won 
the remaining 10 seats and 42% of the popular vote (MacDonald 1986:135). 
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received significant amounts of foreign investment between 1951 and 1970 (Palmer 
2006:282, 284). Manufacturing, excluding petrochemicals and oil refining, increased 
from a contribution of 8.9% of the GDP in 1966 to 11.2% in 1973 (Farrell 2012:106). 
The IDC was successful in registering more than 60 factories producing products such as 
printing, publishing, wood-related products, tobacco, food and beverages, styrotex, 
packaging, electronics, garments, metal fabrication, and more (GOTT 1958:15-16; Farrell 
1979). T&T registered an average annual per capita GDP growth of approximately 3.4% 
for the period 1961-1972 (WDI 2014). 
However, T&T's development strategy did not bring into being the quality of life 
that the working class envisioned. Factories were constructed but employed few workers 
(Carrington 1968:37-43). In addition, sugar and oil producers further mechanized leading 
to more job losses. The petroleum industry was capital-intensive and directly employed 
only 4% of the workforce (Holton 1994:169). In 1968, BP Trinidad Ltd., T&T's second 
largest oil producer, announced plans to eliminate operations in T&T in order to divert 
resources to potentially more lucrative areas in Alaska and the North Sea (Holton 
1994:185). In 1969, Shell also announced their intention to end operations, which 
together with BP, would result in the dismissal of almost 3,000 workers (MacDonald 
1986:155). In the sugar industry, between 1957 and 1961 the number of employees 
decreased from 7,881 to 6,066, a 23% drop in four years (Chalmin 1990:364). Further 
mechanization of cultivation and harvesting in 1965 further reduced the workforce at the 
company by 11% (Chalmin 1990:512).  
Consequently, labor continued to complain of worker retrenchment, repatriation 
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of profits, ethnic favoritism in the job market, foreign control over the commanding 
heights of the economy, income disparities between the upper and lower classes, and 
persistent and rising unemployment, which registered rates of 14 to 20% between 1960 
and 1970 (Kiely 1996:112, 120-123; MacDonald 1986; Palmer 2006:290, 296). In a 
stinging critique of the industrial strategy of the government, labor activist Basdeo 
Panday argued,  
“Government has sought to deal with this problem [of unemployment] by adopting a 
policy of industrialization by invitation; that is, they invite TNCs to set up... screwdriver 
industries...We now have toiler paper that is stamped “made in Trinidad.” What we, in 
fact, do is to import the toilet paper in large rolls and even import the cardboard core, 
then we employ about three people to roll them-that is “industrialization.”” (Panday 
1978:35).  
 
Likewise, George Weekes, newly elected President of the OWTU, criticized 
profit repatriation:  
“I do not say that foreign investment is necessarily a bad thing. In many instances it is the 
only way to develop, but it must be on terms advantageous to the country in which it 
operates in the sense that it must result in a high percentage of local employment and in 
payment of reasonable levels of taxation. This is exactly what the foreign capitalists wish 
to avoid and succeed in avoiding through the help of local governments” (Matthews 
1976:52). 
 
Therefore, economic growth did not meet the expectations of organized labor. 
The legacy of colonial labor persisted into the independence period as a strong, multi-
sectoral, multi-racial and political independent labor movement continued to mount a 
direct and sustained challenge to capital and the state. The labor movement was so 
forceful that it brought the state to its knees just on the eve of first oil boom of 1973, 
which when oil windfalls flooded the economy, shaped the state's use of the revenue in 
ways that promoted rather than inhibited development. 
Between 1960 and 1973, the working class remained active and militant in their 
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attempts to improve their socio-economic conditions. Table 8 shows the number of 
strikes, workers involved, and workdays lost over the period. The number of strikes in the 
country increased from 31 disputes involving 20,898 workers and the loss of 180,573 
workdays in 1960 to 61 disputes involving 17,034 workers and the loss of 130,305 
workdays in 1971 (ILO 1970:826; ILO 1973:793). Interestingly, during the 1969-1970 
period, the number of labor disputes peaked in the same year of independence. In 1962, 
there were 75 disputes involving 15,962 workers and the loss of 164,657 workdays (ILO 
1970:826). Even the youth started organizing. The National Joint Action Committee 
 
Table 8. Labor Activity in Trinidad and Tobago  
Year Number of disputes 
Workers 
involved 
Working 
days lost 
1960 31 20898 180573 
1961 35 12322 145105 
1962 75 15962 164657 
1963 48 17799 204971 
1964 44 8097 95906 
1965 4 7160 88051 
1966 0 0 0 
1967 5 648 3070 
1968 9 681 17568 
1969 9 2767 19972 
1970 64 11280 99600 
1971 61 17034 130305 
 
Source: ILO 1970:826; ILO 1973:793. 
 
(NJAC) was founded in 1969 with members from university students, unemployed, youth 
groups, and older radical sympathizers (Oxaal 1971:22). NJAC, perhaps the most radical 
Black nationalist organization in T&T at the time, was considered by many other 
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government critics as “an irresponsible, racist organization” (Matthews 1976:24,41). 
Nevertheless, NJAC managed to garner a decent following and organized a number of 
strikes across the country (Kiely (1996:112). Therefore, the persistence and enormity of 
social unrest did not end in 1962, but instead, prevailed during the first decade of 
independence.  
 As in the colonial period, workers openly and actively gave support to and stood 
in solidarity with each other across different sectors (Kiely 1996:113). The unrest 
involved workers from a range of sectors: from petroleum and petrochemicals (British 
Petroleum (BP), Texaco, Apex, Shell, Federation Chemicals) to agriculture (Caroni, 
Cooperative Citrus Growers' Association) to services (telephone, Transport and Industrial 
Workers' Union) to manufacturing (Bottlers) to the public utilities and civil service (the 
Lock Joint Sewerage Scheme, Water and Sewerage Authority (WASA), and the Civil 
Servants Association) (Abraham 2007:91; Kiely 1996:94-95,98,100,122; MacDonald 
1986:132-133, 150). The OWTU was critical in this kind of social movement unionism. 
In 1968, the OWTU headed by George Weekes brought together five unions for a 
massive demonstration against unemployment and retrenchment (Abraham 2007:91). In 
1969, the OWTU expanded into other sectors and became bargaining representative for 
workers at the main electricity company (Trinidad and Tobago Electricity Commission), 
a strategic move since these workers are solely responsible for electricity for the entire 
country, and were making inroads into representing the workers at WASA, the 
Telecommunication Services of Trinidad and Tobago and dock workers. NJAC joined in 
support with sugar worker strikes (Palmer 2006:297) and led their own marches in sugar 
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belt with the slogan “Indians and Africans Unite Now” to foster working class solidarity 
(Oxaal 1971:23), and Weekes and the OWTU leadership expressed support for NJAC's 
cause (Kiely 1996:121).  
 The unrest reached a climax in 1970 (Kiely 1996:112, 120-123; Palmer 2006:290-
297).21 In addition to the sugar factory workers strike and the NJAC protests, the Labor 
Congress warned Williams of its intention to “bring the whole community to a standstill 
by calling out the workers in the Port, the Airport, external and internal communications, 
the Civil Service and the daily paid workers...” if no action was taken to meet their 
demands (Kiely 1996:24). This apparent unity among workers across sectors threatened 
to destabilize the nation. What’s more, eight soldiers became mutineers, but the 
commander of the Coast Guard contained them and moved swiftly to arrest protest 
leaders (Palmer 2006:297). The state was on the verge of collapse. 
The state response during this period was analogous to how it had dealt with a 
militant labor movement in the colonial era: repression in the short-term, but, concession 
over the long-term, which improved the institutional strength of the state and the living 
standards of the population. First, facing this political turbulence, the state implemented a 
number of repressive measures to restore peace in the country. The government declared 
several states of emergency, banned meetings and demonstrations in the sugar belt area, 
and issued police searches (MacDonald 1986:150). Labor had this direct impact on the 
state. According to Williams, despite all the public discontent, “it was only when the total 
breakdown of the trade union movement was imminent that I decided to act” (Kiely 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21. See Oxaal (1971) for a detailed timeline of the events leading to the State of Emergency. 
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1996:124). Specific legislation designed to weaken the ability of unions to organize and 
strike were passed, such as the 1965 Industrial Stabilization Act (ISA) and the 1972 
Industrial Relations Bill. Williams, fearing the power of a multisectoral labor movement 
described the ISA as “an attempt to deal with industrial disputes by judicial process and 
to minimize the disruption of the national economy and the losses to the workers of their 
wages which strike action inevitably entails,” and to prevent what was “an open attempt 
to link the trade unions in oil and sugar” (MacDonald 1986:151).  
The ISA laws involved such measures as a greater number of procedures that had 
to be followed before workers could take industrial action (Keily 1996:101). The 
Industrial Relations Bill was more directly aimed at the OWTU in that it prohibited a 
trade union from representing more than one group of workers in “essential industries” 
(e.g. sugar, oil, public utilities, transport, and port facilities) (Kiely 1996:129). Together, 
these measures were effective, at least superficially so. In 1965, only 4 strikes occurred 
involving 7,160 workers, and 1966 was strike-free (MacDonald 1986:151). However, the 
government crackdown only increased anger among labor unions and the working class, 
which led to the emergence of new union leaders and new alliances, and ultimately 
culminated in the events of 1970 and the resurgence of striking shortly thereafter (see 
Table 8) (Abraham 2007:90; Kiely 1996:127).  
However, despite the fact that state was hanging by a thread, it did not introduce 
harsher military repression and other nations did little to help prevent it from falling. The 
British refrained from getting involved in the domestic political situation in T&T. 
Williams requested military assistance from Britain, but the British Prime Minister 
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declined, stating, “no one is better qualified than you to handle the situation,” and adding, 
“I am sure that your wise statesmanship will enable you to overcome successfully this 
emergency” (Palmer 2006:299). Britain conceded the supply of weapons but Williams 
withdrew the request, saying he had already received a shipment (purchased from the 
US). Without British willingness to intervene, Williams appealed to the United States of 
America and Venezuela, but they never landed on Trinidad and Tobago soil, as Williams 
wanted to avoid intervention by white soldiers, which he figured would only made an 
already racially-tense situation worse and local forces efficiently contained the uprising 
(Palmer 2006:300-301). Moreover, a significant portion of the population supported 
efforts to contain the riots. Therefore, while the repressive measures certainly restricted 
political and civic freedoms, it lasted only one year and all except five political prisoners 
were freed, and more drastic military measures were never introduced.  
Short-term repression, as in the colonial period, was followed by concessions, 
which increased the institutional strength of the state. First, the state expanded institutions 
of inclusiveness. Williams organized a much-publicized “Meet the People Tour” and 
“Meet the Party” tours (1963 to 1964), under a philosophy of “direct democracy” defined 
as bringing politicians into direct contact with village-level organizations to discuss 
problems in the communities (MacDonald 1986:148-149). The state tried to grant the 
trade unions greater, though cautious, institutionalized access to decision-making. In 
1963, the National Economic Advisory Council was set with up representative from the 
government policymakers, trade unions and business sector met to formulate national 
economic policies (Hintzen 1981:112; Kiely 1996:96). In 1964, a tripartite conference on 
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unemployment was organized with similar representatives in attendance (MacDonald 
1986:150).22 Such reforms increased inclusiveness, enhanced information exchange, and 
allowed citizens to participate in policy formation and implementation. 
Second, the state also increased its role in the economy. In the Third Development 
Plan, the state noted that “the economy has been acted upon, with the local Governments 
(sic) and people playing a passive dependent role in the process,” and that this position 
has been “modified as a result of the nationalist movement” (GOTT 1970a:7-8). It further 
states that from then on, “The public sector will also not hesitate to enter either alone or 
in partnership with foreign or local private capital into the productive fields of industry, 
tourism and agriculture” (GOTT 1970a:53). Similarly, in a new White Paper on Public 
Participation in Industrial and Commercial Activities in 1972, the state proclaimed its 
intention to become a “prime mover” in the economy, “to move more positively in 
transforming the economy and in reducing the excessive domination of the economy by 
foreign capital and establishing a basis for a greater amount of self-determination in 
economic affairs” (GOTT 1972:4-5).  
One of most significant acquisitions was BP in 1969. The OWTU had already 
been protesting worker retrenchment, and with BP's new announcement to end operations 
in T&T, lobbied for the government to purchase the company to avoid the loss of some 
1,500 jobs and oil revenues (OWTU 1982; OWTU 1967:1-10). Initially, the state 
adamantly resisted acquiring BP as it felt the nation lacked the technical and managerial 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Admittedly, labor felt that government was not taking it seriously as the Second five-year plan 
did not depart significant from industrialization by invitation (MacDonald 1986:149). Moreover, 
in 1967, the Council was reformed and the business sector played a larger role while the role of 
unions was diminished (Hintzen 1981:112). 
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expertise, and the international market access to successfully operate an oil company. 
However, as stated in the Third Development Plan (1969-1973), the state's “concern for 
the declining employment resulted in the decision to acquire the assets of BP and to 
establish a National Petroleum Company” (GOTT 1970a:17). To bridge these two 
concerns, the T&T state forged a joint venture with Tesoro Petroleum Company of Texas 
to form Trinidad-Tesoro Petroleum Co. Ltd., in which the state held the majority 50.1% 
equity and Tesoro assumed responsibility of operating the enterprise (Holton 1994:188). 
Third, the state also increased the channeling of resource revenues toward broad-
based development projects. The government started “Better Village Program,” which, 
with financing from two of the nation's largest multinationals in the oil and sugar industry 
- Texaco and Tate and Lyle, respectively - created community centers, introduced mobile 
health stations, libraries, and postal services, and improved water supplies particularly in 
rural areas (MacDonald 1986:148-149). In addition, to help alleviate unemployment, the 
state placed a 5% unemployment levy on corporate earnings in 1970, which took the 
form of vocational and skill development for the nation's youth, who made up the bulk of 
the unemployed. In 1972, these receipts amounted to approximately $12 million; 969 
students were selected for training; and the funds were used to directly employ more than 
3000 people. According to the Minister of Finance in the 1971 Budget Speech, these 
funds assisted “in the general reduction of tensions in Society and in the improvement in 
social conditions generally in Trinidad and Tobago” (GOTT 1971:40). 
Finally, parliamentary democracy, and open and competitive, free and fair 
elections continued to be upheld. Despite the dissatisfaction with the PNM government 
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and the industrial unrest across the country, and although voter turnout decreased from 
88.11% in 1961 to 65.8% in 1966, the PNM was re-elected. It won 24 of the 36 seats in 
the House of Representatives and 52% of the popular vote (MacDonald 1986:154). The 
DLP, despite adopting a more pro-labor ideology promoting democratic socialism, 
suffered from poor leadership, and infighting between leaders, some of whom had no 
desire to forge an alliance with labor, especially black labor (MacDonald 1986:152). A 
new party, the Workers and Farmers Party (WFP) formed by labor leaders such as 
Weekes from oil and Panday from sugar, and leftist scholars like CLR James, aimed to 
unite a multiracial labor party, but were branded by both the PNM and DLP as 
communist, which did not resonate in T&T (Kiely 1996:110-111). Thus, the politics of 
race superseded the politics of class interest, and many black workers continued to vote 
for the PNM fearing the alternative of an East Indian prime minister (MacDonald 
1986:153). As Weekes explained,  
“I was very popular in the sugar industry and sugar workers were prepared to support me 
though there were doubts in the minds of many oil workers because of the racial problem, 
particularly as the DLP and the newspapers were blowing up the possibility of an Indian 
take over. The Africans became politically scared…they felt I would have taken away 
votes from the PNM and the East Indian candidate might win as a result. Similarly, the 
East Indians felt that if they voted for a WFP candidate, the PNM might have won in a 
DLP stronghold… (Abraham 2007:92).  
 
In fact, the PNM continued to be re-elected and remained in government until 1986. 
These reforms that were instituted as a direct result of the mobilization of 
organized labor increased the institutional strength of the state by expanding 
inclusiveness and regulatory capacity, but they were limited reforms. It was not until the 
booms of 1973 and 1979 that the state received the much needed funds to radically 
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improve its institutional strength, alter its stance on state involvement in the economy, 
and adopt a much more active role in the productive sectors.  
 
Utilizing the Oil Wealth 
This explosive labor situation forced the government to take a more proactive role 
in the economy, and the oil windfalls of 1973 and 1979 provided the state with the 
resources to do so. The state adopted a more active, developmental role in the economy, 
strengthened bureaucratic capacity for managing the resource sector, updated petroleum 
legislation, improved transparency and accountability mechanisms, and became more 
active in the commanding heights of the economy. Organized labor was the force that 
pushed the state to strengthen its institutions, which resulted in vast improvements in the 
economic and social development in the country.  
First, the state, in response to pressure from labor, altered its orientation to the 
economy, switching from facilitator in the Lewis model to a more direct and active 
producer. The T&T government put forward its intention to secure “meaningful 
participation” in industrialization by mandating government participation as a condition 
for licenses in the oil sector, agreed to a certain level of government participation in 
industry, and to, “on its own initiative,” develop projects in line with government 
priorities and plans, seek out private partners for joint ventures and expand into the field 
of petrochemicals and synthetics production (GOTT 1973:622).  
The state created whole new energy-based and energy-related industries. A 
coastal collection of natural-gas-fuelled plants called the Point Lisas Industrial Complex 
was established as a substitute source of revenue to that of the oil sector (GOTT 1981:2). 
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Table 9 lists the industries that were in the complex, including petrochemicals, fertilizers, 
and steel. Constructed between 1977 and 1984, these investments paid off a decade later. 
By the early 2000s, T&T emerged as the world's sixth largest liquefied natural gas (LNG) 
exporter, the largest LNG exporter to the US, the world's largest exporter of ammonia 
and the second largest exporter of methanol (USEIA 2013). 
 
 
Table 9. List of Industries in the Point Lisas Industrial Complex 
 
Name Product 
Investment 
cost for GOTT 
(US$Mn) 
Equity (%) 
Gov Foreign 
Trinidad 
Nitrogen Co. 
Ltd. 
(TRINGEN) 
Anhydrous 
Ammonia 115 51 49 WR Grace 
Fertilizers of 
T&T 
(FERTRIN) 
Anhydrous 
Ammonia 315 51 49 Amoco 
TRINGEN II Anhydrous Ammonia 265 51 49 WR Grace 
Iron and Steel 
Co. of T&T 
(ISCOTT) 
DRI billets 
wire rod 465.7 100 0 
T&T Methanol 
Co. Ltd. Methanol 158 100 0 
T&T Urea Co. 
Ltd. Urea 155 100  
Caroni Water 
Project Water    
Natural Gas Co. 
Ltd. Natural Gas    
National Energy 
Corporation 
Construction 
and Plant 
Operation 
   
Plipdeco  Port Facilities    
Source: Pantin 1988:31-32. 
	  	  
116 
The state became more involved in the economy through purchasing and 
participating in several enterprises from sugar, to manufacturing, and banking and 
finance (Farrell 2012:103). In 1972, the state acquisitions and participation numbered 24 
companies (Farrell 2012:104). However, during the 1973-1983 period, the government 
participated (equity, loans, advances and/or subventions) in more than 60 companies. Of 
these, the government had equity in 54 companies (GOTT 1984:Table VIIIB). 
Accordingly, government participation in companies increased from TT$148.4 million in 
1974 to TT$1461.6 million in 1982 (GOTT 1984:Table VIIIA). One of the most 
significant purchases in this period was of Royal Dutch Shell (Auty and Gelb 
1986:1165). When Shell decided to discontinue its operations in T&T in favor of more 
lucrative ones elsewhere, in 1974, the state purchased Shell’s operations and a new 100% 
state-owned enterprise was born - the Trinidad and Tobago Oil Company (TRINTOC) - 
with the mandate of operating Shell's oilfields and refinery.  
Another major state acquisition was Caroni (1975) Ltd., the dominant sugar 
company in the country. Caroni Limited, owned by the British firm Tate and Lyle, 
became increasingly reluctant to invest in the sugar industry. The company reported 
losses in 1966 and 1967, the future of preferential trade in sugar with Britain seemed 
uncertain, and union demands and labor costs were rising (Singh 1989:93). Given that 
decisions by Tate and Lyle affected the fate of those involved in the sugar industry, that 
is, some 20,000 predominately Indian, highly organized workers, the political fallout 
could be disastrous. Accordingly, oil revenues were used to finance the survival of this 
sector. In 1970, the government purchased 51% of shares in Caroni, and over the next 
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five years, purchased the remaining shares, creating the new Caroni (1975) Limited 
(Munasinghe 2001:103). Sugar workers, in particular, were able to extract vast amounts 
of government subsidies and considerable wage increases despite declining productivity 
(Auty and Gelb 1986:1167-1170). According to Figuera (2003:196), Caroni became “the 
unemployment relief programme of the Indo-Trinbagonians of the cane belt...”  
The state strengthened institutions for managing the resource sector and the 
economy. At independence in 1962, the Ministry of Petroleum and Mines oversaw the 
petroleum sector (Farrell 2012:131). One major step at institutional development was 
government efforts to recruit highly trained personnel for this Ministry in order to 
develop more effective petroleum policy. To meet this goal, the government used the 
resource revenue to offer training programs, scholarships, and on-the-job and overseas 
training for staff in the Ministry to replace expats as much as possible (GOTT 1970a:171; 
GOTT 1970b:25-26). The state also created several other agencies such as an Oil Audit 
Unit in 1974 to assess and collect corporation taxes, advise minister on level of tax 
reference prices and “fair market value” for assessing companies gross income (McGuire 
1981:191). In addition, as a result of the labor unrest, the state noted that it's “concern for 
the declining employment resulted in the decision ... to establish a National Petroleum 
Company” (GOTT 1970a:17). This National Petroleum Company (NPC) was charged 
with control of granting concessions and leases, ensuring the best possible terms for the 
nation, and establishing wholly-owned or joint-venture companies for producing 
petroleum and petroleum-related products (GOTT 1970a:171). The state, instead of 
relying on economists as it did under the first three development plans, turned now to 
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engineers and created the Coordinating Task Force headed by Ken Julian, an electrical 
engineer. This body later became the National Energy Corporation (NEC) in 1979. It 
formulated energy and industrial policy and supervised various state investments in the 
petroleum and energy-based industries (Boopsingh and McGuire 2014:23). In 1993, the 
NEC then became a subsidiary of the National Gas Company and concentrated on 
developing the industrial estates and marine infrastructure for the plants (Farrell 
2012:123). Moreover, paired with the introduction of new agencies, old, defunct, non-
functional organs such as the Energy Secretariat and the Petroleum Institute were 
terminated (McGuire 1981:194).  
Legislation for managing the oil wealth was also updated. Dr. Fuad Rouhani, first 
OPEC secretary general was invited to help align T&T's licensing and fiscal policies with 
those of major oil producers. The recommendations published in the Mustophi Report 
were codified in the Petroleum Act of 1969 and Petroleum Regulations of 1970 to govern 
and regulate activities in the oil sector (GOTT 1970b:23-25). The previous laws required 
companies to pay royalties on crude oil production (10-12%), an oil impost to defray 
administrative costs of running the Ministry of Petroleum and Mines, licensing fees for 
operating in T&T, and corporate taxes of 42.5% of taxable income (Calvin-Smith 
1979:44-45).  
With the oil boom, the state moved quickly to alter fiscal measures in order to 
“ensure that the country derived an equitable share in the profits which accrued to the oil 
companied from the price increase” (GOTT 1974:vii). The Petroleum Act of 1974 taxed 
exploration, production, refining and marketing separately; increased the 
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corporate/petroleum profits tax from 45% in the pre-1974 period to 47.5% in 1974 and 
50% in 1975; made provisions for the imposition of a Refinery Throughput Tax; and the 
pricing was changed from company pricing to tax reference pricing set by the Board of 
Inland Revenue. Royalties remained at a rate of 10 to 12.5%. The country also entered 
into Production Sharing Contracts for the first time in 1974, where the government would 
own the oil or gas if found (Farrell 2012:136; GOTT 1974:vii). Under the new law, 
licenses were to be granted via an open, competitive bidding process and exploration 
would be governed by stricter regulations.  
Investments were made not only in infrastructure for economic growth but also 
for the health and well-being of the population. According to the Williams, development 
“encompasses not only production but the entire economic and social life of a nation in 
transition ... its health, education, social outlook and the dynamism of its political 
institutions” (GOTT 1976:728). The state pursued a number of other efforts to reduce the 
cost of living. Food subsidies on items, including but not limited to flour, rice, sugar, 
increased from TT$3.3 million in 1973 to TT$$115.4million in 1979 (GOTT 1980:52) 
and further to reach TT$225 million in 1982 (GOTT 1984:Table XXXII). Government 
also subsidized petroleum fuel, public utilities, electricity, water, and transportation 
(Boopsingh and McGuire 2014:75). Subsidies to farmers and fishermen increased from 
TT$1.9million in 1973 to TT$7.5million in 1979 (GOTT 1980:53) to a high of TT$23 
million in 1983 (GOTT 1984:Table XXXII). Welfare subsidies (old age pension, food 
stamps, and public assistance such as free bus transport for pensioners and social 
assistance to orphans) in T&T increased from TT$8.2 million in 1973 to TT$81.7million 
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in 1979 (a 895% increase) (GOTT 1980:54), and further to $220.4 million in 1983 
(GOTT 1984:Table XXXII). The state even directly employed workers in the Special 
Works Program of the Development and Environmental Works Division (DEWD), albeit 
often criticized as a “highly unproductive welfare project” (Crichlow 1998:72).  
This strengthening of state institutions and the development of a more active state 
is the result of the labor unrest, and the distribution of oil revenues covered multiple 
sectors. Similar to many other developing countries, this spending was unsustainable. By 
the mid-1980s, T&T had exhausted its savings, succumbed to a severe debt crisis, and 
underwent a decade-long economic recession (Auty and Gelb 1986). In the midst of the 
economic downturn, a group of militant Black Muslims staged an attempted coup in 1990 
over a land dispute with the state. After a five-day standoff, the rebels surrendered, and 
were granted amnesty.23 Nevertheless, T&T emerged from this period with steady 
economic expansion underpinned by economic restructuring and growth in oil, gas, and 
petrochemical sectors. Macroeconomic policy combines measured economic 
liberalization with the strategic use of policy instruments such as tariffs, licensing, 
consumer subsidies, and continued state support for the restructured but still struggling 
agricultural sector (IMF 2011; WTO 2005, 2012). Since the mid-1990s, T&T has 
maintained “solid macroeconomic fundamentals as a result of prudent fiscal management 
and low debt to GDP levels” (WTO 2012:5). The benefits of the investments of the 1973-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23. The coup, while ever-present in national consciousness, did not fundamentally alter T&T 
institutions. In fact, the courts have upheld the amnesty agreement with the group. According to 
Griffin (1995:298-299), this provides evidence that “the various manifestations of political 
instability do not equate to democratic instability nor to a lack of democratic governance...This is 
especially evidenced by its [T&T's democratic system] defense and preservation of the political 
and civil rights of the perpetrators ...” 
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1985 period, while they did not materialize during that same period, laid the foundation 
for success in later generations. 
In sum, the state received the oil windfalls within the context of a strong labor 
movement, and this shaped what the state did with the oil revenues. Across the economy, 
labor unions and workers in various sectors, from oil and sugar to the telephone and 
sewerage companies, were able to negotiate wage increases. Citizens continue to benefit 
from the country's revenues from the oil booms, as health spending and educational 
investments have contributed to increases in life expectancy and mean years of schooling, 
placing T&T among countries with high levels of human development (UNDP 2013). 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
GABON: A CASE OF WEAK LABOR AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT 
Introduction 
The Gabonese economy, as it developed under colonial rule, was similar to 
T&T’s economy: it was dependent upon foreign investment, export-oriented, and trade-
dependent, and it expanded and contracted with the caprices of the world market. Contact 
with Europeans began with the Portuguese explorers and traders in 1471 and soon 
included the Dutch, German, British, and French. A lucrative trade developed where 
Europeans exchanged alcohol, fabrics, tobacco, salt, and earthenware for ivory, gold, 
palm oil, and exotic goods such as parrot feathers and hippopotami teeth (Barnes 1992; 
de Saint-Paul 1989). In the 18th century, African slaves had become the most desired 
commodity by the Europeans. By the mid-1860s, an estimated 700-1000 slaves were 
exported from Gabon annually; in 1875, this estimate rose to 3000-4000 (Gray and 
Ngolet 1999:90). The waning of the slave trade after its abolition gave way to rubber and 
ivory extraction (1830s to 1880s) from Gabon’s vast rainforest, which covers 80% of 
Gabon’s land area. 
Similar to T&T, Gabon's early colonial period is characterized by repressive and 
extractive institutions. French colonial rule in Gabon started in 1839 (a little over 40 
years after the British capture of Trinidad), and the reign of the concessionary companies 
and the rise of the timber industry that fundamentally transformed the Gabonese 
economy. In 1899, the colonial government granted 12 firms 30-year monopolies to 
exploit Gabon's forest (Barnes 1992; Gardinier 1994). The largest company, Société 
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commerciale, industrielle, et agricole, du Haut-Ogooué (SHO), received a territorial 
concession covering half the country (Barnes 1992:24). These companies were 
predominately interested in timber exploitation. Timber sales dominated the economy 
from the 1880s to 1960s. Exports of okoume wood for the German plywood market rose 
from a few logs in 1889 to 7000 tons in 1905, and 91,000 tons in 1911 (Gray and Ngolet 
1999:95-96). It accounted for a high of 87% of total exports in 1957 (de Saint-Paul 
1989:47-48).  
The expansion of the concessionary companies and the timber industry also 
altered labor relations in the colony. During the early decades of colonization, owing to 
the difficulty of penetrating Gabon's dense rainforest, Europeans remained mostly on the 
coast and relied on local clans to collect and bring goods (slaves, rubber, ivory) from the 
country's interior. The local clans leaders organized the labor crews based on kinship 
networks that often involved a clan head's sons, grandsons, and their dependents (Gray 
and Ngolet 1990:90). Early timber extraction did not require sophisticated techniques. 
Clan leaders organized workers to go into the forest, fell the trees located near 
waterways, chop out the logs, and float them down the creeks and rivers to sell to 
European factory agents (Gray and Ngolet 1990). Therefore, labor remained under the 
control of the clans and was organized by traditional methods. 
However, as the demand for forest products surged during the late 1800s, 
extraction moved further and further inland, and need for more labor increased (Gray and 
Ngolet 1990:97). However, Gabon's population density was low and subsistence farming 
practices produced little food surplus. As a result, obtaining labor and food supplies for 
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even the most modest of colonial undertakings was always a challenge (Gray and Ngolet 
1990:96). The concessionary companies met their increasing demands for labor by 
circumventing clan leaders and hiring their own militiamen to penetrate the forest and 
round up labor by force. The laborers earned very low wages, and were often paid in kind 
or in currencies redeemable only at the company's trading posts (Gray 2002). The 
agreement of 1899 also ordered colonial officials to regard company agents as their 
collaborators (Thompson and Adloff 1960:15). As a result, the labor-dependent 
concession companies had the help of the state to repress the workers.  
Oil was discovered in 1951 and commercial production began in 1957 (again, a 
little over 40 years after production commenced in T&T). Oil was first discovered by 
Société des Pétroles d'Afrique Equatoriale Française (SPAEF), a subsidiary of the 100% 
French state-owned company. In March 1957, the first tanker load of crude oil was 
shipped to La Havre, France, but the reserves were estimated for only 6 years of 
production (Yates 1996:56; GOG 1986:56). Over the next few years, the French 
continued to expand their findings, but the French's first ten years of a monopoly on oil 
exploration and production ended in 1958 when Mobil and Shell entered the sector, albeit 
through partnership agreements with SPAEF (Yates 1996:56-57). In addition to oil, 
Gabon also contains vast deposits of manganese and uranium, the exploitation of which 
began in the 1960s. Gabon now ranks one of the top five manganese producers in the 
world, though the French firm ERAMET retains its historical dominance over manganese 
exploitation through La Compagnie Minière de l'Ogooué (COMILOG), a joint venture 
with ERAMET as the major shareholder (Oxford Business Group 2012:103; USGS 
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2014:101). Uranium was exploited by French firm Compagnie des Mines d'Uranium de 
Franceville (COMUF) through the French Atomic Energy agency, and until 1974, all 
uranium production went to the French military and civilian nuclear energy and 
electricity generation projects (Barnes 1992:86). 
As the economy developed, ethnic divisions became structured along sectoral 
lines. Colonial Gabon was divided into eight ethnic groups, each with many tribes – 
Omyene, Fang, Seke, Eshira, Okande, Bakele, Bakota and Mbede. The Omyene represent 
only 5% of the population but, having historically amassed wealth from the slave trade 
and timber exploitation and benefiting from the French colonial mission schooling 
system, are considered the business and political elite in Gabon (Weinstein 1966:29-31, 
39-42). The Fang are numerically the largest group in Gabon, representing about 30% of 
the population, and have risen in prominence in the civil service, the army, and the police 
force (Weinstein 1966:31; 42-43). While the Omyene are not generally found in low-
skilled/laboring positions, Fang can be found across social classes (Weinstein 1966:43). 
They were particularly concentrated in the timber industry as woodcutters and in 
agriculture as farmers and fishermen (Rich 2007:249, 251). 
Similar to conditions in T&T and across the world in the 1919-1920 and 1930s 
periods, life in Gabon was tremendously grueling for the Gabonese subordinate classes. 
Beginning in 1911, colonial reports noted that the rush to work in the timber industry 
resulted in the neglect of village plantations, which combined at times with low rainfall, 
blights, and the high expense of gun powder, which helped stave off animal attacks, 
caused food shortages and deaths from starvation (Gray 2002:152-153, 155; Rich 
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2007:68). In addition, the timber industry came to a complete stop during the outbreak of 
WWI as German firms, who dominated the purchase of Gabonese okoumé, no longer did 
so. This resulted in the abrupt unemployment of thousands of Gabonese wage-earners 
(Gray 2002:153). The French colonial administration, now facing extreme shortfalls in 
tax revenue, compounded these problems by doubling the per capita income tax, ramping 
up violent methods of organizing workers to collect rubber (in order to pay the tax), and 
recruiting thousands of workers to be porters (so that they could both pay the tax and 
serve in the French military campaign in Cameroon) (Gray 2002:153-157). The food 
shortage turned into famine and lasted well into 1930 (Rich 2007:64). Furthermore, the 
spread of the Spanish flu and sleeping sickness further exacerbated the chaos in the 
colony (Gray 2002:154, 158; Rich 2007:69). Therefore, the economic hardships of 
subordinate classes during this 1919-1920 and 1930s period mirrored the horrendous 
conditions faced by the lower classes in T&T. 
In addition, Gabon, like T&T, lacked institutions that would give workers outlets 
for lodging complaints or legitimately seeking recourse. Repeated requests for lower food 
prices and aid in food production fell on deaf ears (Rich 2007:70, 75). Educated local 
women wrote to the administration arguing, “We do not know, Governor, the fault we are 
guilty of for letting us die of hunger,” but they were ignored (Rich 2007:75). In addition, 
the metropolitan French law of 1884 concerning trade union freedom, while extended to 
the colonies in 1920, only applied to those workers who were full French citizens, so 
legally recognized labor organizations could not and did not exist throughout Africa. The 
reforms of Léon Blum government in 1937 allowed for the creation of trade unionism in 
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the colonies for local French subjects but membership was limited to workers who could 
read, write and speak French and who had a primary school certificate, which meant that 
almost all African membership was excluded because of these literacy and certification 
requirements (Martens 1981:5). Therefore, similar to T&T, workers had little formal 
mechanisms through which to voice their concerns to the state and to companies. 
However, despite these similarly trying conditions for the people of Gabon, 
working class organization and unionization in Gabon was weaker than in T&T, and the 
relationship between the colonial state and unions in Gabon was very different from that 
in T&T. Consequently, state-building was left to elites and the French colonial 
administration. Instead of constructing a state that would help improve the quality of life 
for the lower classes, they built weak state institutions characterized by low bureaucratic 
capacity and a lack of transparency, accountability and inclusion. As a result, this weak 
state inhibited rather than promoted economic and social development.  
 
Colonial Labor in Gabon 
The characteristics of T&T's labor movement that enabled it to stimulate 
institutional strengthening of the state, which, in turn, promoted improved resource 
management and long-term economic and social development was not present in Gabon. 
The Gabonese labor movement during the colonial period was not indigenously-
generated, workers made narrow rather than broad-based demands, workers were not 
united across economic sectors and across ethnic groups, and protests lasted for much 
shorter periods than they did in T&T. 
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First, in contrast to T&T where labor organizing was led by workers themselves, 
labor organizing and unions in Gabon were not locally generated. In 1946, when it 
became legally possible for workers to organize trade unions regardless of race, religion, 
or language throughout the French overseas territories, labor movements in Francophone 
West Africa developed along two levels: 1. Interterritorial organizations that coordinated 
activities among the affiliated unions in the individual colonies and liaised with parent 
unions in France and international labor confederations, and 2. Territorial labor 
organizations that attempted local coordination of workers and union activities (Martens 
1981:1, 9). Between 1946 and the 1950s, three French unions in the metropole - the 
Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT), the Force Ouvière (FO), and the 
Confédération  Africaine des Travailleurs Chrétiens (CFTC) - sent representatives to 
organize labor in French African territories. They brought with them financial and 
technical assistance, funds for travel, and training from Paris. The Communists, 
Socialists, and Catholics all competed for worker loyalties (Martens 1981:8-10). Thus, 
the French administration maintained a tight leash on all unions in Gabon by sponsoring 
the formation of unions in the country.  
Furthermore, when leaders across French West Africa such as Côte d'Ivoire's 
Houphouët-Boigny was severing ties with French unions and the autonomous African 
CGT unions started mobilizing for the Code du Travail (minimum standards of wages 
and working conditions), these union chapters remained very weak in Gabon (Thompson 
and Adloff 1960:271). Gabon's first autonomous local union - the Syndicat des Employés 
- was formed in 1944 when union formation became legally possible under French law. 
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When they lobbied the administration for better wages, improved working conditions, 
and more subsidies for Christian mission schools, the administration responded by 
refusing to negotiate, breaking up subsequent strikes, and transferring union leaders to 
remote posts, from which it never recovered (Guiboumou 2008:82). Therefore, in 
addition to the weakness of these chapters in Gabon, these unions were not generated by 
Gabonese workers and decision-making was not local. 
This is not to say that there was no local political activity in Gabon. While there 
was certainly mobilization with regard to conjugality and sexuality and high food prices, 
agitation pertaining to labor unions, parties, and independence was conspicuously absent 
(Jean-Baptise 2014:95; Rich 2007:70-72). Bernault (1996:88) argues that the geographic 
dispersion of industries and the absence of factories, combined with a great number of 
unemployed persons, prevented the formation of a true working class. None of these 
groups were able to mount a formidable challenge to the colonial or postcolonial state.  
The movement was also comparatively weaker because existing unions defined 
their interests in narrow terms rather than the broad social-movement unionism of the oil 
workers in T&T. This difference, in light of the absence of local agitation for institutional 
change, may be explained in part because of the laws regarding trade union membership. 
While in 1944, the law was changed such that a primary school certificate was no longer 
required for membership, it still was a requirement to hold a leadership position in the 
union. As a result, white-collar workers, civil servants, and teachers were among the first 
to create organizations. Their unionism reflected their interest in civil service legislation 
rather than economic problems affecting laborers and manual workers, and their early 
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activity resulted in the tendency to be better paid, more fairly treated and more job 
security than private sector workers. Workers in the private sector tended to organize 
some years after public sector unionism developed (Martens 1981:12). In separate realms 
of resistance, workers at the Compagnie Commerciale de l'AEF went on strike for 2 years 
over owed pay, urban commercial interests wanted lower food prices, and Christian 
unions demanded more money for mission schools. The 1920 boycott of European stores 
against high food prices may have been one exception as the Mpongwe chiefs who 
orchestrated this method of resistance successfully won the support of the Fang and other 
ethnicities. However, the boycott ended within just three weeks as the Fang eventually 
relented and brokered a deal with the Europeans (Rich 2007:71). Nevertheless, overall, 
the separate grievances of distinct groups were not brought together under one, coherent 
banner as the oil, sugar, and urban workers were able to achieve in T&T. 
Gabon also had far fewer organized labor protests during the colonial period than 
in T&T and protests lasted for shorter periods of time. The Christian unions were the 
strongest in the country and agitated for more subsidies for mission schools (Bernault 
1996:166; Gardinier 1994:197-199). Outside the Christian unions, only two groups were 
active: the railway workers who formed the majority in the “Force Ouvrière” Union, and 
the dockers of Port-Gentil. The dockers, by their profession were in contact with 
metropolitan movements (notably the French Communist Party). There, the workers were 
concentrated and in critical number, so their politicization was able to develop. However, 
this situation remained the exception in Gabon (Bernault 1996:88).  
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According to Jean-Baptiste (2014:95), there was only one strike during the 
colonial period that manifest with a forcefulness that was similar to those elsewhere in 
Africa. After WWII, an organization of civil servants in Libreville formed the 
Association of Civil Servants (originally the Professional Association of African Native 
Employees, founded in 1910) and, in 1946, joined a Brazzaville union and staged a two-
day strike for higher wages and promotions of African civil servants (Jean-Baptiste 
2014:95). The 1920 boycott of European stores regarding high food prices lasted only 
three weeks (and the Europeans still declined to drop prices) (Rich 2007:71). However, 
these sporadic two-day and three-week strikes pale in comparison to the repeated strikes 
lasting from weeks to months that characterized the same colonial period in T&T.  
According to historians Thompson and Adloff, “...unions are conspicuously weak in 
Gabon...their influence has been both politically slight and, on the whole, ineffectual in 
obtaining better pay and working conditions” (1960:383). 
The repressive context in which labor attempted to organize was somewhat akin 
to T&T, but very different in the potency of that repression. Similar to T&T, the colonial 
administration dealt with protests by resisting negotiations, cracking down on striking, 
moving union leaders to remote posts, and swiftly repatriating those who wanted to return 
to their villages (Guiboumou 2008:82; Gray and Ngolet 1999:104). However, the 
effectiveness of labor repression in Gabon was much greater than it was in the oil, sugar 
and urban areas in T&T. The Regional Guard, under the colonial administration, and the 
private militias hired by the concession companies had a notorious record of dealing 
swiftly and violently with labor unrest and other disturbances (Barnes 1992). Throughout 
	  	  
132 
the 1920s and 1930s, there were reports of guards mercilessly beating villagers, raping 
women, demanding bribes, pilfering food and livestock, and diverting labor for their own 
personal use (Gray 2002:181-182). While some colonial officials disagreed with the 
actions of the Regional Guard, they did little to stop the abuses. A French government 
inspector remarked “There had developed in the region a kind of tradition which came to 
consider the wrongdoings committed by our auxiliaries as normal and it is this that 
explains the silence and resignation of the populations” (Gray 2002:182). 
 
Reforms and the Seeds of Underdevelopment 
While a powerful local labor movement was not present in Gabon, because the 
country was as part of the Afrique Équatoriale Française (AEF) region, Gabon 
nevertheless benefited from labor movement activity elsewhere in the region and beyond. 
Institutional reform in Gabon followed from labor mobilization in other French West 
African colonies. In the post-war period, the two-month strike in Senegal in 1946 and the 
five-month long strike of railways workers throughout French West Africa in 1947-1948 
brought to the forefront the need for colonial powers to reform repressive institutions in 
the colonies. Not only did the labor unrest change the very nature of European 
conceptualizations of African workers, “the rise of the labor movement in Dakar changed 
the labor question fundamentally: it led to rapid wage concessions and to dialogue” 
Cooper (1996:99). Gabon benefitted from these negotiations and the French Code du 
Travail, which, once hashed out, was applied to the entire AEF region in 1952. The code 
guaranteed wage workers paid vacations and other benefits, a forty-hour work week, the 
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right to organize unions, and established consultative bodies within the state apparatus 
that had union representation (Cooper 1992:10). 
However, the fate of Gabonese workers lay with Gabonese political elites and 
what they were willing or able to achieve at the negotiation table. For instance, for the 
deliberations on family allowances and what the rate should be for monthly allowances 
for each child, prenatal assistance, and bonuses for married couples, while the Congo got 
400 cfa per month per child while Gabon settled for 225 cfa (Thompson and Adloff 
1960:264). The percentage to be paid by employers also differed. Gabon agreed to the 
lowest percent of all territories (57% versus 68% in Oubangui and Tchad) (Ibid:264). 
Without strong, organized labor, these labor codes were applied in Gabon without 
encountering much push-back (Thompson and Adloff 1960:383-384).  
In sum, unlike in T&T where a powerful local labor movement, deeply embedded 
in the fabric of the society, mobilized for institutional reform, Gabon lacked such a force. 
The absence of organized labor, and any such force like it, would set the stage for 
political and colonial elites to control the institution-building process. As the nation 
prepared for independence, this configuration of power lay the foundation for a weak 
state that was unable to promote economic and social development in the post-colonial 
period. 
 
Preparing for Independence: Weak Labor, Parties, and the State 
In the 1945-1960 period, the political situation in Gabon reflected the weakness of 
organized labor and, as a result, diverged markedly from that in T&T in three main ways: 
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the already struggling labor movement grew even weaker, political parties emerged and 
all were conservative, the elite maintained its grip on power, and, while two parties 
competed for control of the government, they ultimately forged a coalition to take the 
country to independence. All the while, labor unions were noticeably far less influential 
in state-building than in T&T, which allowed elite power to flourish. 
First, the labor unions that did exist in Gabon grew even weaker in the post-
war/pre-independence period. According to Bernault (1996:86), the workers in 
construction, mining, transport and other diverse industries, represented 45% of the labor-
intensive workers employed in Gabon in 1957. By 1950, Gabon had about 34,000 
salaried workers and 35 unions (Guiboumou 2008:82). Yet, despite the number of unions 
at the end of 1950, according to Bernault (1996:34), they were very weak in terms of 
combativeness, lethargic, and remained “une force politique de second ordre.” Many 
unions even lost membership in the post-WWII period. Le Syndicat des travailleurs des 
expolitations forestières de l'Ogooué-maritime had approximately 450 members in 1955, 
but this number fell to less than 100 the following year. Another major union, - Syndicat 
des ouvriers agricoles of Libreville - had only 50 members (Bernault 1996:86). Where 
trade unions were deeply involved in nationalist movements across former colonies, 
according to Bernault (1996) and Reed (1987:288-289), a sizeable indigenous nationalist 
movement never developed in Gabon. In fact, the 16-year decolonization process, 
beginning in 1944, was non-violent and orderly (Yates 1996:97). Simply put, organized 
labor was not a political force to be reckoned with as it was in T&T. 
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Second, unlike T&T, political parties emerged and all were conservative. The 
1945-1960 period was an era of multiparty politics in Gabon, and by 1954 two main 
political parties led by educated elites emerged. First, the Union démocratique et sociale 
gabonaise (UDSG) was led by Jean-Hilaire Aubame, the first Gabonese representative to 
the French National Assembly (1946-1958) and he generally had the support of the 
northern Fang, French administration, and Roman Catholic leaders. Second, the Bloc 
Démocratique Gabonaise (BDG) was formed by Paul Gondjout, Gabon's senator to the 
Council of the Republic, with the support of the Libreville Chamber of Commerce, which 
included powerful forest companies and local business interests. In 1954, Gondjout 
formed an alliance with Leon Mba's Comité mixte gabonaise (CMG), which had the 
estuary Fang as its base. The alliance gave Mba the support of the Omyene 
(business/commercial elite) community, giving the appearance that the party was based 
on moderate broad-based interests rather than tribal affiliations, and the French timber 
interests (Barnes 1992:33; Reed 1987:292; Weinstein 1966:100-101). A smaller, less 
influential third party Party d'Union Nationale Gabonaise (PUNGA) was formed by 
Rene-Paul Sousatte to unite former UDSG members, trade unionists, radical students, and 
non-Fang southerners and counterweight the Fang and Omyene control of politics (Reed 
1987:295).  
However, these parties were all non-radical. According to Reed (1987:289), 
leading politicians, despite competing party affiliations, were “elitist, non-radical... 
occasionally anti-colonialist, and almost always pro-French.” They all favored 
maintaining a close relationship with the French government rather than complete and 
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total independence (Barnes 1992:34-35; Reed 1987:295-296). De Gaulle offered a 
referendum that colonies could chose to remain in the French Community but warned on 
a tour in 1958 that colonies that vote “no” would see the immediate withdrawal of French 
aid. Gabonese leaders all favored integration into the French system of overseas 
administrative units (Barnes 1992:34-35). In January 1960, Mba's political party 
spokesman reported, “out of consideration for the present insufficiency of Gabonese 
administrative and technical cadres ... [Mba] would prefer, rather than total and nominal 
independence which would plunge the state into neo-colonialism, actual internal 
sovereignty which would permit him to prepare himself efficiently for his international 
responsibilities” (Reed 1987:295). Mba's rival, Paul Gondjout, was also reported saying, 
“I affirm my belief that it would be premature now for Gabon to achieve total 
independence, for this would precipitate it irreparably into anarchy or, what would be 
even worse, into a sort of neo-colonialism” (Reed 1987:296). In addition, Gabonese 
voters overwhelmingly supported de Gaulle's proposal (190,334 to 15, 244). Gabon 
simply “never produced a tradition of radical anti-French politics despite the harsh 
colonial legacy” (Reed 1987:205). This was the case both at the level of the local political 
elite and the local population at large. 
Third, whereas in T&T, organized labor was able to alter the configuration of 
power in society and weaken the traditional political elite, the Gabonese elite maintained 
its hold on power in the country. The Mba-Gondjout alliance did not succeed in unseating 
Aubame from Territorial Assembly in 1957 elections since they won the popular 
majority. However, it was able to dominate the Territorial Assembly through funding 
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from lumber interests, which they used to bribe several UDSG deputies to switch 
affiliation to the BDG and gerrymandering of legislative districts in ways that benefit the 
BDG and ensured that Mba became the vice president of the Government Council, and 
then in 1960, President of Gabon (Yates 1996:103-105). Therefore, the lumber interests 
and local political elite retained their influence over the political institutions at 
independence. 
Such was the configuration of power in Gabon on the eve of independence. 
Organized labor was very weak and the local political and economic elite and French 
administration retained control of the institution-building process. This legacy persisted 
into the post-colonial period and resulted in a state that was unwilling and unable to use 
the oil wealth from the 1973 and 1979 booms to transform the development path of 
Gabon.   
 
Legacies of Weak Labor and Autonomous Elites 
The historical weakness of Gabonese labor combined with the retention of elite 
control of the state apparatus had significant detrimental consequences for development 
in Gabon. First, the passivity of the state toward the economy persisted into the post-
independence period. Second, the little influence that organized labor had had in the 
colony was progressively dismantled in the early decades of independence. Third, the 
political elite, in particular President Mba, moved quickly to consolidate his grip on the 
state and country and the creation of legal-administrative institutions based on personal 
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and militarized rule cemented state-led predation and the path to socio-economic 
underdevelopment. 
In T&T, organized labor forced the state to re-evaluate its originally passive 
orientation toward the economy. Conversely in Gabon, the state’s approach to the 
economy remained largely unchanged. Similar to T&T, the economic policies of the post-
independent Gabonese state did not radically transform the standard of living for the 
masses of the population. Gabon's first development plan - Économie et Plan de 
Développement - was formulated by the French Ministry of Cooperation, and therefore a 
legacy of its colonial ruler. Like the first development plan of T&T, the document also 
discusses the small domestic market, and lacked the local expertise and resources 
required for a more active approach. Thus, Gabon also took a similar pragmatic and 
minimalist approach to development, and the role of the state as reflected in the 
development programs was confined to the provision of favorable infrastructure to attract 
foreign investment, rather than direct involvement in productive activities or employment 
creation (GOG 1963). Likewise, the 1966 Gabonese plan explicitly states: “We feel that 
in the new, young, and consequently inexperienced countries, the recourse to state 
industrialization ... is hazardous” (GOG 1966:291-292).  
Consequently, the state sought to attract foreign capital to make up for the limited 
supply of local capital, technology, and expertise, and aggressively export manufactures 
to North American and European markets (Yebe 1993:47). Similar to T&T, some of 
those incentives to attract foreign investors included up to 10 years tax exemption, 
exemptions from all export duties, and exemptions from customs duties on the imports of 
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factory equipment (building materials, tools, plant and machinery) and material imports 
(Yebe 1993:49).24 The state also engaged in some limited import-substitutions policies 
designed to foster growth of manufacturing capacities. The Economie et Plan de 
Développment indicates manufacturing in Gabon consisted only of 15 sawmills, 5 wood-
based factories, 15 coffee mills, 4 palm oil factory, one rice processor, and 1 soap factory 
(GOG 1963:22). The state announced its intention to stimulate industrialization by 
putting in place institutions to offer financing and technical assistance to stimulate the 
development of small and medium enterprises (GOG 1963:39), and trade regimes to 
protect these local industries from foreign competitors (Yebe 1993:48). The state also 
created l'Agence Gabonaise de Promotion Industrielle et Artisanale (PROMO-GABON) 
in 1964 to promote local and foreign industrial and artisanal enterprise, and to research, 
prospect, locate factory space for industries (GOG 1963:298-300; GOG 1971:64).  
Also mirroring the results of the pre-oil boom development plans in T&T, the 
results of the Gabonese plans were uneven. Gabon registered an average annual per 
capita GDP growth of approximately 5.7% for the period 1961-1972 (WDI 2014). The 
extractive industries (petroleum, natural gas, uranium, manganese, and gold) accounted 
for 15.8% of the GDP in 1960 and 32.4% in 1972 (GOG 1986:17). Petroleum production 
dominated the sector, increasing from an average daily rate of 16,000 barrels in 1960 to 
100,000 barrels in 1969 (Yates 1996:65-66). Industry manufacturing increased from 6% 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24. In Gabon, this regime is covered in the national investment code (Ordinance 21-67, 23 March 
1967, modified from 4 Dec 1961) and elaborated in the UDEAC code of 1965 (Code des 
investissements 1967: 48-59). In T&T, this regime is covered in the Aid to Pioneer Industries 
Ordinance of 1950, and was later expanded in the Petrochemical Industry Development Act of 
1962 (Mulchansingh 1971:86; Yelvington 1995:58). 
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of the GDP in 1960 to 8% in 1972, and construction expanded from 8% to 11% over the 
same period (GOG 1986:17). New industries included a brewery, a flour mill, biscuit 
factory, confectionery, fish smokier, panty hose factory, paint factory, metal shop, and 
furniture factory (GOG 1966:310-318), a 5% share in the oil refinery Société Equatoriale 
de Raffinage (SER, est. 1964) designed to meet the UDEAC region's petroleum needs 
(Yates 1996:185-186), cellulose factory (SOGACEL, est. 1969), food and beverages, 
cigarettes, and more (GOG 1971:51-65).  
However, these gains benefited a small segment of the population. In the enclave 
industries in Gabon, 64 percent of the wages and salaries paid were earned by 8 percent 
of the workers. Expatriates transfer an estimate of 40 percent of their incomes abroad, 
while the lower paid Gabonese save only up to 10 percent of their income (World Bank 
1971:5). In addition, according to the Gabonese 1966 plan “unemployment is almost 
unknown” (GOG 1966:291). Given that about 80% of the economically active population 
was engaged in agriculture, hunting, and fishing (Yates 1996:144), and the contribution 
of agriculture to the GDP went from 12.3% in 1960 to 7% in 1970 (GOG 1986:17), one 
can assume that unemployment was extraordinarily high in Gabon. These were some of 
the same issues faced in T&T in the pre-boom period. 
Where T&T and Gabon diverged is on the power and ability of labor to alter the 
country’s development path by forcing the state to improve its institutional quality. 
During this same period between independence and the first oil boom when labor strikes 
were rampant across T&T, the already weak Gabonese working class was further 
crippled. Between 1960 and 1964, the number of industrial disputes increased from 31 to 
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51. The number of workers involved also expanded from 1,522 workers in 1960 to 4964 
workers in 1964. In 1964, 12,388 workdays were lost to industrial disputes (ILO 
1970:795). The Christian unions remained the strongest in the country with 3,000 
members in 1953 and 13,500 in 1965 (but their demands remained very narrow; they 
promoted Roman Catholic social doctrines and pushed for more subsidies for mission 
schools) (Bernault 1996:166; Gardinier 1994:197-199). While labor agitation appeared to 
have expanded, it pales in comparison to labor activity in T&T (see Figure 7). However, 
in 1963, Mba had met with union leaders and warned them to align with his 
administration (Barnes 1992:49). In figure 7, we can observe the number of strikes, 
workers involved and workdays lost in Gabon grows progressively smaller over the 
period. In 1967, on the eve of the first oil boom, the ILO reports just 5 industrial disputes 
in Gabon involving a low of 441 workers, the lowest worker involvement in the 
preceding 6 years. Consequently, organized labor agitation in Gabon in the first decade of 
independence was far weaker than in T&T. 
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Figure 7. Comparing Labor Activity in Trinidad and Tobago and Gabon 
 
Source: ILO 1970:784, 788, 795, 826; ILO 1973:793.
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Another dimension of divergence between T&T and Gabon lay in the 
preservation of the multiparty political system. Whereas in T&T it was upheld in the face 
of even more potent labor unrest, in Gabon, the elite moved quickly to stamp out the 
ability of its citizens to demand transparency and accountability by instituting a one-party 
authoritarian state. At independence, Mba led a coalition government, and in this 
inherited system from the French, did not enjoy a strong executive as he was forced to 
share power with his assembly. Shortly after independence, Mba argued that a multiparty 
system leads “to confusion, to anarchy and to disorder” rather than “stability” (Barnes 
1992:41).  Just one year after independence from colonial rule, Mba called for a 
constitutional convention to change the parliamentary system to a presidential system like 
De Gaulle's 5th Republic. Under this system, the President would be elected by direct 
popular vote and the legislature relegated to a more consultative role (Yates 1996:105). 
This proposal was met with immediate criticism from former allies such as 
Gondjout and and Aubame. Over the next four years, Mba proceeded to silence his critics 
through prison sentences, restricting open public debate, and demoting challengers within 
the legislature (Barnes 1992:40-42; Reed 1987:296). In 1963, the coalition government 
disbanded as opposition members USDG and PUNGA were removed from government 
(Weinstein 1966:176-177). Also in 1963, he successfully pressured the assembly to pass 
legislation to create the office of President (Yates 1996:106). Finally, in 1964, Mba 
changed the laws in order to create a one-party state (e.g. he succeeded in reducing the 
number of seats to ensure that those elected would be members of his party), dissolved 
the National Assembly, and called for elections (Weinstein 1966:178; Yates 1996:105-
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106). 
The lack of strong opposition from the weak labor movement did not mean that 
there was no dissatisfaction with Mba’s increasingly autocratic rule within the society in 
Gabon. Apart from widespread public anger about the high level of inequality in the 
country and ostentation of the elite, army officers were also discontent because many of 
them had served in the French army where they earned better pay and benefits (Reed 
1987:297). In 1964, a group of young army officers stage a bloodless coup and captured 
Mba. However, within 24 hours, French troops flew in from Dakar and restored Mba to 
office. The French claimed that under the terms of a defense agreement signed at 
independence, Mba requested assistance so they were compelled to come to his aid. 
However, the evidence suggests that neither Mba nor any other Gabonese official 
requested assistance, leading many to believe that the intervention was unilateral action 
by France to protect their natural resource interests (Yates 1996:112). For instance, 
Gabonese uranium fueled French nuclear energy development and Mba guaranteed 
access to the ore (Barnes 1992:43).  
The French determination to support Mba was displayed by a station of military 
troops near the Libreville Airport (Barnes 1992:42-44; Reed 1987:296). Public 
opposition to French intervention involved student and worker demonstrations, but with 
the French military support, Mba was able to reestablish his rule through a range of 
violent and repressive measures. Under the French-supported autocratic state, the strikes 
were suppressed by public beatings, shaving women's heads, banishing people to isolated 
regions away from their homes and families, and using what was called “national 
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indignity” to strip citizens of their rights (Weinstein 1966:184). The state also had the 
power to imprison and terrify activists in the population, and strong-arm members of the 
assembly to create a Presidential system and a de-facto one-party state (Barnes 1992:44-
45; Reed 1987:298). Politicians were kept in line by the President's power to dissolve the 
National Assembly without consultation, have deputies arrested despite parliamentary 
immunity, appoint and remove judges, and a 1965 ordinance which granted the President 
the power to dissolve any political party, trade union, or association (Weinstein 
1966:185). US Ambassador to Gabon, Darlington, describes the era of state-led terror on 
the population as follows:  
“For all this sordid work France bears a large share of responsibility. France protected 
Leon Mba with French soldiers, not just for a few days but indefinitely, and when this 
book went to press in the summer of 1967 they were still in Gabon. Behind them he was 
safe, safe not only to govern, but also to give free reign to his passions. Frenchmen in the 
Ministry of Information helped him to keep the public misinformed. French officers in 
charge of the gendarmery helped him to carry out his wholesale political arrests and 
brutalities” (Yates 1996:113).  
 
French military forces were permanently garrisoned in Gabon to protect Mba and helped 
him silence dissent (Weinstein 1966:186).  
Upon Mba's death in 1967, this centralization continued under his successor, 
Omar Bongo.  Omar Bongo was groomed to inherit the Presidency because of his loyalty 
to French government and economic interests. He moved up the state ranks rapidly, from 
a clerk in the post office, to second lieutenant in the French Army Air Corps, to a position 
in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and then in the cabinet of Mba (Yates 1996:114-115). 
In 1966, Mba was admitted to hospital with cancer and the French became very 
concerned about who would take his place at the throne of power (Yates 1996:116-117). 
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Bongo cooperated willingly with Jacques Foccart, Secretary General for the Community, 
and hounded Mba on his hospital bed to appoint Bongo as Vice President and change the 
constitution to allow the Vice President to succeed the President (Yates 1996:116-117). 
Foccart and Bongo were successful. A constitutional revision of 1963 enabled Bongo, the 
then Vice-President to take over the duties of the President during Mba's illness (Barnes 
1992:47; Reed 1987:299). When Mba died, Bongo inherited the presidency. In 1968, 
Bongo announced the complete dissolution of all existing political parties in Gabon and 
the creation of a new, single-party system of government under the claim that multiparty 
politics invigorates tribalism and threatens national unity (Barnes 1992:48-49; Reed 
1987:300). The Parti Démocratique Gabonaise (PDG) replaced Mba's BDG and became 
the sole legal political party in the country (Yates 1996:117).  
Finally, in stark contrast to the trade unions in T&T, which maintained a large 
degree of organizational autonomy from political parties and the state, the Gabonese 
unions did not enjoy independence for party and state machinery. In 1969, Bongo 
consolidated all 70 unions into a single organization, the Fédération syndicale gabonaise 
(FESYGA) (Docherty 2004:103; Yates 1996:119). After several years of cooperation 
between FESYGA and the ruling party, FESYGA was formally incorporated as an organ 
of the political party by a government ordinance in July 1973 and renamed la 
Confédération syndicale gabonaise (COSYGA) - a labor union of “collaboration rather 
than contestation” (Barnes 1992:49; Nze-Nguema 1998:173). COSYGA had the 
exclusive right to represent workers (International Business Publications 2004:138). 
Therefore, despite T&T and Gabon both being parliamentary democracies in 1960, 
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Gabon lacked a strong local labor movement as a counterbalance to state power, and 
within a short space of time, the Gabonese state became more centralized and more 
despotic than the T&T state.  
These reforms that were instituted increased state power relative to the 
population, and in the absence of a strong countervailing force within the society to resist 
such a centralization of power and to demand improvements for workers, the population 
was crushed under the weight of the state. This configuration of power shaped the 
subsequent approach of the state to the oil booms of 1973 and 1979. 
 
Squandering the Oil Wealth 
As a result of this colonial legacy of weak unions that lacked autonomy, and with 
no other formidable countervailing force to the despotism of the state, Gabon developed 
into a weak development-inhibiting state. In contrast to the T&T state, the state in Gabon 
increased participation in the economy but in predatory rather than developmental ways; 
it did not strengthen bureaucratic capacity for managing the resource sector; petroleum 
legislation was updated but in ways that enabled it to collect rents from the resource 
sector without become actively involved in it; and mechanisms of transparency and 
accountability were actively avoided. This resulted in a squandering of the oil revenues 
and relatively fewer improvements in the economic and social development in the 
country.  
First, the state increased their participation in industry in ways that served to 
enrich the elites rather than the population at large. In 1973, the Société Equatoriale de 
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Raffinage regional partnership collapsed and Gabon bought out the other regional 
partners to form the Société Gabonaise de Raffinage (SOGARA), with shares split 
between the Gabonese state (25%) and Mobil, Shell, Elf, Total, Texaco, Petrofina, BP, 
and Agip (de Saint-Paul 1989:55; Yates 1996:67). The state also used oil profits to 
establish agro-industrial units in the name of rural development, food security, and 
modernization (but it also happened to fit with the private interests of the local elites and 
their Western contractors). SOCFIN, Societe nationale de developpement des cultures 
industrielles (SONADECI), Societe d'aide technique et de cooperation (SATEC), 
SOMDIAA (Multinational Corporation for Food and Poultry Distribution), the ranching 
Societe de developpement de l'Agriculture et de l'Elevage au Gabon (AGROGABON), 
and Societe industrielle d'agriculture et d'elevage de Boumango (SIAEB), Haut-Ogooué 
Sugar Company (SOSUHO) are enclaves of agricultural technology (Pourtier 1989:282-
302).  
However, these companies experienced only marginal success in the early stages 
but then profitability markedly declined (Barnes 1992:89-91). These were unproductive 
agro-industrial projects of which state officials had direct shareholder interests. The 
president, his family, and his inner circle became key shareholders in the country's major 
companies, including Elf Gabon, and a number of other sectors (transport, fishing, 
industry, agriculture, cement, paint, drilling, etc.) (Soares de Oliveira 2007:130). The 
state subsidies to these unproductive companies, which came from the oil revenues, did 
not promote broad-based economic and social development. 
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While T&T used oil revenues to invest in the productive Point Lisas industrial 
enterprises, Gabon’s spending projects gobbled sizable portions of the oil revenue but did 
not promote industrial transformation. The Gabonese state channeled exorbitant amounts 
of the oil revenues toward infrastructure projects, but many argue, the state did not target 
the areas where infrastructure was most needed. Transportation infrastructure was 
desperately required. Due to a combination of difficult topography and inadequate 
maintenance, the road network was inadequate to the country’s needs (Zafar 2004:8). 
However, public investment improperly targeted two major infrastructure projects - the 
Transgabonais and the 1988 mineral port at Owendo (Barnes 1992:92). In 1968, the 
Bongo government sought funding to construct a railway from Libreville to enhance 
manganese, uranium, and iron ore exploitation. Despite IMF and World Bank warnings 
of projected losses, the Gabonese state went ahead with the project using money from a 
variety of sources, including aid from France, loans from Morocco, Japan, West 
Germany, Saudi Arabia, and of course, from oil windfalls.  
A major share of the development budget (estimated 2.3 billion CFA francs) was 
directed toward the railway (Yates 1996:179). The project was also controversial because 
it involved significant deforestation and a stunning feat of civil engineering, and while 
expensive would only employ a little over 3000 workers (Barnes 1992:81). The state 
nevertheless went full speed ahead. In fact, Bongo later diverted the tracks away from the 
ore deposits, and instead toward Franceville, his hometown (Barnes 1992:83; Yates 
1996:180). Some say that it was Bongo's personal political strategy to move the capital 
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from Libreville to Franceville, nearer to the home of the Bateke population, as he wanted 
to be recognized as King of the Batekes (Reed 1987:216).  
Construction began in 1972 and completion was celebrated on Bongo’s birthday 
in 1986 (Yates 1994:8-9).  The entire project cost nearly $4 million, 6 million trees were 
felled, 49 bridges constructed, 4000 workers were employed (3400 Africans (of which 
two-thirds were Gabonese) and 400 expats) for the second phase of construction, even 
though it was expected that it would never run at a profit (Reed 1987:317). Many 
Gabonese are extremely and fiercely proud of the accomplishment and view it as an 
important expression of national sovereignty (Barnes 1992:83). However, throughout the 
1980s, the Transgabonais required a state subsidy of $60 million a year (Reed 1987:317). 
Furthermore, the line is underused and poorly maintained (Zafar 2004:8) 
In addition to the Transgabonais railway, a significant portion of revenue went to 
construction for the 1977 Organization of African Unity (OUA) conference (World Bank 
1985:47). Expenditures included building highways, villas, theaters, and importing 
limousines and Cadillacs (Yates 1994:12). Spending was frivolous. By the end of the 
1970s, Gabon became one of the largest consumers of champagne in the world (Pourtier 
1989:115). The state elites certainly enjoyed the oil boom at the expense of generating 
long-term economic and social transformation.  
Second, unlike the state in T&T, the Gabonese state did not improve its 
bureaucratic capacity. Few agencies were established to increase the state's active role in 
the resource sector. Those that were, such as Petrogab (a national oil company created to 
explore, refine, and market petroleum), were plagued with inefficiencies, remained 
	  	  
151 
relegated to the role of rent collector, and almost entirely unproductive (Yates 1994:72). 
In addition, the state lacked a meritocratic bureaucracy with the capacity to direct 
economic and social development. The state did embark upon a program called 
“Gabonization,” which partly entailed replacing foreigners in upper-level positions within 
corporations and government with native Gabonese citizens. However, properly qualified 
local bureaucrats and experts were severely lacking in Gabon. One World Bank report 
captures the bureaucratic inefficiency in the Ministry of Water and Forestry, but which 
was also common in Ministries across the state: 
The Ministry “is over-staffed but the provincial and the district office are severely 
lacking in qualified staff and therefore the control of forestry activities in under the 
responsibility of agents whose training is very limited. The provincial and district offices 
are desperately in need of additional buildings and equipment, as well as financial 
incentives for their staff” (World Bank 1985:16). 
 
 
Without native Gabonese experts, French advisors and French holdovers from the 
colonial bureaucracy were retained in the top ranks of Gabon's administration (Barnes 
1992:45; World Bank 1971:53). According to another World Bank report:  
“Ten years after independence Gabon’s development planning is still in the hands of 
expatriate advisers. No matter how competent these people may be, the fact remains that 
Gabon will need people capable of analyzing and determining important policy options 
who are citizens of the country” (World Bank 1971:55).  
 
Even the government body in charge of economic planning had several handicaps. The 
Plan Commission, which was responsible for national economic and social development 
planning and program coordination and implementation lacked trained personnel and did 
not even have regular meetings (World Bank 1971:53). The National Executive 
Committee, established in 1969 to prepare new plans and supervise plan execution, is 
	  	  
152 
described as performing “only a perfunctory role” (World Bank 1971:53). As a 
consequence, development planning suffered from significant budgetary problems such 
as huge overruns. Therefore, the state did not have the bureaucratic capacity necessary to 
effectively manage national development, much less alter the development trajectory of 
the nation. 
Like T&T, changes in the petroleum taxation regime also guaranteed greater 
revenues, but only with an eye toward increasing rents rather than competitively 
improving the performance of the resource sector. In 1972, President Bongo successfully 
renegotiated the taxes, royalties and rents in the 1960 accords, which divided ownership 
between French interests and the newly independent Gabonese government (Barnes 
1992:73). The state was able to take a 10% share in all new foreign companies that came 
into the country. In addition, the petroleum law of 1974 enabled Gabon to acquire a 25% 
stake in the country's two oil firms and taxes on petroleum companies went from 38% in 
1971 to 73% in 1977 (Pourtier 1989:195). Shell and Elf-SPAFE also agreed to pay a 12% 
royalty on crude, the increased income tax (38%), and an additional 5-10% royalty on all 
offshore production. This increased state budget from $US 45 million in 1970 to $US 64 
million in 1971, and US$ 74 million in 1972 (Yates 1996:67). 
In addition, in 1974, Gabonese authorities set up a special fund called the 
Provision for Diversified Investment (PID) to get oil companies to participate in the 
nation's economic and industrial effort. Companies had to contribute at least 2% of 
profits, and the state and oil companies partners in investment projects that created a 
more diversified domestic manufacturing sector and promoted local recycling of profits 
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to the direct benefit of the country's development (de Saint-Paul 1989:41; Barnes 
1992:92). PID funds were used to set up a sawmill, construction of a microwave 
communication link Port Gentil/Mayumba and the Lambarene Hotel in 1984 (de Saint-
Paul 1989:41), a domestic paint industry, cement production, to developing the palm oil 
industry (Barnes 1992:92). However, the president, his family, and his inner circle hold 
interests in the country's major companies (Soares de Oliveira 2007:130). 
Another institutional difference stemming from the varied abilities of organized 
labor in each country to effect state-building was in transparency and accountability 
mechanisms and structures of inclusivity. For example, individual ministers could and 
did undertake major development expenditures using pre-financing contracts. These 
appeared in the budget when payments were due even though money was available to pay 
those bills. On top of that, these projects lacked adequate preparation, competitive 
bidding, and proper supervision (World Bank 1971:53-54). Another example of the lack 
of transparency and accountability was the diversion of PID funds to subsidize state-
owned companies that were unable to meet their debt obligations, and to directly and 
indirectly subsidize contractors and suppliers to the Government (World Bank 1985:37). 
According to the report on these practices, “the Government has lost control of the 
[parastatal] sector… [and] is not in a position to either monitor parastatals’ performance 
or to propose remedies” (World Bank 1985:37). There are numerous other reports of 
flagrant corruption within the state and without a strong labor movement demanding 
accountability for the use of oil revenues, state officials remain in a position to enrich 
themselves. For instance, independent reports show that countries leaders were principal 
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shareholders in private civil engineering firms that win government contracts 
(CountryWatch 2011). Another report showed that Bongo and his inner circle owned 33 
apartments and houses in France, including a private mansion close to the Champs-
Élysées that cost $19 million euros (Magrin and van Vliet 2009:116). 
Political elites, with the help of the French military forces, used the resource 
revenue to further exclude the population from the development process. Elections were a 
sham. The 1993-94 elections were broadly cited by international observers as lacking 
transparency and institutional accountability. International observers released a statement 
saying, "the arbitrary and ad hoc manner in which the election was administered provided 
multiple opportunities for the process to be manipulated in a fraudulent manner" 
(Country Watch 2011). Furthermore, the government owned the dominant avenues of 
public expression, for example the major newspaper L’Union, and used them to control 
public criticism (Barnes 1992:52-53). Therefore, without a strong labor movement to 
push for institutional reform, the state continued to develop institutions that lacked 
transparency and accountability and excluded citizen participation. 
Finally, while the state increased investments in education and health, it was not 
enough to transform national levels of social development. As a percentage of GDP, 
countries with fewer resources such as Central African Republic and Congo 
outperformed Gabon in state investments in health and education (Yates 1994). Life 
expectancy is low and infant and maternal mortality remained very high. Morbidity in the 
period continues to be caused by parasitic and infectious disease (World Bank 1997:xvii). 
According to a World Bank Report (1997), health facilities are ineffective due to 
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unqualified staff, insufficient materials, and lack of basic medications. Moreover, there is 
a lack of coordination and planning in the health sector resulting in duplications of 
mandates in some parts of the country and no facilities at all in others. Similar problems 
plague education. Despite increased spending on education and a high participation/net 
enrollment rate of about 86% in the 1990s, the system produces poor results (World Bank 
1997). Even at the turn of the century, a World Bank 2001 report noted, “pockets of 
extreme poverty are growing in urban areas” (World Bank 2001). Moreover, an average 
of 34% of people had no access to potable water in provinces across the country, ranging 
from 15% of people in Libreville to 80% of people in Nyanga and Ngounié (World Bank 
1997:x). 
Similar to T&T, this large spending later precipitated a significant number of 
economic problems, which led to economic contraction and the introduction of IMF 
structural adjustment policies. In 1986, Bongo noted that Gabon had entered a “financial 
Ramadan,” and cut the budget in half between 1985 and 1987 (Pourtier 1989:110). 
However, unlike T&T, Gabon's oil wealth did not allow the country to radically alter its 
development path and the country remained comparatively underdeveloped. 
 
Conclusion 
 A postcolonial approach to the T&T and Gabonese experience suggests several 
implications for theories concerning the legacies of colonialism upon post-colonial 
development. It shows that in both territories, neither the colonial state, foreign capital, 
nor European settlers had, of their own volition, made any significant steps toward 
	  	  
156 
institutional reforms geared at a more broad-based distribution of the gains from the 
exploitation of the country’s resources.  It was organized labor that altered T&T from the 
path that it was on with Gabon.  
 In T&T, organized labor, both in the colonial and postcolonial period, was a 
strong, autonomous counterweight to the local elite, foreign capital and the colonial state, 
and played a significant role in promoting the development of stronger state institutions 
that were better able to manage the oil revenue and direct development. As we have seen, 
the oil enclaves were loci where laboring men and women generated the ideas, 
institutions, and inter-sectoral and inter-racial networks that enabled them to challenge 
the colonial forces’ imposition of repressive institutions and transform the course of their 
nation. The mobilization of labor and state-labor relations influenced by British oil 
interests prompted the colonial government to pursue institutional reform that increased 
wages paid to oil and other workers, improved working and living conditions, 
ameliorated relations between labor and capital, decentralized the state, and expanded 
democracy. The persistent militance of labor carried over into the post-colonial period, 
forcing the oil-rich T&T state to become more directly involved in the resource sector, 
invest in health, education and infrastructure, address persistent unemployment and 
underemployment, and increase the transparency in government spending patterns.  
 The absence of strong labor in Gabon allowed state officials to retain control of 
state-building and the oil revenues, which, in the long-run, produced weaker state 
institutions. The lack of bureaucratic capacity, weak structures of transparency and 
accountability, and citizen exclusion rather than inclusion in the development process 
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produced lower levels of development. Therefore, this study, by highlighting the role of 
organized labor, exposes a causal path toward the development of stronger state 
institutions that is different from what has discussed in the colonial legacies literature.   
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CHAPTER FIVE 
COMPARING LABOR, INSTITUTIONS, AND DEVELOPMENT 
Introduction 
Comparative-historical research, because it relies on a very small number of 
cases, is commonly criticized for its inability to provide explanations that can be 
generalized to a larger number of cases. The mechanisms that produced stronger state 
institutions in T&T and comparatively weaker institutions in Gabon may not necessarily 
be generalizable and therefore may not underlie the statistical results. To address this 
problem, I examine the extent to which the mechanisms highlighted in the T&T-Gabon 
comparison reoccur in additional cases using abbreviated case studies. 
Despite their brevity, abbreviated case studies provide an assessment of the 
generalizability of the causal processes. If these short case studies consistently show that 
the causal processes from the in-depth case studies, that is, that resource-rich countries 
with stronger labor movements have stronger state institutions that promote development, 
they offer evidence that the mechanisms from the T&T-Gabon comparison is 
generalizable. If the data from the abbreviated case studies are not consistent with this 
assertion, the T&T-Gabon comparison does not underlie the general statistical findings. If 
the case studies provide mixed evidence, the findings about the importance of labor 
movements is inconclusive. 
With this aim, I analyze three resource-rich countries in this chapter: Guyana, 
Niger, and Zambia. Case selection is based on the development outcome - low 
development versus high development – where the GDP per capita serves as a proxy for 
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development, in addition to four criteria: (1) British/French colony; (2) 
Caribbean/African region; (3) Oil/Mineral-rich. I find that the cases conform to both the 
statistical findings and the mechanisms described in the T&T-Gabon case comparison. 
Guyana is a case where a strong colonial labor movements contained within it seeds of 
disunity, which, compounded by it’s organizational absorption into political parties, 
resulted in the construction of a relatively weak state. Niger mirrors developments in 
Gabon where a very weak labor movement was crushed early in the post-colonial period 
leaving state-building to elites. This resulted in weak institutions that were unable to 
promote development. Zambia is a case of a strong colonial labor movement that 
developed an ambiguous relationship with political parties and the state during 
decolonization. This legacy resulted in the construction of a weak state.  
 
Guyana 
Of all the countries in this part of the research, Guyana is most similar to T&T. 
The British captured the territory from Dutch, French, and Spanish colonizers starting in 
1803 and formally established the Colony of British Guiana in 1831 (Bissessar and La 
Guerre 2013:36). Similar to T&T, Guyanese citizens encompass indigenous Amerindians 
as well as groups that came to the country by will and by force: East Indians, Africans, 
Europeans, Chinese, including a variety of mixed peoples as primarily labor or capital for 
an economy based on sugar plantations and production. The social hierarchy was similar 
to T&T: the white elite possessed the economic power and political privileges, and the 
Africans (slaves and their descendants) and East Indians (indentured laborers and their 
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descendants) were at the bottom of the social ladder (Ibid). Throughout the 1920s and 
1930s, the Guyanese economy remained dependent upon agricultural production, 
specifically sugar and rice. Bauxite, raw material for aluminum, was first discovered in 
1910. The mining industry was primarily dominated by Aluminum Company of America 
(ALCOA) in the first three years, after which Demerara Bauxite Company took over 
from ALCOA in 1916 (Girvan and Vale 1973:90). 
Organized labor in Guyana was very active in the colonial period, even much 
more so than labor in T&T. However, the movement suffered from a lack of unity across 
racial and economic sectors, and eventually became embroiled in racial party politics. 
Consequently, state-building followed the path of despotism, which led to 
mismanagement of the resource wealth and, ultimately, underdevelopment.  
During the colonial period, labor unrest in Guyana was frequent and persistent. 
There were numerous large-scale disturbances and strikes in the later decades of the 
nineteenth century (one in 1869, six in 1870, one in 1872, more than 14 in 1873, 100 
between 1886 and 1889, 49 between 1895 and 1897, 60 between 1899 and 1903, and one 
in 1905) versus only one in T&T (in 1903) (Bolland 2001:174, 181-182). Between 1900 
and 1950, there were over 250 strikes, resulting in the deaths of 47 workers (Sallahuddin 
1994:27). In 1938, colony-wide labor unrest brought the entire economy to a standstill for 
nearly nine months (Lange 2009:123). In addition to labor militance, labor organizations 
preceded that in T&T. The first trade union, the British Guiana Labour Union (BGLU), 
was launched in 1919 by Herbert Critchlow and registered in 1922. By the end of 1919, 
the BGLU had about 7,000 members (Singh 1988:15). Thus, the history of persistent 
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labor militancy and organizations is longer in Guyana than in T&T. 
However, the Guyanese labor organizations that emerged reflected the racial 
segmentation of the population in the colony at the time; the more divided the movement, 
the weaker the movement. There were many unions and they maintained a very close 
association between ethnicity and union membership. The majority of sugar and rice 
workers were East Indian and resident estate workers were almost all Indians. However, a 
large proportion of the non-resident sugar factory workers and cane cutters were African 
(Bolland 2001:338-339). Indian field workers primarily joined the Manpower Citizen's 
Association (MPCA), which was formed in 1936 by Ayube M. Edun and registered in 
1937 (Bolland 2001:350; Bissessar and La Guerre 2013:66). The MPCA was the 
dominant union in Guyana in terms of numbers; it claimed 10,000 members in 1939 and 
20,000 by 1943 (Bolland 2001:350; Chase n.d.:85).  
However, African factory workers largely did not join the MPCA, gravitating 
instead to the British Guiana Workers League (BGWL) (Bolland 2001:356). African 
workers were active in other voluntary organizations and trade unions, such as the British 
Guiana Seamen's Union, the Transport Workers' Union, the Post Office Workers' Union, 
the Subordinate Medical Employees Union, the British Guiana Congress of General 
Workers and the Subordinate Government Employees Association (all registered in 1938) 
(Bolland 2001:351). There was also the Civil Service Association (CSA), the League of 
Colored People (LCP), which, alongside the BGLU, were very vibrant and active in 
protesting (Bissessar and La Guerre 2013:67). 
This racial segmentation weakened the potential power of trade unions to effect 
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institutional change. The labor advisor to the British government's Secretary of State for 
the Colonies, Orde Browne noted: 
“While the various trade unions all stoutly maintain their disregard of racialism, there is a 
very perceptible mistrust between brown and black” that employers could easily use “for 
the purposes of strike-breaking, a quite possible development which would... product 
most mischievous results” (Bolland 2001:351).  
 
Moreover, geographically, while the MPCA was active in sugar estate areas, the activities 
of the BGLU and BGWL remained restricted mostly to Georgetown and represented 
mostly African dock workers and stevedores (Bolland 2001:349). The labor unions in 
Guyana were sharply divided by ethnicity, which inhibited their strength with the 
introduction of party politics.    
The racial-sectoral divisions in the movement were also evident in the lack of 
coordination across sectors, particularly between bauxite workers and sugar workers, the 
backbones of the Guyanese economy. Large concentrations of Africans formed in 
Georgetown and environs with the sudden expansion of the bauxite industry in the early 
1900s (Bissessar and La Guerre 2013:67). Workers in the bauxite industry suffered from 
long hours (e.g. 60-hour work weeks) during times of high demand, and retrenchment, 
loss of work hours, and reduced pay during times of low demand (Bolland 2001:431). 
Critchlow had been attempting to draw bauxite workers into the BGLU between 1942 
and 1944. In 1944, bauxite workers went on strike for higher wages and improved 
working conditions. Critchlow rushed to the scene and met with the management at the 
Demerara Bauxite Company but no workers were present. When he announced that 
strikers should return to work and left for Georgetown, workers viewed him as a sell-out. 
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The strike subsequently petered out and few bauxite workers retained union membership 
after this failed attempt to organize in this sector (Bolland 2001:431, 602 from Chase 
n.d.:128).  
Another feature of the labor movement in Guyana is that, in the post-war period, 
unions came to be dominated by middle class activists. These activists later became the 
leading politicians who inherited the state upon Guyana's independence from Great 
Britain. Consequently, labor became closely intertwined with political parties, and racial 
divisions in the labor movement were replicated in party politics. In 1946, a group of 
middle class Marxist-Leninist radicals comprised mostly of overseas-trained 
professionals and intellectuals and led by Cheddi Jagan, an East Indian dentist, organized 
the Political Affairs Committee (PAC) (Bissessar and La Guerre 2013:67; Bolland 
2001:602). PAC managed to capture control of the trade union movement (Ibid). Leading 
members of the PAC, such as H. Jocelyn M. Hubbard, played a leading role in assisting 
bauxite workers during their major strike in 1947 (Bolland 2001:602-603). In 1949, Jagan 
became president of the Sawmill Workers' Union (Bolland 2001:609-610). PAC 
members also supported sugar workers and became involved in the Guiana Industrial 
Workers Union (GIWU), which was founded in 1946 as a radical alternative to the 
conservative unions representing East Indian sugar workers at that time (Bissessar and La 
Guerre 2013:68). According to Chase (n.d.:141): 
“Dr. and Mrs. Jagan addressed several meetings of the strikers and inspired them to keep 
united in the struggle for their rights.... Dr. and Mrs. Jagan also paid considerable 
attention to the day to day organization of the strike and to many details. They helped in 
raising funds for the strikers, in organizing “soup kitchens” and in the general propaganda 
work.”  
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According to Premdas (1974:12,19), the Jagans “were idolized by the sugar workers after 
this strike,” which undoubtedly helped the PAC expand its base. 
Another major difference between T&T and Gabon was that in T&T, the political 
parties in the 1946-1950 period were not united in a single front; there were multiple 
formidable groups and no clearly dominating party. However, in Guyana, the People's 
Progressive Party (PPP) dominated the political landscape and faced very little 
competition from other parties/organizations. Led by Jagan and the PAC members and 
Forbes Burnham, a young black lawyer who became the BGLU's new chairman, forged 
this powerful nationalist working-class, multi-ethnic coalition party in 1950: Jagan's base 
was the East Indians, Burnham's base was the Africans (Bissessar and La Guerre 
2013:68; Bolland 2001:609-610; Rueschemeyer 1992:253). In the first general election 
with universal adult suffrage in 1953, the PPP along with four other parties (National 
Democratic Party, People's National Party, United Guiana Party, and the United Farmers' 
and Workers' Party) contested the elections (Bissessar and La Guerre 2013:69). The PPP 
won 18 of 24 seats (Bissessar and La Guerre 2013:70). Thus, labor was overtaken by 
middle class activists and was unable to remain relatively autonomous from party 
politics, particularly when racial politics heightened in subsequent years. 
Guyana benefited from the West Indian-wide constitutional reforms and 
expansion of the suffrage and achieved independence in 1966. However, local 
organizational developments shaped the political landscape in ways that inhibited rather 
than promoted the kind of state-building that was necessary for development. There was a 
sharp Indian-African divide within the labor movement and a coalition party, led by 
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middle class intellectuals and activists, with bases in each of these groups. The fissures 
within the PPP surfaced quite early in its organization and, together with foreign 
interference in the local political affairs, would ultimately lead to the construction of a 
weak state that squandered rather than sowed the nation's resource wealth.  
Race became a paramount issue in Guyanese politics and would grow to hinder 
the construction of a strong state. The PPP broke apart very soon after its inception for a 
variety of issues, many of which were grievances based on race. Jagan's development 
policies appeared to benefit the Indians more than the Africans. They favored agriculture 
over urban development; gave assistance to small and medium business (and therefore 
Indians); increased East Indian representation in the civil service; and educational 
reforms benefited the East Indian community (Despres 1967:232-52; Hintzen 1989:49-
50; Spinner 1984:74,80-81). These policies could be viewed as the concrete fulfillment of 
the ideological views of the communist party on development, but to Burnham and many 
in the Afro-Guyanese community, these policies benefited the Indians (Despres 
1967:253-5, 260-2). Burnham sought to usurp Jagan as the leader of the party, and, when 
he was unsuccessful and opted to leave the party, several Afro-Guyanese leaders also 
resigned, giving the appearance that race was a motivating factor for the split (Bolland 
2001:614). Burnham contested the 1957 election under this new party, the People's 
National Congress (PNC), with Afro-Guyanese workers as its base (Bolland 2001:625). 
Moreover, similar to what happened in Gabon, external interference in Guyanese 
politics only served to further frustrate the state-building process. The PPP was 
vehemently anti-colonialist and communist in ideology, which created great tension 
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between them and the British colonial officials. In T&T, the PNM government had the 
support of trade unions for independence but evaded union calls for radically altering the 
economic interests in the colony. However, the PPP in Guyana “declared open war upon 
the colonial economic-political alliance that dominated the territory” (Lewis 2004:285). 
Jagan's Marxism-Leninism, his contact with like-minded communists in the UK and 
eastern bloc countries, and his radical policies were enough to distress the colonial 
government and local elites (in particular, the Rice Farmer's Security of Tenure 
Ordinance which allowed the government to force the sale of private land, and the Labor 
Relations Bill which would effectively replace the MPCA with Jagan's GIWU as the 
sugar workers' representative) (Bolland 2001:616-617; Spinner 1984:83).  
In 1953, after just 133 days in office, the UK suspended the Guyanese 
constitution (Bolland 2001:614). British troops forcibly removed the PPP from 
government, the British forbade PPP members from holding meetings, limited their right 
to move freely about the country, imprisoned several of the party leaders, including the 
Jagans, and propped up an interim government for the next five years (Lange 2009:124-
125). In addition, the US government, as part of its war on communism after WWII, 
supported Burnham over the Marxist Jagan. Using several tactics, the US tried to get rid 
of Jagan, including attempts to get Britain to suspend the Guyanese constitution a second 
time (Rolison 1974:155-157); working to steer unions away from communism through 
organizations such as the Institute of Free Labor Development (Rolison 1974:161-162); 
and active CIA involvement in inciting strikes and providing food, funds, and medicine 
to sustain the rioting (Rabe 2005:93; Ince 1974). 
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In this context of infighting between PPP leaders, a labor movement that lacked 
political independence from parties and the state, and external political interference, the 
next election in 1957 began the ethnic mobilization and vicious conflict that would 
continue to characterize Guyanese politics in the post independence period. The British 
fomented the split between Jagan and Burnham by referring to the former as communist 
and the latter as moderate (Bolland 2001:625). Despite the fact that Jagan's PPP won the 
1957 election, the British refused to accept the results and held three subsequent elections 
in the hope that their preferred candidate, Burnham, would win. However, this only 
served to increase ethnic competition and violence. Between 1962 and 1964, government 
workers who were overwhelmingly African went on strike; they were supported by the 
PNC and explosives were found in the PNC headquarters (Lange 2009:127-129). In 
addition, the Labor Relations Bill became politicized as African workers perceived it as 
an attempt to be dominated by the predominately Indian PPP-backed Guiana Sugar 
Workers' Union.  
The resulting unrest became “a war between the races” (Bissessar and La Guerre 
2013:85). Indians and Africans alike engaged in rioting, ethnic-based murder, arson, 
beatings, and looting that spread across the country (Bissessar and La Guerre 2013:85-
86). After a year and a half of ethnic violence that claimed the lives of some 150 people, 
injured 800, and dislocated over 13,000, British troops finally intervened in 1964 to 
restore order and maintain peace for the upcoming elections (Rolison 1974:285). Jagan, 
having been cornered by both internal and external pressures and criticized for being an 
ineffective leader, relented to British/US and PNC pressure to introduce a system of 
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proportional representation, and the Burnham's PNC succeeded in ousting the PPP in the 
1964 elections (Bissessar and La Guerre 2013:86). 
As a result of the disorder and conflict within Guyana during the 1950s and 
1960s, institutional development followed a decidedly despotic course. There was 
electoral fraud, patronage, and repression, which impeded development in the country. 
First, given that racial distribution of the population and the fact that the Afro-Guyanese 
were in the minority, the PNC manipulated the electoral system to maintain power 
(Bolland 1997:300-304). Irregularities included dubious increases in the number of voters 
in PNC strongholds, voter padding of non-residents, and inconsistencies in voter counting 
(Bissessar and La Guerre 2013:88). Second, Burnham used state resources to maintain his 
base - the black middle and lower classes - and attract the most powerful Indian 
organizations away from Jagan (Premdas 1972; Hintzen 1989). Burnham also took 
control of hiring/firing procedures. Within the administrative institutions, he established 
that “any state employee could be dismissed at the pleasure of the Prime Minister without 
explanation and within the aggrieved party having recourse for redress” (Brotherson 
1988:64). According to Gafar (2003:9): “Under Burnham's rule, qualifications, merit and 
experience were sacrificed in determining public sector employment, and the basis, in 
most case was political party affiliation and race.” In addition, the establishment of the 
External Trade Bureau in 1970 served as an institution to dispense licenses to favored 
businessmen and PNC officials (Lange 2009:134). This rendered large proportions of the 
population dependent upon the PNC and the state.  
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Third, corruption was rampant and there were few checks and balances, which 
served to enrich PNC elite. Under Burnham’s 1974 “Party Paramountcy” policy, the PNC 
gained direct access to state revenue without having to account for the use of these funds 
(Lutchman 1979:22; Rose 2002:195). Tennassee (1986:22) lists several strategies and 
legislative changes that allowed Burnham and his cronies to fill their pockets with state 
monies. Finally, much institution-building energy and resources were expended to 
increase the military apparatus of the state. Burnham expanded the security forces from 
2,000 personnel in 1964 to 22,000 in 1977 (Danns 1978:16; Sallahuddin 1994:308-9) and 
the defense budget increased from 2% to over 14% in the same period (Danns 1978:18). 
Similar to Gabon where Bongo's security detail was comprised of members of his ethnic 
group, Burnham staffed the security forces of Guyana with Africans (about 90%), and 
made himself Minister of Defense. Murder, intimidation, and brutal attacks became 
common (Singh 1988:86-88). Like Gabon, political assassinations were used to stifle 
dissent, for example, of the prominent and outspoken Walter Rodney (Tennassee 
1986:309; Morrison 1998:130-170). 
Thus, these weak state institutions were incapable of directing development in 
Guyana. Burnham nationalized the key sectors of the economy, including bauxite and 
sugar industries, giving the state control over about 80% of the economy (Rose 
2002:355). However, production declined and the economy stagnated. Production of 
bauxite and aluminum fell by 40% annually between 1970 and 1980, and sugar 
production fell by about 10% over that period (Tennassee 1986:35). Economic 
mismanagement caused frequent electricity outages and breakdowns in the water supply, 
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lack of sewerage system maintenance increased rates of gastrointestinal diseases, poorly 
maintained seawalls, canals and drainage caused flooding, inflation soared, 
unemployment surged and food shortages increased malnutrition to an alarming 71% of 
children under five years old (Rabe 2005:165). Burnham also established diplomatic 
relations with Cuba and the Soviet Union and voted against US resolutions at the UN, to 
which the US retaliated by reducing its own loans and blocking loans from other 
international agencies to Guyana. The US also excluded Guyana from preferential trade 
agreements to which other Caribbean countries were privy (Rose 2002:356, 358). Thus, 
Guyana's external debt grew burdensome and foreign exchange reserves had been 
depleted by the late 1970s and IMF austerity measures did not help. In addition, citing 
human rights violations, economic instability and rigging of elections, the IMF barred 
Guyana from using its financial resources, forcing Guyana to borrow extensively from 
Caribbean neighbors, especially T&T and Barbados (Rose 2002:358-359).  
After Burnham's death in 1985, Desmond Hoyte, a leading member of the 
government inherited the Presidency. However, under increasing domestic pressure due 
to economic problems and international pressure, Hoyte called elections in 1992 and 
relinquished power to Jagan and the PPP. The repressive force of the state has since 
diminished and economic development has improved somewhat but the state still remains 
institutionally handicapped and incapable of using the resource wealth to achieve 
economic and social transformation. 
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Niger 
Niger is a case where the legacy of a very weak labor movement resulted in the 
construction of a very weak state and, accordingly, very low levels of economic and 
social development. As of January 2015, Niger, a former French colony, is ranked the 
world's fourth largest producer of uranium (World Nuclear Association 2015). Uranium 
production began in 1971 under the dual leadership of French-controlled Cie generale des 
matieres nucleaires (COGEMA) and the Société des Mines de l'Air (SOMAÏR) (the latter 
had 36.6% Nigerien participation through the Office National des Ressources Minières 
(ONAREM)) (Idrissa and Decalo 2012: 457). Later in 1974, a new company Compagnie 
Minière d'Akouta (with capital from COGEMA, ONAREM, Japanese and Spanish 
investors) also exploited the deposits in the country (Idrissa and Decalo 2012:458). 
During the 1975 to 1982 period, Niger experienced a boom in uranium prices and 
exports (IMF 2013:18). Uranium export earnings expanded from less than 19% of total 
export earnings in 1971 to about 88% in 1979 (Robinson 1991:10). The windfalls 
radically transformed Niger's economy from an agricultural base (primarily peanuts) to a 
mineral-exporting one. This boom lasted until the 1982 to 1990 period, during which 
world demand for uranium plunged and a drought caused losses in the production of 
export crops. The economy contracted and Niger underwent IMF structural adjustment 
(IMF 2013:19). Since the 1990s, Niger has been liberalizing the economy and 
improvements in weather conditions have boosted the agricultural sector. In 1999, a new 
democratic government was introduced but the country still battles high rates of poverty 
and only modest improvements in real GDP per capita (IMF 2007:26-27). 
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Similar to the Gabonese labor movement during the colonial period, organized 
labor in Niger was weak, was not indigenously-generated, workers made narrow rather 
than broad-based demands, and workers were not united across economic sectors and 
across ethnic groups. First, labor activity was weak in Niger and really only emerged in 
the postwar period. In 1948, about 14% of wage salary workforce or 1,100 people were 
trade union members (Martens 1981:18). This increased to 15% in 1952 (Martens 
1981:32,50), and then to 26% in 1956 (3500 people) and 21 unions (Martens 1981:48, 
51). By far, the most prominent labor leader was Djibo Bakary. Upon his dismissal from 
being a teacher in 1948, he started a commercial garden and numerous workers asked 
him to assist in organizing agricultural workers since he had a primary school certificate.  
In 1951, Bakary grouped workers into the Union des Syndicats Confédérés du 
Niger (USCN), which was affiliated with the CGT (Walraven 2013:63). The union 
platform allowed him to organized union cells across the country (Walraven 2013:64). 
He organized a series of successful strikes in the early 1950s, and in 1952, helped secure 
a 33% increase in salary for workers (Fuglestad 1973:316). He and other labor activists 
such as Adboulaye Mamani organized workers in Niamey in Niger's first massive strike 
in 1953 to improve wages (Walraven 2013:65). Bakary’s success in securing wage 
increases for the workers increased his supporters in Niamey and the inter-territorial 
organizations (Ibid). However, labor mobilization only emerged in this 1950s period, 
almost a full three decades after labor had started organizing in T&T. 
Also similar to Gabon, the unions in Niger were not autonomous from the 
metropole. The CGT, CFTC and CGT-FO established chapters in Niger, although, 
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admittedly, they were not very powerful (Martens 1981:13). A small group of CGT did 
exist in Niamey, the capital city of Niger, and Bakary’s USCN maintained an affilation 
with the CGT (Martens 1981:5). Therefore, following the same pattern as Gabon, 
decision-making was not local and unions were not independent. 
Another characteristic of labor in Niger that weakened its ability to stimulate 
institutional change is its entanglement with political parties. In Niger, three main parties 
emerged during the postwar period - the Parti Progressiste Nigérien/Rassemblement 
Démocratique Africain (PPN)/RDA, the Union Nigérienne des Indépendants et 
Sympathisants (UNIS) later renamed the Bloc Nigérien d'Action (BNA), and the Union 
Démocratique Nigérienne (UDN). The PPN was formed in 1946 by civil servants, 
particularly schoolteachers and led by Bakary’s cousin and great rival Hamani Diori. It 
was a branch of Houphouët-Boigny's RDA, an inter-territorial radical-nationalist party, 
that aimed to challenge the power of chiefs and the French colonial administration 
(Fuglestad 1973:314). This party appealed to the évolués (Fuglestad 1973:315). Much 
like the British tactics towards local agitators, the French administration transferred the 
most formidable of threats within the PPN to remote posts, and with chiefs barring any 
reform, the PPN/RDA failed to become a mass party (Fuglestad 1973:314).  
Second, Bakary started the UDN in 1954 when he broke from the PPN/RDA. 
Other UDN founders included a baker, bookkeeper, bartender, and veterinary nurse 
(Walraven 2013:68-69). When Côte d'Ivoire's Houphouët-Boigny led the charge to sever 
ties with the French Communist Party, Niger's leadership did not agree on whether to 
support the move. The PPN-RDA then split into two factions: the PPN/RDA that aligned 
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themselves with Houphouët-Boigny, and the UDN, led by Bakary, which remained 
affiliated with the French Communist Party (Idrissa and Decalo 2012:84-85). The UDN’s 
base was urban wage-earners (Fuglestad 1973:315-316). Bakary and the UDN worked to 
organize the masses, reduce taxation, protect groundnut farmers, increase wages and the 
standard of living in general, in addition to criticizing the emergence of petty-bourgeois 
parliamentarians. The UDN rapidly built support in both urban areas and among the 
peasantry (Walraven 2013:70-71). The third political party - the BNA - was formed in 
1948 and tried to court rural and traditional members, but had an ill-defined agenda and 
little membership (Fuglestad 1973:315, 317). 
Niger's unions tended to align themselves with political parties as their leaders 
criss-crossed both organizations. Bakary pursued careers both in political parties (e.g. the 
Parti Communiste Français-Rassemblement Démocratique Africain (PCF-RDA)) and 
labor unions (e.g. the CGT) (Martens 1981:22, 33). Bakary became the secretary-general 
for the CGT coordination committee in 1951 and two years later, at the same time he 
organized Niger's first strike and was elected to the communist World Federation of 
Trade Unions (Walraven 2013:65-66). Also, to contest the 1952 elections to the 
Territorial Assembly, Bakary and a group of activists formed a political group called 
“Entente Nigérienne.” Members included Abdoulaye Mamani (an employee at a trading 
firm and active unionist) in addition to clerks, veterinary assistants, telephone and cinema 
operators, and post office workers (Walraven 2103:63-64).  
In the 1956 elections, Djibo and the BNA merged to form the local section of the 
Mouvement Socialiste Africain (MSA - an autonomous inter territorial political party that 
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attempted to forge unity in the disintegrating AOF region) and won the mayorship of 
Niamey (Fuglestad 1973:317-318; Martens 1981:60). In the 1957 elections to Niger's 
first autonomous Territorial Assembly, the MSA won the majority, largely with the 
strong support of the Hausa farmers for whom Bakary had fought in his union activities, 
and Bakary became Niger's first Deputy Prime minister (Fuglestad 1973:318-319). Union 
organization provided the support base for the governing party so party-union leaders 
entered government and there was a blurring of the party-union organizational boundaries 
(Martens 1981:61). 
As in Gabon and Guyana, Niger’s organized labor, however weak, was further 
cripple by external interference in local politics. The French government wanted a 
French-friendly government in Niger because the country had uranium and because it 
bordered Algeria (Cooper 2014:322). However, Bakary was one of the few, if not the 
only, African political leaders who was unwavering in his support for total independence 
from France rather than becoming a member of the “French Community” (Crowder 
1978:303-304). French administrators saw him as a “fanatic, skillful and dangerous 
agitator” that should be silenced (quoted in Walraven 2013:67). Consequently, the French 
interfered with Niger’s first elections by manipulating electoral lists, increasing the 
visible military presence in the colony, instigating disagreements between Bakary and 
chiefs, supporting the rival RDA's efforts, and encouraging fraudulent vote counting 
(Cooper 2014:322-323).  
Bakary was already on shaky ground with the coalition of his own radical, urban 
worker-based party and the conservative group of traditionalists (Martens 1981:62). He 
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favored independence and federalism, traveling to Mali and Benin to involve himself in 
political developments there, which put him at odds with several BNA leaders, some of 
whom were close to the chiefs (Fuglestad 1973:320). In addition, the peasantry feared 
that French withdrawal would leave their territory vulnerable to attack from the Tuareg, 
which had happened before, and that the price of groundnuts on which they depended 
would fall (Fuglestad 1973:328). Bakary ultimately lost the referendum for independence 
and wrote that he would respect this result, but the French administration forced him to 
resign within two weeks (Crowder 1978:304, 322-323). 
Consequently, the state institutions that were built in Niger lacked the 
bureaucratic capacity, mechanisms of corruption control, and inclusiveness that were 
required for achieving economic and social development. Between 1958 and 1974, a 
powerful oligarchy ruled the country and built institutions that would ensure its hold on 
power. Similar to Gabon, by 1963, the PPN managed to create a one-party state by 
eliminating its opponents (Robinson 1991:6). Administrative machinery of the state still 
relied heavily on French citizens. Over 90 French citizens had senior administrative 
positions, making Niger one of the governments in francophone Africa with the least 
Africans, which the educated youth viewed with resentment (Higgott and Fuglestad 
1975:388). 
The lack of state capacity was evident in its inability to deal with the economy. In 
the early 1970s, the country suffered from economic and social misery as there was a 
drought that lasted from 1970 to 1973, rampant corruption, high oil prices, and the crises 
meant that government tax revenue was lower. The one attempt to increase the benefits of 
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the uranium wealth for the country ended poorly. As with decolonization in Gabon, 
France also signed a series of defense and raw material agreements with Niger during 
decolonization that would ensure its privileged access to uranium and prohibit exports to 
countries that conflicted with French national security interests in exchange for providing 
military support against both internal and external threats, development aid, and 
guaranteed product markets to the African leaders (Hecht 2012:109).  
France had an agreement with the Nigerien government to reserve exclusive 
uranium access to France, which used the mineral to produce nuclear energy as its main 
source of electrical power. Niger's government received royalties but had little 
understanding of and control over the uranium pricing. Without a strong state at the time 
of this agreement, the exclusivity of Niger's uranium exploitation meant that the country 
did not extract as much benefit as was possible from this key activity. Driori's entered 
into negotiations with France and tried to pressure the French to modify the agreement. 
However, Driori's regime was toppled by a military coup led by Seyni Kountché just days 
before the last stage of the uranium negotiations (despite the fact that a French squad 
stationed in Niamey was meant to protect him, unlike in Gabon where the French military 
intervened) (Idrissa and Decalo 2012: 458; Robinson 1991:9). 
This state weakness persisted under the new regime. Kountché's economic plan - 
Discours-programme - of 1974 pledged to invest in rural development, education, health 
and improved pay for civil servants, which involved building roads, drilling wells, 
constructing clinics and affordable housing, increase electricity and training opportunities 
for state workers. However, these projects only served to distribute state monies to state 
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functionaries, rural elites, salaried workers, companies who secured government 
contracts, and did not significantly alter the quality for life for the masses (Robinson 
2001:10). 
Corruption was rife within the state institutions in Niger. For example, having 
long been aware of the economic problems of mono-cropping, the government 
established four para-statals to create new markets targeting meat and livestock, hides, 
and dairy production. However, according to Robinson (2001:7), “These agencies had 
only a marginal impact ... [instead] they served the state... as political patronage 
bureaucracies, providing jobs, services, and contracts for the party's clients in the 
countryside.” In addition, the state lacked mechanisms of accountability to the citizens. 
For example, there are reports of over 40 vehicles supplied by international agencies 
being used as taxis for hire; thousands of tons of grain from relief aid were being stored 
in a warehouse waiting for prices to rise; and the President's wife, who amassed a 
significant fortune embodied in her luxury homes in the capital (Higgott and Fuglestad 
1975:390). 
The state also lacked inclusivity. Since independence, voices of opposition were 
not tolerated and no free and fair elections were held (Higgott and Fuglestad 1975:386). 
The already weak trade union movement was further debilitated as Bakary was exiled. 
The few liberal reform-minded party members were removed. For example, René 
Delanne, leader of the trade union movement, was dismissed in 1971 for not supporting 
the government when pay increases were demanded (Higgott and Fuglestad 1975:387). In 
the early 1970s, the state faced increased public discontent with the economic situation 
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and criticism of the suppression of strikes and imprisonment without trial, and the 
government responded by further cracking down on public demonstrations (Higgott and 
Fuglestad 1975:392). In 1980, the new government launched an initiative to establish 
new relations between the state and society claiming it would build consensus with civil 
society (Robinson 1991:11-12). However promising, within a decade, the regime reverted 
to electoral practices of the Diori type (Robinson 1991:15). 
This weakness of labor and the control of institution-building by the political elite 
is a colonial legacy that shaped the development trajectory of Niger. Unfortunately, it has 
resulted in the failure of citizens to benefit from the nation's uranium wealth.  
 
Zambia 
During the colonial period, Northern Rhodesia, as Zambia was called at that time, 
developed into a dual economy, where the enclave mining sector existed alongside an 
agrarian economy (Butler 2007:2). Since copper-mining began the late 1920s with 16,000 
workers (Cooper 1996:45), the ore has been the backbone of the Northern Rhodesian 
economy. By the end of WWII, two private foreign companies - Anglo American 
Corporation (AAC) of South Africa and the Rhodesian (later Roan) Selection Trust (US 
company) - dominated the sector and Zambia became one of the five largest producers in 
the world, accounting for 10% of world production in the 1930s and 1940s (Adam et al. 
2014:204). Copper-mining significantly transformed social life in Northern Rhodesia. 
Similar to the natural resources in other former colonies discussed in this 
dissertation, Northern Rhodesia held resources of vital importance to imperial interests - 
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copper. According to Cooper (1996:336), the Copperbelt, “with strong copper prices after 
the war [was] perhaps the most valuable and vulnerable industrial site.” Linked to the 
expansion of electrical, motor, and more strategically, defense industries, the Copperbelt 
became “more vital to the metropolitan industry than perhaps any other part of Tropical 
Africa” (Butler 2007:4). Therefore, when workers began mobilizing in this sector, at a 
time when copper prices were soaring, the colonial state responded with repression and 
some limited reforms. However, the movement was not as consolidated as it was in T&T, 
and the relationship between organized labor and political parties in the decolonization 
and post-independence (1964) period was at times cooperative and at other times 
contentious. Therefore, state-building in this context produced some gains for the 
working class, but overall, impeded the radical reforms needed for greater economic and 
social transformation. 
During the colonial period, workers in Northern Rhodesia, particularly in the 
Copperbelt, were very active. In 1935 and 1940, Northern Rhodesian miners went on 
strike for higher wages. There were no unions yet, but strikes were nevertheless well-
organized and spread along the Copperbelt through personal networks, dance societies, 
religious organizations, and later mass meetings (Henderson 1975; Parpart 1983; Perrings 
1979). At various other points in the 1940s, sawmill workers and railwaymen also 
participated in striking (Meebelo 1986). When unionization was legalized in the country, 
the unions that emerged had large memberships, were well organized, and had a militant 
rank-and file.  
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The African Mineworkers Union (AMWU), which was created in 1948, 
dominated government labor policy throughout the 1950s. By 1960, the AMU had over 
5000 members, and the total unionized labor force increased from about 50,000 in 1961 
to 102,000 in 1964, which represented nearly half of the total wage labor force (LeBas 
2011:83). Furthermore, between 1960 and 1964, a variety of other unions emerged, 
including two national public sector unions (LeBas 2011:83). Strikes were violent and 
lasted for long periods of time. For example, the AMWU, frustrated with not being able 
to attain higher-ranking jobs with better pay, organized a massive strike in 1952, which 
lasted three weeks (Cooper 1996:341). In 1955, AMWU went on strike again for a 
general wage increase; this time for nine weeks, followed by a series of strikes in 1956 
(Cooper 1996:344-345). These strikes followed the tradition of the 1930s and 1940s 
strikes and were replete with violence, looting, and destruction (Meebelo 1986). Labor 
organization and activity was a common feature of the political landscape in Northern 
Rhodesia. 
While there is evidence of cross-sectional linkages between unions and attempts 
to unite beyond ethnic divisions, some gaps in the unity of the labor movement were 
evident. Both AWMU members and non-members participated in strikes. For example, 
the AMWU called a strike in 1955 to protest the large wage gap between African and 
European workers. 95-96% of African workers observed the strike, and only 630 of the 
20,000 non-unionized workers reported for work (Meebelo 1986:289). In addition, a 
number of scholars note that trade unions attempted to transcend ethnic identity (Epstein 
1958; Gertzel 1979:316; Ferguson 1994). However, race was a core component in the 
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labor situation as there were unionized white workers and unionized black workers. 
Northern Rhodesia's color bar denied access to certain jobs by non-white workers, and 
the white union - European Mineworkers Union (EMU) - vigorously opposed allowing 
Africans to get positions formerly reserved for whites (Cooper 1996:220, 338). The EMU 
was politically powerful in Northern Rhodesia and often succeeded in blocking 
legislation that would improve the lot for African workers (Cooper 1996). 
The colonial government, like it did elsewhere, used considerable force against 
the Northern Rhodesians and shot many of them who were involved in strikes and 
protests. In the 1940 strike, 15,000 strikers walked out and as many as 17 miners were 
shot by police (Cooper 1996:66, 130). However, in terms of reform, the responses of the 
colonial capital and state were inconsistent. First, worker gains were mixed. After the 
1952 AMWU strike, African miners achieved substantial concessions in this arbitration: 
the starting rate being raised from 45 shillings per ticket to 80 (Cooper 1996:341). In fact, 
between 1950 and 1954, African mineworkers achieved more than a doubling of their 
total wage bill, even though the workforce increased by less than 7% (LeBas 2011:82). 
Average wages in the mines increased by 116% between 1949 and 1955, while at the 
same time, price increases went up by 28% (Cooper 1996:346, 461). Northern Rhodesian 
miners earned significantly higher than their counterparts in the Belgian Congo and South 
Africa, and were increasingly moved into semi-skilled and skilled positions. However, 
despite these gains, there was still a considerable wage gap between Europeans and 
African miners (Cooper 1996:346, 461). This dual wage structure remained a legacy of 
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colonial rule into the postcolonial period and was not abolished until 1969 (Cooper 
1996:348).  
Institutional reform was also mixed. Some bureaucratization did occur, but the 
pace of institutional change was very slow and strongly resisted by entrenched colonial 
interests. According to Cooper (1996:54), the Labor Government of 1929-31 had little 
impact on Northern Rhodesia: “Even the most obvious reformist gestures - recognizing 
trade unions, preventing racial discrimination - remained unmade except in the most 
formalistic way, and no real challenge to the settlers of Kenya or the Rhodesias came 
from London.” Prior to the labor unrest, the colonial government relied on tribal leaders 
as the main instrument of local governance and communication between workers and 
management (Cooper 1996:130). However, according to Burawoy, the strikes made clear 
that these leaders were “ineffective for industrial conciliation and reliable for social 
control” (Burawoy 1982:146). Despite their acknowledged ineffectiveness, colonial 
officials recommended strengthening this system (Cooper 1996:130). It was not until 
1953, when miners voted for the abolition of the system of tribal elders, that those leaders 
lost their grip on power. 
Similarly, in a 1937 report by Major Orde Browne, he stated that the colony 
lacked the staff and administrative machinery to understand the needs and experiences of 
workers (Cooper 1996:59). He nevertheless favored conservative solutions such as better 
identity documents, the use of penal sanctions to punish workers who “deserted” their 
jobs even though civil suits were allowed in such situations in the western countries, and 
withholding of wages (Cooper 1996:60). Colonial officials in Northern Rhodesia 
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vigorously opposed the creation of a separate labor department (Cooper 1996:61) and, up 
to as late as 1958, supported the continued use of penal sanctions (Cooper 1996:367-8). 
There was a very inconsistent relationship between political parties and unions 
prior to independence. In the lead up to independence, two political parties emerged in 
Zambia: (1) the African National Congress (ANC), which was created in 1948, and drew 
its support mainly from the South of Zambia and led by Harry Nkumbula since 1951; and 
(2) a radical offshoot of the ANC called the United National Independence Party (UNIP) 
led by Kenneth Kaunda in 1959, which drew support from people in the Northern 
regions, urban voters, and mineworkers in the Copperbelt (Larmer 2011:25-28; Rakner 
2003:51).  
Political leaders recognized the importance of the Zambia's unions and sought to 
enlist them, particularly the AMWU, into the nationalist struggle. They used several 
strategies such as forming new rival trade unions (despite their limited industrial 
experience) in an attempt to draw members away from existing unions, and pressuring 
mining companies to recognize it as a bargaining agent for workers (Larmer 2011:234). 
UNIP has some success. It undoubtedly drew members away from poorly organized, 
weaker unions (Larmer 2011:234). In addition, the mineworkers joined UNIP in 
thousands as UNIP promised to transform working conditions (Larmer 2011:233, 322). 
The political parties also created sufficient divisions within the union leadership over 
union strategy. In 1953, some AMWU branch officials organized a local strike in support 
of nationalist leaders, and by 1956, 20 of AMWU's 59 branch officials held ANC 
positions (Larmer 2005:321).  
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However, unions were not totally co-opted into party politics. The AMWU had 
superior organizational strength and these tactics neither fully fragmented the very 
powerful union nor succeeded in getting the companies to recognize the new UNIP-
sponsored mining union (LeBas 2011:83; Larmer 2011:234). In addition, the unions did 
not always organizationally support nationalist party initiatives (Larmer 2011:233; 
Larmer 2005:322). AMWU leader Lawrence Katilungu repeatedly refused to use strike 
action as a tool to strengthen the nationalist parties in their struggles for independence 
(Bates 1971:6; Larmer 2005:321: Le Bas 2011:83; Meebelo 1986:419). His successor in 
1960, John Chisata, continued this legacy of resisting incorporation of the AMWU into 
party machinery despite being a UNIP supporter (Larmer 2005:322). As one AMWU 
branch official put it: 
“….those in politics have their responsibility to the nation, but we in the trade union 
movement have our responsibility to the cause of the workers. Surrendering our 
responsibility because of political misdirection means sacrificing that cause to the hungry 
capitalists” (quoted in Gertzel 1979:320).  
 
In 1964, a month before Zambia's independence, AMWU changed its name to Zambia 
Mineworkers' Union (ZMU) and reinforced its pledge to promote Zambianisation 
(replacing expats with Zambians), end racial discrimination and coercive labor practices, 
particularly unequal pay between blacks and whites, and dramatically improve social 
conditions for workers. 
Thus, at independence, the Northern Rhodesian state faced a powerful labor 
movement with a strong record of wining wage increases and concessions for its 
members. Similar to T&T and Guyana, workers engaged in a wave of persistent striking 
	  	  
186 
in the immediate post-independence (1964-1969) period. The unrest involved workers in 
mining, railway, local councils, and schools and hundreds of work stoppages lasting 
anywhere from hours to days (LeBas 2011:84; Larmer 2005). In Zambia, the ruling party 
attempted to weaken the unions by co-optation and state control, but was only partially 
successful. As a result, this mixed legacy contributed to some gains for the working class, 
but, overall, presented an obstacle to the construction of a strong state and long-run 
development. 
The legacy of organized labor swinging back and forth between autonomy from 
and direct incorporation into ruling party structures persisted into the post-colonial 
period. In the period of decolonization, UNIP, with eyes on occupying the independent 
state warned that “Unless immediate remedial steps are taken . . . the Copperbelt can be 
expected to be a hot bed of trouble as far as strikes occurring with disturbing frequency,” 
and that “Interference in a country's affairs can mainly be found in the trade union 
movement, and this must be stamped out at all costs . . .” (Quoted in Larmer 2005:323). 
Consequently, in 1964, the government sought to centralize unions and establish direct 
state control over the worker organizations by establishing the voluntary Zambia 
Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) (LeBas 2011:85). The ZCTU had substantial powers 
to create and dissolve member unions, change their rules, and approve or reject strikes 
and industrial action. The Ministry of Labor had significant powers over it, including the 
right to appoint its first officials, and the power to approve or reject changes to its rules 
(Larmer 2005:325-326).  
While initially resisting the ZCTU, the ZMU joined in 1966, resulting in their 
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official loss of autonomy. ZCTU leadership used the union to promote voting for UNIP, 
called for “discipline and productivity,” and even pressured the ZMU to accept pay 
agreements far below worker demands (to which some workers responding by organizing 
unofficial strikes) (Larmer 2005:327, 330). Government further intensified efforts to 
control labor in the 1971 Industrial Relations Act, which now required unions to affiliate 
with the ZCTU, largely outlawed all strikes, and established a strike permission process 
so cumbersome that it made striking nearly impossible (LeBas 2011:85). The government 
also created “work councils” and “party committees” as a way to shape organized labor 
into implementers of government policy (Bates 1971). Union leaders were co-opted by 
strategic promotions and government appointments. The strategies, while somewhat 
successful, only increased the resolve of already militant rank-and-file, whose 
dissatisfaction with their union leaders was a prominent feature of labor in Zambia during 
the 1970s and 1980s. Faced with ongoing labor disturbances in industry and infighting 
between party leaders, Kaunda in 1972 announced the introduction of a one-party state, 
which lasted until 1991 (Rakner 2003:51-52). 
This mixed legacy affected the development of Zambia. During the first ten years 
of independence, the Zambian economy grew fairly well at 2.3% annually in terms of real 
GDP (Rakner 2003:53). In 1965-1975 period, copper accounted for 45% of government 
revenues and 95% of export earnings (Adam et al. 2014:13). However revenues were 
used to finance consumption subsidies and inefficient state-owned enterprises. They were 
also used as collateral for international borrowing, which was, in turn, used to finance 
recurrent consumption and production inefficiencies. As a result, Zambia's copper was 
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not used to assimilate assets, but rather to accumulate debt (Adam et al.19). Between 
1968 and 1971, as part of the Mulungushi reforms, the state nationalized (by purchase) a 
significant portion of the Zambian economy. The state acquired controlling shares in 26 
major companies and a 51% controlling share of the two major mining companies 
(Rakner 2003:45). However, international copper prices plummeted in 1974 and low 
prices persisted through the 1980s and 1990s.  
 
Summary 
 This dissertation's comparative-historical analysis component investigates the 
potential mechanisms underlying what factors and processes produced strong state 
institutions in some oil- and mineral-rich countries and weak states in others. The 
analysis of T&T and Gabon showed that local labor movements, not just European 
colonial agents, played an important role in the construction of state institutions. In T&T, 
a militant, multi-racial, multi-sectoral, politically independent labor movement forced the 
state to adopt a more active “developmental” approach to the economy and to expand the 
bureaucratic capacity to be able to effectively implement broad-based development 
policies. In Gabon, organized labor was relatively weaker, it was not unified across 
ethnicities and sectors, and it lacked political autonomy from the one-party state. As a 
result, state-building remained squarely under the control of the political and economic 
elite, which produced weaker state institutions that were unable to transform the oil 
wealth into broad-based national development. The abbreviated case studies in this 
chapter test the generalizability of the argument that labor movements impact national 
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development. The findings largely reinforce the main proposition from the previous 
chapters and show consistency across the statistical analysis and the in-depth case 
studies. 
Guyana, Niger, and Zambia had varying labor movement strengths in the colonial 
period and all developed varying state strengths and development records as a result. 
Guyana had the longest history of labor militancy and labor organization. However, the 
unity of the movement was marred by racial/sectoral conflicts and, during decolonization, 
the rise of middle class radicals who captured the labor movement further weakened the 
ability of the movement to challenge the state and to make claims that would benefit the 
population as a whole rather than a particular ethnic group. Thus, a weak state was 
constructed and the post-colonial period was characterized by a racial and violent 
political atmosphere and the inability of the state to promote broad-based economic and 
social development. Organized labor in Niger was very weak during the colonial period, 
and mirroring developments in Gabon, very early in the post-independence era, labor was 
subsumed under the one-party state. The lack of a strong countervailing force to the 
power of elites in the state-building process resulted in the building up of a very weak 
state that was unable to use the uranium wealth to generate national development. Zambia 
lies somewhere in between. Zambia had a relatively strong militant labor movement 
during the colonial period that was able to achieve significant reforms and improve their 
standard of living. However, the movement was impeded by racial/ethnic disunity and the 
emergence of an ambivalent relationship during decolonization between organized labor 
and the ruling party. As a result, Zambia has achieved a somewhat mixed record where 
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the state is, at times aloof from the economic and social conditions of the population, and 
at others, held very much accountable for the state of development in the country. 
Overall, these findings of the abbreviated case studies further support the claim 
that legacies of colonial labor shape post-colonial development trajectories by enhancing 
state strength to manage the resource wealth and the economy. These additional cases 
also provide evidence that the institutional changes during decolonization were critical to 
setting former colonies on very different developmental paths. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSION 
Review 
This dissertation began with the question: What accounts for the variation in 
economic and social development trajectories among oil- and mineral-dependent 
countries in the Global South? To answer this question, I employ a three-tiered research 
design that combines quantitative and qualitative methods. The statistical analysis 
provides powerful evidence that the strength of state institutions is a critical determinant 
of development, and the results of the comparative-historical and abbreviated case study 
analyses are not only consistent and complementary, but also traces the origins of strong 
and weak states to variations in the strength of organized labor during colonialism and its 
legacies in the postcolonial period. 
To begin the analysis, I test the explanatory power of institutional perspectives 
against other prominent development theories using cross-national time-series regression 
analyses and a sample of 26 oil- and mineral-dependent countries. I discover that strong 
state institutions - that is, bureaucracies that are somewhat autonomous from political 
pressure, have mechanisms for recruitment and training, and govern smoothly despite 
changes in government, with strong and impartial legal systems and popular observance 
of the law, and with limited patronage, nepotism and bribery - is positively, significantly, 
and consistently associated with per capita GDP and life expectancy, and significantly 
and negatively associated with infant mortality rates. In other words, stronger states in 
oil- and mineral-dependent developing countries tend to have higher levels of both 
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economic and social development. The results also show consistent evidence that 
dependence on FDI and foreign debt has a significant and negative impact on economic 
and social development in these countries. Therefore, while the importance of strong 
states has been confirmed, the importance of foreign capital dependence and debt 
overhang cannot be dismissed if we are to have a holistic view of the factors affecting 
development in these countries. In contrast, there is little statistical support for claims that 
parliamentary or presidential systems, state intervention policies, natural resource exports 
to high-income countries, or IMF pressure decisively impact development in these 
countries.  
Following the statistical analysis, the in-depth comparative-historical analysis of 
oil-dependent T&T and Gabon and the abbreviated case studies of three mineral-
dependent countries provide insight into the causal mechanisms that led to the emergence 
of strong states in some countries and weak states in others. These case studies provide 
evidence that in countries with strong labor movements - multi-racial/ethnic, multi-
sectoral, politically independent labor movements - the colonial state was forced to 
undertake reforms to improve the strength of state institutions to better manage resource 
revenues, which, in turn, had positive consequences for resource-driven development. 
Conversely, in countries with weak labor movements, institution-building was left to 
colonial administrators and local political elites who were more likely to set up 
extractive, predatory institutions, which persisted into the postcolonial period and led to 
mismanagement of resource revenues, and ultimately, underdevelopment. I find that the 
strength of labor movements caused three differences in state-building. 
	  	  
193 
First, the strength of labor movements creates states with different bureaucratic 
capacities, which affected the extent to which they could provide developmental goods to 
the population. Strong organized labor movements forced states to develop new agencies 
and new machinery to mediate between capital and labor, to develop meritocratic rather 
than racial hiring in industry and within the state, to expand the productive sectors of the 
economy, and to provide social welfare to the population. In contrast, in countries with 
weak labor movements, there was no formidable social group that could articulate 
demands and organize for a state that would construct structures to effectively improve 
working and living conditions for subordinate classes. In this situation where organized 
labor was relatively weaker, there resulted the institutionalization of systems of 
predation, rampant corruption, disregard for formal law, and states that were not built for 
and therefore incapable of providing developmental goods such as health care, education, 
and social safety nets for the masses.  
Second, this dissertation provides evidence that labor movements helped shape 
institutions of transparency and accountability of the state. I find that strong labor 
movements demanded, in no uncertain terms, that states ensure that the natural resource 
wealth of the nation benefit the population at large and not the few foreign corporations 
or local elites who already benefit from a historical position that enabled them to reap 
disproportionate wealth and rewards. This institutionalized structures, agencies, and state 
bodies whose mandate involved disseminating how resource revenues were utilized with 
the public and monitor state officials. The construction of these transparency and 
accountability mechanisms did not occur in countries with weak labor movements. 
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Instead, structures were built that protected state officials from having to face public 
scrutiny, such as one-party systems, the absorption of labor unions into party and state 
machinery, and state control of media outlets. 
Third, institutions allowing citizens to participate in policy formulation and 
implementation enhances information exchange and collaborative relations between state 
and societal actors. I find that in countries with strong labor movements, states gained 
critical information about the needs of workers and local communities, which helped 
states to effectively provide the necessary developmental goods. These countries also 
benefited from relatively high levels of participation between states and societal actors in 
the drafting and execution of development policy. In contrast, in countries with weak 
labor movements, the state lacked a similar “embeddedness” in the society. 
Consequently, states were less aware of the special needs of the population and, 
therefore, less capable of meeting them.  
The abbreviated case studies had the extra advantage of illustrating that not only 
does the strength of labor movements lie on more of a continuum than a dichotomy, but 
also the varied peculiarities of labor movements and the many contingencies involved in 
institution-building. Consistent with the findings on strong and weak labor movements, I 
find evidence that the more formidable the labor movement, the higher the levels of 
bureaucratization, the more mechanisms of transparency and accountability, and the 
greater the inclusiveness of state institutions. However, the analysis also shows that the 
strength of labor movements were often inhibited by a range of conflicts - racial/ethnic, 
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rural-urban, union-political party, in addition to, albeit not always as Zambia has shown, 
external support for state-sanctioned repression.  
In sum, this dissertation show that strong state institutions are positively 
correlated with economic and social development, and that the origins of state strength 
depends upon a legacy of the strength of labor movements from the colonial to post-
colonial period. I therefore conclude that the colonial legacies of local labor movements 
are an important cause of uneven development among oil- and mineral-dependent 
developing countries. Thus, contrary to some scholars who focus more attention on the 
colonial state officials and settlers, my findings show that the agency of the colonized, 
particularly of organized labor, actively shaped state institutions, the legacies of which 
had ramifications for resource-driven development in the postcolonial period. 
 
Limitations 
While this study presents a number of methodological strengths and theoretical 
innovations, it also has some limitations. For the quantitative component, the main 
limitation is one that plagues many cross-national studies of Third World development - 
the small sample size. This study's focus on oil- and mineral-dependent, sovereign, 
developing countries limits the sample to 49 countries, and data availability further 
reduces the number of countries and observations in the study. Consequently, the models 
are unable to include all the controls that could be drawn from the development literature. 
Still, the REMs help by taking into account all those unmeasured factors.  
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In addition, the 1985-2010 period in this study covers the era of neoliberalism. 
While, this study shows that institutional quality, FDI, and debt dependence are key 
determinants of the diverse economic and social development outcomes during this 
period, it is possible that other factors may have played important roles in the pre-1985 
period (perhaps even other than organized labor, which was discovered in the qualitative 
component of the research).  
Another limitation is that, by design, this dissertation examines only the variation 
in economic and social development. Per capita income is essential in assessing the 
average living standards in resource-dependent nations in the Third World, but a great 
deal of work remains to be done to better understand the gap between rich and poor 
within these nations.  
For the qualitative component, I have found that the colonial legacies of local 
labor movements upon state strength are a key component of post-colonial development 
trajectories that have not yet been considered in existing studies of the legacies of 
colonialism. The major limitation of this component is that this study does not directly 
test, through statistical analysis, the impact of colonial labor upon state strength or post-
colonial development. However, future research could address this limitation. 
Another aspect of the research design that may hinder applicability of the 
argument is that, for methodological reasons, the case studies focus on only British and 
French colonies. By selecting T&T and Gabon, the abbreviated case studies selected here 
also remain confined to former British and French colonies in order to avoid introducing 
other confounding factors. However, future studies could expand the research of 
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development in oil- and mineral-dependent countries to examine colonial labor and state 
institutions in other contexts, such as in former Spanish colonies and so on. For example, 
there is evidence that organized labor played a similar developmental role in Venezuela 
(Bergquist 1986).  
Implications and Future Research 
Having said that organized labor was a decisive factor in state-building and that 
their legacies upon development in resource-dependent countries must be taken seriously 
in the development literature, I do not claim that organized labor was the only factor 
affected development paths in oil- and mineral-exporting developing countries.  
Labor played a very limited role in the institutional development of Botswana; 
instead, the propertied class (chiefs and cattle-owners) is credited with creating 
development-promoting state institutions (Acemoglu et al. 2003). Likewise, Rosser 
(2007) has argued that Indonesia's economic success and the successful management of 
oil revenue is largely due to the triumph of capital over communist social forces. In T&T, 
the working class was the main force pressing for institutional reform, but Delacroix 
(1980) and Okruhlik (1999) have highlighted that group identity in some oil-rich 
countries are principally defined in terms of family, tribe, ethnicity, and religion. These 
forms of organizing may or may not have similar institutional impacts as class-based 
identities, mobilization, and conflict. Furthermore, in many resource-rich countries, 
particularly in the Middle East, the vast majority of private-sector workers are foreign 
migrants (Halliday 1977). Given that labor and trade union legislation cover only 
citizens, worker unionization and mobilization in these countries are severely 
	  	  
198 
constrained. As such, country-specific colonial regimes, social structures, and labor 
relations must be investigated in order to make claims about the specific role of labor in 
institution-building and development outcomes in different contexts. 
I also do not claim that the institutional capacities of strong states can never be 
eroded or that those of weak states cannot be strengthened. In fact, the dissertation clearly 
discusses the conditions under which institutional change occurred and did not occur. 
This project shows that organized labor was historically important for altering the path of 
institutional development in resource-rich countries. However, other research shows that 
profound transformations in the global economy since the 1980s and 1990s have 
significantly weakened the power of labor unions in countries across the globe. Despite 
extensive research in this field, little attention has been paid to the impacts of 
globalization on workers in extractive sectors in particular. It is not clear that these 
workers have suffered the same fate, especially since these sectors continue to be of 
strategic importance to the states that depend upon them. Therefore, more research is 
needed to understand to what extent labor is able to promote development in this new 
global economic context.  
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